Szociológiai Szemle by unknown
SG155
REVIEW OF SOCIOLOGY
Board of Editors Editors
László Cseh-Szombathy Dénes Némedi
(Chairman) (Editor in chief)
Rudolf Andorka
Róbert Angelusz László Gábor
László Bertalan Imre Kovách
György Csepeli György Lengyel
Zsuzsa Ferge József Mészáros
András Hegedűs
Tibor Huszár Éva Heleszta
Viktor Karády (Editorial secretary)
István Kemény
Tamás Kolosi This issue was edited by
Teréz Laky 
Ágnes Losonczi
Vera Gáthy
Mária Márkus Style editor: Elayne Antalffy
Iván Szelényi
László Vaskovics
Editorai Office:
Benczúr u. 33.
H-1068 Budapest 
Telephone: 36-1-321-4830 
Fax: 36-1-322-1843 
e-mail: mszt@mailhost.mtapti.hu
Review of Sociology
of the
Hungarian Sociological Association
Special Issue
1996
Contents
Poverty in Hungary in 1992-1995 3
Rudolf Andor ka, Zsolt Spéder
The Network Approach: A N ew  Paradigm? 29
Róbert Tardos
Privatisation and the Laughing Third 37
Gabriella Fogarassy, Zoltán Szántó
The Selection o f  Bank Managers in Hungary 
in the 80s and 90s 46
Eva Várhegyi
Tax Behaviour o f  Small and Medium-size Enterprises 67
István János Tóth, András Semjén
Changes in the Structure o f  Denominations 
in East and Central Europe 88
Miklós Tomka
Local Revolution 104
Árpád Tyekvicska
Rudolf Andorka-Zsolt Spéder
POVERTY IN  HUNGARY IN 1992-1995
Poverty was taboo in Hungary right until 1981, when the conference of the 
Hungarian Sociological Association on multiple disadvantageous position was held. 
More exactly: journals did not publish papers, and publishers did not bring out 
books which mentioned the occurrence of poverty in the Hungary of those days. 
The media made even fewer references to poverty. Today the situation is almost the 
reverse: the media constantly deal with impoverishment and poverty, with its 
causes, manifestations and consequences. However, we are of the view that data 
related to poverty are known in a circle which is smaller than it should be, and 
social scientists have not yet discussed the problematique of poverty in the required 
detail and depth.
For this reason the present paper attempts to publish and analyse the most 
important data available from one of the fundamental sources of sociological data, 
the survey, known as the Hungarian Household Panel. It is not intended to make 
indisputable statements, and attention is called to the problems of data, methods 
and concepts, together with doubts that may be raised at the interpretation of data. 
With this it is hoped that we will be able to contribute to a professional discourse 
and to offer an objective basis for such a debate.
It should be stated in advance that only poverty will be dealt with, and 
impoverishment is not discussed, though in the media the two are often linked and 
even confused. The somewhat loose expression of impoverishment refers to the 
process when the real income of the individual or of the household falls. We have 
no exact data about how much of Hungarian society has experienced the fall of per 
capita income since 1989. It can be said with a rather rough estimate that at least 
two thirds of Hungarian society have been impoverished since 1989, while the real 
income of about ten per cent has grown, whereas the real income of the remaining 
part has been left at its earlier level.
The concept of poverty is much more precise: those people are called poor who 
are forced to live on an income below a certain income level. As it will be seen, of 
the various income thresholds used here, the proportion of the poor does not appear 
to be above 30-35 per cent even in the case of the highest one in 1995. The present 
paper deals with precisely that 30-35 per cent of the Hungarian society.
The source of data
All data are taken from the series of surveys entitled Hungarian Household Panel 
(Sík, Tóth, 1992, 1993, 1995; Tóth, 1994), with the exception of the macro- 
statistical data given in Table 1, and of the data of Tables 2 and 4, which are taken 
from the income surveys of KSH (Central Statistical Office). The Hungarian
3
Household Panel follows the method of similar foreign longitudinal surveys 
(Duncan, 1984), and particularly that of the West German ones (Hanefeld, 1987; 
Rendtel, Wagner, 1991; Zapf, Schupp, Habich, 1996). The latter were extended to 
the former East Germany immediately after reunification.
About 2000 households were included in the original sample of the survey. They 
were randomly selected, but the sample was strongly concentrated territorially 
(originally not all the counties were included). About 4500 individuals above the 
age of sixteen live in these households. A questionnaire was filled in about the 
households and about every individual above the age of sixteen. In addition, there 
were about 1200 children in those households; their data figure in the questionnaire 
of the household.
It derives from the nature of panel surveys that these households are visited each 
year (in May) and are questioned. The questionnaires primarily contain data about 
incomes and employment-unemployment. In addition - not with annual regularity - 
questions are put in many other topics. Such questions enquire about satisfaction, 
symptoms of psychological problems, manifestations of anomie and alienation. 
Data concerning the latter have been utilised in the present paper too. However, 
many other problems included in the questionnaire are not dealt with, for instance, 
preferences of political parties, religious sentiments, entrepreneurial inclinations, 
plans for emigration, etc.
The panel nature of data collection raises several problems, primarily because of 
the gradually occurring dropouts from the sample. The handling of these problems 
is not dealt with here; it should suffice to say that dropouts are counterbalanced by 
weighting, the practice used in the case of similar data collections abroad. In other 
words, in categories where dropping out is greater, the remaining members of the 
sample are multiplied by a weight greater than 1. Thus in theory the sample - if it 
was properly weighted - would reflect the characteristics of the entire population of 
the country in 1995 as well.
The panel has the special advantage of allowing not only for the study of annual 
cross-sections, but the situation and characteristics of the same individuals and 
households in subsequent years, so that the changes can also be analysed. Naturally 
such a longitudinal analysis raises new methodological problems: it can use only 
the data of those individuals and households where questionnaires were filled in 
each year of data collection, and on whose questionnaire the data studied are 
available (not unknown). This is the reason why the number of cases (already 
multiplied ones) figuring in the tables may be slightly different.
Concepts and methods
To sociologists it is obvious that tnere are quite a number of concepts of poverty. In 
this paper the one based on income is used. In other words we have not applied the 
concepts of multidimensional poverty and deprivation, introduced by Tamás Kolosi 
(1984) and Agnes Bokor (1985) at the data collection on social stratification of the 
years 1981-1982. The primary reason is that, apart from poverty based on income, 
no other data related to other dimensions of poverty (such as poor health status) are
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available from the panel surveys. This means that there are no data in this paper 
about those who can be regarded as poor for some other reason than their low 
income (very poor health status, very bad environment of residence, etc.). In other 
words the number of the poor, or people in a disadvantageous position is 
significantly bigger than the poor defined here only on the basis of income. Of 
course the panel surveys also offer possibilities to study poverty from other angles 
as well. Mária Gyenei (1995) for instance, tried to define who were poor and who 
were well off on the basis of the value of homes, equipment, consumer durables, 
property, etc.; that is on the basis of indices of possessions. According to that 
calculation, 17.6 per cent of the population was very poor, 12.6 per cent was poor, 
43.8 per cent was in a medium material condition, 15.1 per cent was well-to-do and 
11.0 per cent was rich in 1994.
If one concentrates on the study of poverty defined on the basis of income, even 
then several borderlines, or thresholds of poverty can be drawn. Two major types 
can be distinguished: thresholds of poverty based on the concepts of absolute and 
relative poverty. The former define an income by some theoretical considerations 
below which no income is acceptable. The various income minimums, particularly 
subsistence level, fall under this category. The latter consider those people poor 
who, for some reason, lag behind the average income, or, more simply: those who 
belong to the lowest income categories. It is not the intention here to enter into 
disputes on the concepts and thresholds of poverty, we only wish to indicate that 
five poverty thresholds are used in the present paper. They include the absolute 
poverty threshold (subsistence level), and the purely relative poverty threshold 
(below 50, or 60 per cent of the average).
1. The definition of poverty of people belonging to the lower two deciles, in other 
words to the lower quintile (the lower 20 per cent) on the basis of the per capita 
income of the household was used for the first time when the first wave of the 
household panel was analysed. According to estimates by Tamás Kolosi and Endre 
Sík (1992), 21.5 per cent of the population lived on incomes lower than the 
subsistence level of 1992. The proportion of those living below subsistence level has 
grown ever since. In the interest of comparing the results of the subsequent waves 
of the household panel we have applied this poverty threshold.
2. As long as KSH calculated and published the subsistence level, naturally we 
also used that threshold. This concept of poverty is particularly important when we 
wish to compare today’s poverty with the 1980s, as the KSH subsistence level and 
the household income surveys of KSH offer an opportunity to assess the size of 
poverty in the 1980s and to study its composition.
3. As proposed by the World Bank, we used the minimum pension as a poverty 
threshold in data compilations prepared for the World Bank. The minimum 
pension can be interpreted as a subsistence level tacitly accepted by the state social 
policy. It is one of the paradoxes of the Hungarian situation that the minimum 
pension (just as the minimum wage) is lower than the subsistence level calculated 
by KSH.
4. Fifty per cent of average income is a very relative poverty threshold. 
Accordingly, those whose per capita weighted income is lower than the average per 
capita weighted income are regarded as poor.
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5. When analysing the 1995 wave, we used 60 per cent of the average as poverty 
threshold.
We do not wish to take stands for any of the concepts and thresholds of poverty. 
However, each one has its specific advantage, and each is suited for answering 
certain special research problems. It is clear that the lower the income where the 
upper limit of poverty is drawn, in other words the less people are poor by our 
definition, the sharper the social differences of the occurrence of poverty would be. 
For instance, the lower the poverty threshold is, the bigger the over-representation 
of Roma ethnicity is among the poor.
A basic methodological question of poverty research and of income surveys in 
general is whether to calculate with the simple per capita income, or to apply some 
kind of weighting by the age and economic activity of the members of the 
household, or by the size of the household. With weighting normally the following 
considerations arise: 1. according to public opinion the needs of children are 
smaller than those of adults, 2. the needs of the economically inactive (or elderly) 
are smaller than those of active adults, 3. with the increase in the number of 
members of households a certain economy of size, or saving emerges in the field of 
expenditure; for instance, the cost of heating does not increase in proportion to the 
growth of membership.
There is no unambiguous proof of which weighting best reflects the actual 
consumption of households. However, we are of the view that the use of weighting 
describes the poverty of the households better than per capita income, or household 
income can do. The use of weighted income data is supported by the fact that they 
are internationally widespread. Such weighted income was applied at the poverty 
thresholds of 50, or 60 per cent of average, and of the minimum pension. With 
these concepts of poverty those people were included among the poor whose 
weighted, per capita household income was less than the corresponding poverty 
threshold. A very simple equivalence scale, used by OECD, was applied at 
weighting, the flexibility of which is e = 0.73 as a function of the membership of 
household, in other words, the weight of the first member of the household was 1.0, 
the weight of the second member was 0.73, that of the third was 0.53, etc.
Macroeconomic indices and changes in the inequality of incomes
The growth of poverty may have, and does have two reasons in Hungary: the 
unfavourable changes of the macroeconomy, in other words the fall of all incomes, 
and the growth of the inequality of incomes.
It would be wrong to forget that macroeconomic processes had rather 
unfavourable changes already in the 1980s: the GDP was almost stagnant; as a 
result the real value of the real income of the population hardly increased, and the 
index of real wages within it has been constantly falling since 1978. However, after 
1989 far more unfavourable processes unfolded.
We do not wish to embark on the issue of how big a role was played in this by 
structural transformation, inevitably accompanying the change of the economic 
system, by destruction considered "creative", by the unexpected economic
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depression occurring in the world economy as a whole, and particularly in the 
developed Western countries, and by the collapse of our export markets in the 
former socialist countries. However, it is beyond doubt that economic recession is 
far deeper and lasting than was expected in 1989-1990 either by the Hungarian 
economists and politicians, or by the vast majority of foreign experts. It may also be 
added that as far as we know, recession is much graver and prolonged in the former 
socialist countries east and south of us and in the majority of the successor states of 
the former Soviet Union.
The GDP has dropped by about 21 per cent (Table 1). According to macro- 
statistical data the fall of the per capita real income of the population was less, only 
about 11 per cent up to 1993. The fall of real consumption by the population is 
somewhat less. Two negative processes have directly affected the population and its 
incomes: 1. inflation, as a result of which consumer price level was about four times 
as much in 1995 as it was in 1989, in other words, the real value of an identical 
nominal income is only one fourth what it was in 1989; 2. the growth of 
unemployment. It should be added that the fall in employment (retirement, often 
early retirement, withdrawal from the labour market to the household) is more than 
double the unemployment peak of 13 per cent.
A decisive issue from the angle of the changes in poverty is how the economy 
fared during the past two years. Signs of the slowdown and end of economic 
recession could be sensed already in 1993; in 1994 the GDP, the real income of the 
population and real wages increased, unemployment decreased. In March 1995 the 
government considered the well known package plan was needed because of the 
large deficit of the balance of payment and of the budget. The measures introduced 
changed the new tendencies of 1994, indicated above. According to preliminary 
data, to be regarded as estimates only, in 1995 the GDP continued to grow, but real 
wages fell sharply, together with the significant fall of the real income of the 
population, inflation accelerated, and the fall of unemployment seemed to stop by 
the end of the year. As a result of the fall of real incomes, poverty has probably 
grown; it is bigger than indicated by the data of the household panel collected in 
May 1995 and covering the incomes of the previous 12 months. Nevertheless, it can 
be said that we have passed the lowest point of economic recession, so poverty need 
not necessarily grow in the coming years because of the falling GDP.
Income inequalities point in the opposite direction (Tables 2 and 3). We have 
data about the changes of income inequalities since 1962 from the household 
income surveys of the KSH, and since 1992 from the Hungarian Household Panel. 
It should be noted however, that data derived from the two different sources are not 
perfectly comparable, as the KSH data are the share of the deciles of individuals in 
the total income, ranked in order on the basis of the per capita household income, 
whereas the data of the Household Panel are the share of the deciles of households 
in the total income, ranked in order.
However, the trends of income inequalities can be inferred. There were income 
inequalities in the socialist period as well, and not insignificant ones at that. This is 
one of the scientific achievements of decisive importance of the KSH data 
collections (Ferge, 1969). From 1962 up to about the late 1970s income inequalities 
were decreasing slowly and not along a straight line, but they began to grow from
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the mid-1980s onwards. After the systemic change income inequalities have 
suddenly and greatly grown, and while they seemed to have stabilised (or perhaps 
even decreased a little) by 1993, again started to grow in 1994 and 1995. It can be 
stated roughly that the income inequalities which used to be on the level of the 
Scandinavian countries in the socialist period, have increased to the level of West 
Germany, or to the average level of West European countries after the systemic 
change. A big question is how income inequalities will change in the future: 
whether they will remain on the European average, or grow further, to reach the 
level observed in the United States, or even in some Latin American countries. If 
the latter tendency prevails, it will not be promising for the reduction of poverty 
even if the GDP grows in the coming years.
The per capita household incomes by social stratum (Tables 4-5) give 
information on which strata are in a more privileged, and which are in a more 
adverse situation, and which strata have been the great losers during the course of 
the changes of income inequalities described above, and which strata have been 
able to retain, or even improve their real income. The KSH data and the data of the 
Household Panel cannot again be fully compared, as the KSH gives figures about 
the per capita income of households categorised on the basis of the head of the 
household, whereas the Household Panel data show the per capita average 
household income of persons above sixteen.
Yet the changes of income differences by stratum can be inferred from those 
data. In socialism too4t was the higher managers and professionals who occupied 
the summit of the income hierarchy, the other white collar workers and skilled 
workers occupied the middle, and the unskilled workers and agricultural 
occupations-were at the bottom. After the systemic change the income position of 
higher managers has not only improved strongly if compared to the national 
average, but also in an absolute sense, that is in respect of real income, and seems 
to improve yearly. On the average, professionals have been able to retain or 
improve their income situation a little, the former middle strata continue to occupy 
the middle of the hierarchy, though the average of their real income has decreased, 
while the 'lower' strata continue to occupy the bottom. But the tendency, shown by 
the Household Panel data, namely that all those who do not follow a usual, or 
'regular1 occupational career, have a far worse income situation, is regarded as more 
important. Extending our inference, it means that those households where one or 
more members belong to these 'non-regular' categories, are in a significantly 
disadvantageous position. These categories are the following: primarily and 
naturally the unemployed, but also those on disability pension (who retired before 
reaching retirement age), persons living on the pension of their deceased spouse 
(who do not receive a pension on their own right), as well as women engaged in 
household duties and other adult dependents. The old age pensioners do not belong 
to this category. At any rate, the conclusion can be drawn that those whose 
employment has ceased for some reason or other - unemployment, early retirement 
- or, who do not and did not do some gainsome work, constitute the most 
disadvantaged stratum of the society and their disadvantages have visibly increased 
during the past few years.
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Since there are often doubts about the reliability of the stated income data, the 
differences among these social strata in respect of certain other indices, like homes, 
consumer durables and lifestyle were also studied. All the indices were developed so 
that we assumed the lack of an element of equipment in the home, of a consumer 
durable, or the lack of trips abroad as indices of social disadvantage, enabling us to 
draw inferences about low incomes (Table 6). It can be said that these indices have 
confirmed the differences of social strata and their order identified on the basis of 
income data.
In addition to the social and occupational position, the place of residence also 
involves significant social advantages and disadvantages. There has been a 
significant difference in the income of Budapest and the other cities and settlements 
(Table 7). This difference however, was slowly decreasing during the socialist 
period (up to 1982), but it has grown very strongly after the systemic change and 
still seems to be growing. If we consider only those settlements which are located in 
micro regions qualified as backward, the income disadvantages of the latter seem to 
be even more significant.
The extent of poverty
In the 1980s the number and proportion of those living on incomes less than the 
subsistence level was estimated to be around one million, that is ten per cent. It 
should be noted that even in those days there were different estimates of the number 
of the poor. The figure of one million is obtained if those who live below the 
national average subsistence level are regarded as poor. If the starting point is the 
different subsistence level of households of different composition and place of 
residence, and the number of the poor is assessed separately in these categories of 
household, then a somewhat smaller estimate can be obtained.
Tamás Kolosi estimates the proportion of those living below the KSH 
subsistence level to be 22 per cent in 1992, 24 per cent in 1993, and 32 per cent in 
1994. He made this estimate by adding the non-stated income to the incomes 
recorded by the Household Panels which were stated at the macro-statistical data 
collections. In 1995 the KSH did not publish data concerning subsistence level, 
therefore the 30-35 per cent, estimated for 1995, is simply based on the fact that the 
average increase had hardly any decrease from 1994 to 1995 and the share of the 
first three deciles in the total income did not change if compared to 1994. Whatever 
the opinion of social scientists may be about the subsistence level calculated by 
KSH, it is absolutely clear that poverty has increased very significantly, by at least 
three-fold
The spread of poverty is not so extensive if other concepts of poverty are 
employed. By definition the lowest quintile always contains 20 per cent of the 
population, hence this concept of poverty is unsuited for identifying the actual 
extent of poverty. The relatively moderate growth of the proportion of those with 
less than 50 per cent of the average income essentially expresses only the effect of 
the growth of inequality. According to the poverty line "below 60 per cent of the 
average", used only in 1995, 22.7 per cent was poor in that year. Finally, the
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proportion of those having an income below the minimum pension has increased 
relatively less because the minimum pension has been raised annually but 
significantly less than the price index, meaning that the minimum pension has been 
equivalent to an ever lower real income each year.
The composition of poverty
The issue of who are the poor, the members of what demographic, social, etc. 
groups constitute poverty is far more interesting theoretically as well as from a 
practical social policy point of view than the number and proportion of the poor and 
their tendencies. Here the issue is put as follows: how many should be classified 
under poverty from the different demographic, social, etc. categories; what 
percentage would fall below the different thresholds of poverty; in other words: how 
big is the incidence of poverty by group.
The issue of poverty is often formulated in the American and West European 
literature on social science and in public discourse by saying that the society of "two 
thirds-one third" has developed, in which two thirds of the society enjoy the benefit 
of economic growth and of additional incomes, they live in increasing wealth, 
whereas one third is left out of these benefits and is poor in the long run, so much 
so, that it is practically excluded from society (Glotz, 1984).
This issue appears differently in the present Hungarian disputes. Usually it is 
assumed that a very wealthy and increasingly rich one tenth occupies the summit of 
the society, whereas about 30-40-50 per cent of the society is becoming 
impoverished at the bottom of the hierarchy, sinking into lasting and almost 
hopeless poverty. If the proportion of the poor is analysed by demographic and 
social categories in the case of different poverty thresholds, then the outlines of four 
kinds of poverty emerge (Tables 9 and 11): 1. traditional poverty about which we 
had quite precise knowledge already during socialism, 2. new poverty which has 
appeared since the systemic change, or, has drawn attention only since that point of 
time, 3. demographic poverty, 4. ethnic poverty.
1. Two factors are known from the socialist period which caused significant 
income disadvantages and were therefore accompanied by a far bigger than average 
occurrence of poverty: i. belonging to the strata of unskilled labourers and to that of 
the agricultural blue-collar workers with low school education as their corollary, ii. 
village residence. Both factors continue to be accompanied by a big risk of poverty, 
both (otherwise overlapping) social and residential strata have been significantly 
impoverished, in other words, they undoubtedly belong to the losers of systemic 
change. Yet it is not they who are the poorest and the greatest losers but the 'new 
poor'.
2. The unemployed have been the entirely 'new poor' since the systemic change. 
However, the retired disabled, pensioners on widow’s pension, housewives and 
other adult dependents should also be classified under this heading, in other words, 
all those who have no job producing regular income, or who do not enjoy a pension 
paid after a career of more or less full employment. The 'new poor' come from 
among the 'traditionally poor' strata to a large extent, because they have low school
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education, they are unskilled workers and peasants, and unemployment is much 
higher than average among the rural people and the members of these strata retire 
as disabled to a much higher proportion, they do not have a pension on their own 
right (and their entitlement is only as widows), and it happens relatively often that 
in families belonging to this stratum the wife does not have a gainsome occupation 
and there are other dependent adults as well. All this corroborates the commonly 
known fact that if somebody drops out of regular occupation this becomes one of 
the decisive factors of his life, causing poverty.
3. We have already noticed the tendency in the socialist period that, as 
contrasted to the former situation, an increasing number of children may be 
classified under the heading of the poor besides the older generations. Incidentally, 
this tendency can be observed in the developed countries (Rainwater, 1988; 
Smeeding, 1988; Smeeding, Torrey, 1988). This tendency, however, seems to have 
grown stronger after the systemic change.
Here a brief explanation is required to understand why the proportion of the poor 
is smaller among the elderly, and particularly among those aged 60-69. The likely 
cause is that the majority of the elderly population have acquired the right to a 
relatively high pension, and though the real value of pensions has decreased, the 
income situation of the population in retirement age has deteriorated less than the 
national average, partly because the real value of pensions could be protected 
against inflation to some extent (at least the pensioners were not threatened by 
unemployment, the major risk factor of the active age group), and partly because 
the old age population is being constantly replaced demographically, the older 
people on smaller pension die and are replaced by younger ones with higher 
pension (the real value of whose pension will decrease in the coming years). 
However, it should be stressed that the fact that the proportion of the poor is not 
particularly high among the elderly, does not mean that there are not groups among 
the elderly who live in abject poverty. Such are the people on widow’s and disability 
pension mentioned above, people who have retired early during the past few years. 
The elderly living alone (in single member households) may also belong to this 
group. A large part of the latter are old rural widows. Finally there are the oldest 
people whose pension has sunk to the proximity of subsistence level, and who are 
unable to obtain even a minimum of additional income (for instance, by cultivating 
their garden around the house) because of their health condition.
Whatever definition of poverty is employed and whatever weighting, or scale of 
equivalence is used, today the poverty of children in Hungary is a very conspicuous 
phenomenon. We agree with the statement of the Florence research centre of the 
UNICEF (1993) that children are among the great losers of systemic change in East 
Central Europe. It is considered to be highly problematic from the angle of the 
future of Hungarian society that a significant part of our children are brought up 
under poor conditions at least in part of their childhood. This may be highly 
detrimental to many different sides of their life, from nutrition to progress in 
school.
4. Last but not least - and it should be stressed - there is poverty of ethnic 
character in today's Hungary. It was known earlier as well that a much larger than 
average part of the population of an estimated half a million people of Roma
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ethnicity is poor. However, the Hungarian Household Panel offers an opportunity 
for the first time to make comparisons between the income relations of the Roma 
and non-Roma population. The reason being that earlier there was no possibility of 
identifying the ethnic origin of people in the national surveys. When the panel 
surveys were made, the data collector made notes (without asking questions) 
whether he/she considered the household questioned a Roma one. No doubt this is a 
far from perfect method but we were unable to find a better one. It should also be 
noted that the number of failed interviews was much higher in the case of Roma 
people, thus, as contrasted to the expected 5 per cent, a much lower proportion, 
only 3.8 per cent belonged to the Roma ethnic group in the samples of 1994 and 
1995. Despite all these reservations the very fact that the 'overrepresentation' of the 
poor in the case of every poverty threshold is the highest among the Roma people, 
calls attention to the fact that they constitute the part of Hungarian society most 
endangered by poverty, and in all probability it is they who are the greatest losers of 
systemic change.
If the proportion of the poor is studied by types of households and not by 
individuals, some supplementary information may be obtained (Tables 10 and 12). 
There are more poor among the households with children than among the childless 
ones. The proportion of the poor is particularly high among the households with 
three and more children. The proportion of the poor is particularly high in 
households of the type of 'one parent and child'. If the head of the household is 
unemployed, it means a grave disadvantage to the household.
Lasting and transitory poverty
One of the most remarkable and most disputed results of foreign household panel 
surveys has been that poverty in those societies was mostly transitory, and people 
found poor in a given year would raise above the poverty threshold in the next one 
or several years (Duncan, 1984; Headey, Habich, Krause, 1990: Bemsten, Rendtel, 
1991).
The results of the Hungarian Household Panel (Tables 13 and 14) also show that 
the movement of the population surveyed is very big between the income deciles. 
More than two fifths of those belonging to the lowest decile did not belong to that 
one in the next year, and about half of those leaving the lowest decile have jumped 
upwards by at least two deciles. Conversely, two thirds of those belonging to the 
lowest decile had not been there in the previous year.
In relation to this result one has to state several kinds of reservations: 1. crossing 
the threshold of a decile does not mean emerging from poverty, particularly if the 
average incomes and thus the limits of deciles have sunk, 2. if demographic events 
such as the birth of a child, increasing the number of household members, or a 
member of the household dies, retires, avails him- or herself of child care leave, 
etc., play a significant role in the annual changes of the income situation besides 
becoming unemployed or newly employed.
The most doubtful problem is how the earlier 'decile career' of the individuals 
and households influences movement upwards or downwards from the decile
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position just occupied. In other words: how big is the possibility of a person who 
has emerged from the lowest decile to, let us say, the third, or fourth one, of sinking 
back to one of the lowest ones next year. A comparison of the quintile positions of 
the years 1992 and 1995 (Table 15) suggests that such major shifts did not take 
place during those three years as would appear if the changes were added up one by 
one.
In addition to the study of the transition matrixes between deciles or quintiles, 
the durability of poverty was also analysed so that the persons about whose income 
we had data in 1992, 1993 and 1994 as well, were classified according to how many 
times they fell below the various poverty thresholds during those three years. Thus, 
if subsistence level is chosen as poverty threshold (as it was seen, the proportion of 
the poor has been growing each year on that basis) then 10 per cent of the 
interviewees were poor 'at length' (in all the three years), 32 per cent were poor 
transitorily (for one or two years), and 59 per cent were not poor. Naturally, the 
proportion of those in lasting and transitory poverty is naturally smaller if poverty 
is defined by the lowest income quintile, below 50 per cent and below the minimum 
pension. However, our main conclusion must be that at present the bigger part of 
poverty in Hungary is of transitory nature, the majority is able to emerge from 
poverty temporarily or with a lasting effect. Yet it does not at all mean that the 
problem of lasting poverty is negligible. On the contrary, the problem of lasting 
poverty deserves an extraordinary attention from a theoretical as well as social 
policy point of view. Therefore, who are those who were poor at length, during all 
the three years is a particularly interesting question (Table 17).
Such an analysis brings out in bold relief which are the demographic and social 
categories particularly threatened by poverty in present-day Hungary: those first of 
all who belong to the Roma ethnic group, almost half of whom belonged to the 
lower quintile during all the three years, together with the unemployed, those who 
work in the household only and other adult dependents. It should also be noted how 
high the proportion of the long-term poor is among children between 0-19 and the 
young.
The consequences of poverty: dissatisfaction, psychological problems, anomie 
and alienation
In the individual waves of the Hungarian Household Panel, questions were put 
about satisfaction with the different dimensions of individual and social life, about 
the occurrence of somatic and psychological symptoms suggesting problems of 
psychological life, and about opinions and attitudes related to anomie and 
alienation.
It is known from other sociological data collections (Rose, Haepfer, 1994) and 
public opinion surveys that dissatisfaction with income, with living standards, with 
the economic and political situation of the country is very widespread in Hungary. 
Following the pattern of the German data collections, we have studied 
dissatisfaction by requesting the interviewees to indicate their dissatisfaction with 
the different dimensions of their own life and the condition of the country along a
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scale of 0 (totally dissatisfied) to 10 (totally satisfied). We regarded as dissatisfied 
those who indicated 0-3 on the scale (Table 18). There are unambiguously more 
people among those who belong to the lowest quintile, that is among the poorest, 
who are dissatisfied with their income, living standards, homes, future perspectives 
and the entire pattern of their life. Thus the conclusion can be drawn that 
dissatisfaction with the material conditions of individual life reflects well the 
objectively more difficult situation. Correlation is much less strong between poverty 
and dissatisfaction with such non-material, human dimensions of life as the family, 
relatives and friends, colleagues and work in general. Dissatisfaction with the 
health condition is not bigger in the lowest quintile than in the next two. It is 
conspicuous that dissatisfaction with the economic situation of the country is almost 
equally big in every quintile and even dissatisfaction related to the possibility of 
citizens' political intervention, that is with the functioning of democracy does not 
show much difference by income. Therefore the conclusion can be drawn that the 
poor are not dissatisfied and complaining in general, but they are dissatisfied with 
those very concrete material conditions of their life where they are significantly 
disadvantaged.
According to studies by Mária Kopp and Árpád Skrabski on mental and health 
condition (1992) the proportion of those suffering from different psychological 
problems was rather high and growing in Hungary in the 1980s. In the Household 
Panel survey of 1993 some questions - taken over from the German data collections 
- were put which tried to explore the frequency of somatic and psychological 
symptoms indicating psychological problems. A study was made of whether these 
symptoms were more frequent among the poor than among the well-to-do (Table 
19). It was found that all those symptoms - such as headache, palpitations, 
nervousness, exhaustion, trembling, worry for one's health condition, as well as 
feeling unlucky, the inability to overcome worries, and becoming confused if faced 
with more than one task at a time, are far more frequent among people in the lower 
quintile than among the better off. Thus the poor not only have to live on a much 
smaller income but they also suffer more often from psychological problems. This 
also leads to the conclusion that the main cause of the high frequency of such 
psychological problems should be sought in the bad material and income situation 
in Hungary.
Elsewhere (Andorka, 1994) we have expounded the hypothesis that a very deep 
and critical anomie and alienation had developed in the socialist period. Anomie 
and alienation were regarded as the slightly different sociological concepts of the 
same phenomenon, more specifically what is usually described by sociology under 
the terms anomie and alienation, are actually different sides of the same social 
crisis. In the 1993 wave of the Household Panel we tried to approach this 
phenomenon again with questions taken from German data collections. The 
answers received (Table 20) suggest the inference that many more people gave a 
positive answer in the lowest quintile than among the well-to-do in respect of the 
two dimensions of anomie and alienation, that is powerlessness and the 
meaninglessness of life. It should be noted however, that mentioning loneliness 
hardly shows any difference by income, suggesting that human solidarity still 
asserts itself among the poorest. It is even more interesting that again there does
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not seem to be any difference between the poor and the rich in respect of violating 
norms of behaviour and rules. Thus the rather frequent violation of norms which 
can be observed in Hungarian society, cannot be simply attributed to poverty and 
impoverishment, because a far deeper crisis of norms is involved, which seems to 
be pervasive in every stratum of the society. This result also warns that the different 
aspects of anomie and alienation - such as the sense of powerlessness, the sense of 
the meaninglessness of life, loneliness and an inclination to violate norms should 
not be lumped together in the analysis, but they should be studied and interpreted 
one by one.
Some closing thoughts
We do not wish to state final and ultimate conclusions. However, we think that 
some ideas, extending over a broader circle, should be raised.
It is beyond doubt that poverty has grown sharply during the past few years and 
it hits a significant part of the Hungarian society. It is obviously a grave ordeal for 
the majority of the Hungarian society even if emergence from poverty does not 
seem to be impossible. Poverty is accompanied by a great degree of dissatisfaction, 
serious psychological problems and stresses. The different aspects of anomie and 
alienation, first of all powerlessness, the sense of vulnerability and the loss of faith 
in the meaning and understanding of life are very widespread among the poor.
The growth of poverty not only affects the poor gravely, but it affects and even 
endangers the development of the entire Hungarian economy and society. This 
statement can be supported primarily by the obvious fact that the society has to 
provide at least for a minimum care for those who have sunk into poverty', for 
instance, for giving aid to the unemployed, which necessarily means a significant 
economic burden. Taking a broader view, it could be said that the development of a 
modern economy primarily depends on how educated and skilled the members of a 
society are, how far they can meet the rapidly changing demands of modern 
technology and economy. The children of poor families have little chance of 
acquiring the necessary school education and knowledge.
Extensive poverty means an even bigger danger for social integration. Though it 
has to be admitted that societies in general, and modern societies in particular are 
characterised by the existence of conflicts among the groups of different interest, 
attitude and culture, yet we wish to stress our conviction that if a consensus is 
missing among these different groups, at least in respect of the basic institutions of 
the economy, society and politics, then conflicts may become so acute that they 
threaten the functioning of the economy and political democracy. An extensive, 
lasting and hopeless poverty is obviously a very grave source of conflict.
What can be expected and what can be done in the light of these thoughts in 
respect of the future of poverty ? Obviously, the growth rate of the GDP and how 
lasting it is are factors of decisive importance. If inequalities of income do not 
change, then the growth of per capita GDP would sooner or later bring about the 
growth of the per capita real income, which would automatically reduce poverty.
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However, it is a big question whether income inequalities will remain at the 
present level, or, continue to grow. It can hardly be stated that a further growth of 
income inequality would be necessary or desirable. Since we have already reached 
the West European level of inequality, nothing justifies a further shift in the 
direction of Latin American inequalities. It cannot be stated on a theoretical and 
philosophical level either that the growth of income inequality is desirable. One 
should remember the thesis of John Rawls (1972), who is perhaps the most 
prominent American liberal social philosopher, according to which inequalities can 
be accepted as long as they result in the growth of income and the improvement of 
living standards in the medium run, in other words: as long as they speed up 
economic growth.
Social policy is one of the means of moderating inequalities and mitigating 
poverty. Particularly in a period when poverty is growing, it is essential to have the 
safety net offered by social policy which protects people with low incomes from 
impoverishment. We are aware that the present social policy represents a rather big 
burden for the budget. In this situation however, its reform is desirable so that it 
can concentrate more on the poor and a drastic reduction of welfare support should 
be avoided by all means. Hopefully our empirical studies and analyses of poverty 
will promote the identification of those social and demographic groups which 
deserve the special attention of social policy because of the frequent occurrence of 
poverty among them.
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Table 1 Main macro-statistical indices of the Hungarian economy, 1989-1994
Y e a r  G D P  
1989= 
100
E m p lo y m en t*  U n e m p lo y m e n t 
ra te , %
P e r c ap ita  
rea l 
incom e 
o f  th e  
po p u la tio n , 
1 9 8 9 = 1 0 0
Index  
o f r e a l  
w ag es  
1 9 8 9 = 1 0 0
P e r  c a p i ta  C o n su m e r 
re a l  p r ic e  
c o n su m p tio n  in d ex  
1 9 8 9 = 1 0 0  1 9 8 9 =  100
1 9 8 9  100 100 0 .3 100 100 100 100
199 0  96 99 0 .4 98 96 9 7 129
1991 85 96 1.9 96 90 92 174
199 2  81 86 7 .8 94 89 91 214
199 3  79 78 13 .2 89 85 92 2 62
1 9 9 4  82 7 4 11.0 92 91 93 3 1 2
199 5  84 - 10.5 87 81 91 4 0 2
* Those people who have a job from where they have an income. Persons on child care aid
and allowance were not counted under this heading.
Table 2 Decile distribution: The share of population deciles by per capita
income of the total of personal incomes, 1962-1987
Decile 1962 1967 1972 1977 1982 1987
Lowest 3.9 4.0 4.0 4.5 4.5 4.5
2 5.6 6.0 5.9 6.3 6.0 6.0
3 6.5 7.1 7.0 7.3 6.9 6.9
4 7.6 8 .0 7.9 8.1 7.7 7.7
5 8.6 8.9 8 .8 8 .8 8.5 8.5
6 9.7 9.9 9 .8 9.6 9.4 9.4
7 1 1 .0 10.9 1 0 .8 10.7 10.5 10.5
8 12.3 1 2 .2 1 2 .1 11.9 1 1 .8  1 1 .8
9 14.6 14.0 14.0 13.7 13.7 13.8
Topmost 2 0 . 2 18.9 19.7 18.6 18.6 20.9
Topmost, lowest 5.2 4.7 4.9 3.8 3.8 4.6
Table 3 Distribution of deciles: the share of household deciles by the per
capita income in the total of personal income, 1992-1995
Decile 1991/1992 1992/1993 1993/1994 1994/1995
Lowest 3.6 3.8 3.3 3.6
2 5.7 5.7 5.3 5.3
3 6.6 6.7 6.5 6 .2
4 7.4 7.4 7.3 7.0
5 8.1 8 .1 8 .0 7.8
6 8 .8 8.9 8.9 8.6
7 9.9 1 0 .0 1 0 .0 9.7
8 11.4 11.4 1 1 .6 11.3
9 14.2 14.1 14.4 14.4
Topmost 24.3 23.9 24.7 26.1
Topmost/lowest 6.7 6.3 7.4 7.3
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Table 4 Per capita household income in households belonging to different 
social strata, 1962-1987
Social stratum 
of household head
Per capita household income as a percentage 
of the national average
1962 1967 1972 1977 1982 1987
Manager and professional 154 410 150 142 127 125
Medium level white collar 128 122 115 108 107 117
Clerical 119 111 108 97 99 93
Skilled worker 109 103 100 99 99 102
Semiskilled worker 95 92 89 93 92 88
Unskilled worker 82 86 86 86 84 81
Agricultural 87 101 105 104 95 90
Pensioner 84 81 83 91 98 94
Table 5 Per capita average annual income by social stratum, 1993-1995
Social stratum Per capita income as a percentage 
of the national average1
1993 1994 1995 N=1995
Higher and medium manger 162 184 211 158
Professional 140 156 163 250
Supervisor 114 138 137 120
Clerical 120 118 124 322
Self-employed artisan, merchant 122 121 131 162
Skilled worker 100 96 93 492
Unskilled worker 90 88 83 464
Peasant, agricultural labourer 85 83 84 86
Old age pensioner 101 95 1045
Pensioner on widow's allowance 96 78 75 153
Disability pensioner 87 80 78 290
Child care allowance and aid 83 70 76 167
Unemployed 78 74 68 188
In household 68 62 95
Other dependent 69 68 60 190
All 16 year-olds and above2 100 100 100 4484
1 As a percentage of the average per capita income of the 16 year-old and older interviewees.
2 The present and all subsequent Tables do not include data concerning pupils due to their 
special position, or the data of those who have gainsome activities besides their pension, or 
of the helping family members because of the small number of such cases. But naturally they 
are also included in the 'total'.
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Table 6 Home equipment, possession of selected consumer 
durables and trips abroad, 1994
S o c ia l s tra tu m
R u n n in g
w a te r
T h e  h o m e  h a s  no
W C  B a th ro o m  P hone  
P e r  c en t
C ar
T h e  h o u s e h o ld  h a s  n o
A u to m a tic  C o lo u r  
w ash in g  T V  
m.
PC
D id  n o t 
go
a b ro a d  
la s t y e a r
H ig h e r  a n d  m ed iu m  
m a n a g e r
2 .8 0 .0 0 .9 4 2 .6 23.8 16.2 6 .6 7 2 .0 43 .1
P ro fe ss io n a l 1.6 1.6 1.6 3 6 .7 34 .5 21.1 7 .5 72 .3 5 4 .8
S u p e rv is o r 3 .2 0 .0 3 .6 6 5 .0 32 .4 3 5 .2 2.3 8 4 .8 6 4 .8
C le r ic a l 1.4 1.8 1.0 5 3 .0 3 8 .0 3 3 .6 8.6 8 3 .7 7 3 .4
S e lf-em p lo y ed  artisan , 
m e rc h a n t 2 .3 1.6 2 .3 4 5 .7 26 .9 2 7 .3 6 .4 7 9 .9 6 4 .8
S k il le d  w o rk e r 7.1 6 .4 7.1 7 1 .4 4 4 .7 5 1 .9 14 .9 8 7 .6 7 6 .7
U n sk ille d  w o rk e r 10.3 12.9 11 .9 80.1 6 0 .7 69 .3 2 6 .9 9 3 .5 8 8 .4
P e a sa n t, ag ricu ltu ra l 
w o rk e r 19.5 2 0 .9 1 8 .4 8 3 .0 4 1 .0 77 .1 2 4 .5 9 5 .3 9 3 .3
O ld  a g e  p en sio n e r 14.3 16.8 17.3 7 1 .2 7 3 .0 7 5 .5 3 6 .2 9 7 .4 8 9 .4
D isab il i ty  p en sio n e r 16.5 15.0 2 0 .2 7 8 .0 6 3 .4 7 4 .2 3 5 .7 9 5 .2 9 1 .5
P e n s io n e r  on w id o w 's  
a llo w a n c e 22 .9 2 5 .2 2 9 .8 83.1 8 5 .8 8 5 .0 51 .5 100.0 9 6 .6
C h ild  c a re  a llo w an ce  
a n d  a id 11.9 13.0 15.2 7 5 .4 48 .5 5 4 .3 23.1 9 2 .6 8 9 .9
U n e m p lo y e d 15.8 15.5 19 .7 7 7 .8 65 .5 6 6 .5 3 2 .6 9 1 .2 8 1 .7
In h o u se h o ld 3 1 .0 18 .7 2 9 .4 8 1 .2 6 7 .7 8 0 .9 3 3 .5 95.1 8 9 .2
O th e r  d e p en d en t 2 1 .5 16.5 21.1 8 1 .7 6 5 .4 7 3 .6 3 6 .5 9 3 .5 8 6 .4
A ll 16 y ear-o ld s  
a n d  a b o v e 11.5 11.1 12 .9 6 8 .4 55 .9 59.1 2 5 .0 9 0 .0 8 0 .4
Table 7 Per capita average annual income by place of residence, 1962-1995
Year Per capita income as a percentage of the national average 
Villages Towns Budapest
1962 90 108 131
1967 95 99 119
1972 95 97 118
1977 96 98 116
1982 96 99 112
1987 94 100 114
1992 89 95 129
1995 85 93 145
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Table 8 Proportion of the poor in the population in the case 
of different poverty thresholds, 1992-1995
Y e a r Below
the subsistence 
level
Below 50%  
o f  average 
per capita incom e 
Per cent
Below
the m inim um  
pension
1 9 9 2 2 1 .5 10.1 5 .2
1 9 9 3 2 4 .0 1 0 .4 5 .4
1 9 9 4 3 1 .8 1 1 .6 6 .7
1 9 9 5 3 0 -3 5 1 2 .4 -
Table 9 Proportion of the poor by age group, social stratum and ethnicity 
in the case of different poverty thresholds, 1994
A g e  g ro u p , 
so c ia l s t r a tu m , 
e th n ic ity
B elow
subsis tence
level
In th e  lo w est 
incom e 
q u in tile
B e lo w  50  %  
o f  th e  
a v e ra g e
B elo w  th e  
m in im u m  
pen sio n
N =
Age group 
0 -2 54.5 38.1 2 2 .8 15.0 1 44
3 -6 4 1 .8 29.2 11 .7 6 .8 3 1 2
7 -1 4 42.3 3 1 .4 16.4 9 .5 6 4 2
1 5 -19 41 .5 29 .9 15.9 10.5 4 4 7
2 0 -2 9 34 .5 18.8 9.5 4 .7 7 9 4
3 0 -3 9 3 6 .4 2 4 .7 13.4 8.1 7 9 6
4 0 -4 9 31 .3 18.4 9 .3 4 .4 7 7 8
5 0 -5 9 28.3 13.8 11.3 7 .5 6 6 8
6 0 -6 9 16.1 7 .6 7 .4 3 .7 711
7 0 + 16.7 10.2 9.1 4 .9 5 8 7
Social stratum 
H ig h e r a n d  m e d iu m  
m a n a g e r 7 .4 5 .7 2 .8 1.9 143
P ro fe ss io n a l 10.6 2.1 1.0 1.0 2 4 0
S u p e rv is o r 5.8 2 .2 0.0 0.0 121
C le ric a l 19.6 8.1 4 .2 3 .2 3 8 2
S e lf-e m p lo y e d  
a rtis a n , m e rc h a n t 32 .6 22.3 13.8 7 .2 168
S k illed  w o rk e r 24 .8 11.6 4 .0 1.0 5 2 9
U n sk ille d  w o rk e r 34 .6 19.4 7.1 2.3 5 2 7
P e a sa n t, a g r ic u l tu ra l  
w o rk e r 39.5 2 6 .0 11.7 3 .6 116
U n e m p lo y e d 55.5 3 7 .6 26 .6 17.9 2 2 6
C h ild  c a re  a l lo w a n c e 5 1 .7 3 5 .5 17.2 11.1 186
O ld  a g e  p e n s io n e r 15.9 8.5 6 .7 3 .7 11 6 5
D isab ility  p e n s io n e r 4 8 .7 24 .8 13.8 6 .5 2 63
P e n s io n e r  o n  w id o w 's  
a llo w a n c e 3 3 .7 14.0 19.2 8.1 148
In h o u s e h o ld 56 .4 4 4 .6 3 1 .8 22 .8 103
O th e r  d e p e n d e n t 5 3 .7 37 .5 2 8 .2 16.9 2 0 7
Ethnicity
N o n -R o m a 28 .4 16.3 8 .5 4 .2 5 7 4 3
R om a 8 6 .7 7 3 .0 56.1 4 3 .3 2 7 7
T o ta l p o p u la t io n 3 1 .8 2 0 .0 11.6 6 .7 5 8 7 7
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Table 10 Proportion of poor households by type of household, number of
children, place of residence, the unemployment of the head of the 
household and ethnicity in the case of different poverty thresholds, 1994
Type of household, number of 
children, place of residence, 
unemployment of head of 
household, ethnicity
Below
the
subsistence
level
In the Below 
lowest 50% 
income of the 
quintile average
Per cent
Below
minimum
pension
N=
Type of household
One person 19.7 23.3 9.4 4.7 473
Married couple 12.0 9.6 6.0 3.8 438
Married couple with 
child(ren) 34.7 17.9 11.2 6.4 821
One parent with child(ren) 43.2 26.6 12.6 9.0 163
Three generations 43.9 22.5 10.3 6.4 66
Other 31.3 23.8 14.0 5.5 121
Number of children
No children 18.3 6.8 8.5 4.7 1259
One child 37.2 17.4 10.3 6.2 347
Two children 37.0 21.6 8.4 4.6 329
Three and more children 62.5 53.2 29.5 17.6 124
Place of residence
Budapest 11.9 7.2 2.8 1.3 358
County seat 25.7 16.2 6.5 4.3 299
Other town 30.5 18.9 12.4 7.6 620
Village 31.4 24.3 12.6 6.4 816
The head of the household is
unemployed 63.5 39 7 27.6 19.1 103
not unemployed 25.1 17.5 9.1 4.9 1990
Ethnicity
Roma 82.5 67.0 49.4 39.1 65
Non-Roma 24.6 15.8 7.5 3.5 1959
All households 27.1 18.6 12.6 6.4 2093
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Table 11 Proportion of the poor by age group, school education, place of
residence, social stratum and ethnicity in the case of different poverty 
thresholds, 1995
Age group, school education, 
place of residence, social stratum, 
ethnicity
In the lowest 
quintile
Below 60 % 
of the 
average
Below 50% 
of the 
average
N=
Age group 
0-2 years 32.9 34.7 20.6 131
3-6 26.9 29.9 16.6 279
6-14 25.9 27.5 17.6 613
15-19 24.6 27.0 16.3 465
20-29 19.0 21.7 11.9 732
30-39 17.7 19.8 10.4 751
40-49 19.3 21.2 13.1 866
50-59 14.1 17.4 9.3 632
60-69 12.7 16.3 6.0 620
70 and over 23.7 28.2 12.6 503
School education 
0-7 grades 36.4 41.2 23.6 604
8 grades 23.6 27.9 15.5 1251
Trade school 18.4 21.1 11.1 1092
Secondary school 9.4 11.2 4.0 1023
University, college 1.6 1.7 0.8 513
Place of residence 
Village 25.5 28.9 17.4 2166
Town 22.2 24.2 11.8 1655
County seat, city 17.0 21.4 9.3 721
Budapest 7.2 8.3 5.3 1049
Social stratum
Higher and medium manager 0.0 0.9 0.0 158
Professional 0.7 0.7 0.7 250
Supervisor 7.6 7.6 - 120
Clerical 7.0 8.3 2.4 322
Self-employed artisan, merchant 12.3 13.1 5.4 162
Skilled worker 12.1 14.3 4.2 492
Unskilled worker 14.8 18.8 10.5 464
Peasant, agricultural worker 16.7 18.2 9.1 86
Pensioner, working 4.6 6.4 2.8 87
Old age pensioner 11.9 16.2 5.1 1045
Disability pensioner 30.6 36.0 18.7 290
Pensioner on widow's allowance 48.6 53.1 31.5 153
Child care allowance and aid 29.7 32.1 18.5 167
Unemployed 44.2 46.3 31.8 188
In household 54.7 56.8 48.1 95
Other dependent 48.0 51.2 39.2 190
Student (above 16 years) 19.7 22.3 11.7 356
Ethnic group 
Roma 66.5 74.5 55.8 214
Non-Roma 17.8 20.1 10.4 5296
Altogether, total population 20.0 22.7 12.4 5592
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Table 12 The proportion of poor households by the age of the householder, by type 
of household, membership and by the number of children in the case 
of different poverty thresholds, 1995
Age of householder, type of 
household, membership 
and number of children
In
the lowest 
quintile
Below 60% 
of the 
average
Below 50% 
of the 
average
N=
Age of householder
-29 23.7 26.2 12.1 185
30-39 16.3 18.9 10.4 355
40-49 21.1 22.6 14.6 502
50-59 16.2 20.6 12.0 363
60-69 16.9 20.7 8.1 401
70 and over 27.2 32.7 13.8 348
Type of household
One person 27.0 33.1 14.8 563
One parent with child(ren) 24.9 26.3 18.7 190
Childless married couple 11.3 14.0 5.6 436
Married couple with child 18.8 21.2 11.6 814
Three generations 15.2 16.7 9.6 54
Other household 20.3 22.1 14.1 98
Membership of household
1 27.0 33.1 14.8 563
2 13.0 15.9 7.6 601
3 20.0 20.9 13.8 417
4 15.8 18.5 8.3 384
5 28.0 31.7 17.7 126
6 and more 31.5 32.7 24.6 63
Number of children living 
in the household 
0 17.6 21.7 9.8 1342
1 23.4 26.1 15.6 381
2 17.9 19.5 10.8 323
3 33.5 35.6 22.0 83
4 and more 69.8 69.8 49.2 26
All households together 19.9 23.2 11.9 2154
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Table 13 Changes of the position of individuals in deciles from 1993 to 1994, 
distribution of the 1993 deciles by the 1994 situation
D e c i le  
in  1 9 9 3
L o w e s t 2 3 4
D e c i le  in  1 9 9 4  
5 6  7 8 9 T o p m o s t
T o ta l N =
L o w e s t 5 7 .2 21 .1 15.1 2 .9 1.3 0 .6 2 .8 1.3 0 .5 1.8 1 0 0 .0 4 7 9
2 1 2 .4 37 .1 23 .2 11.1 6.1 3 .5 0 .9 1.8 2.8 1.0 1 0 0 .0 521
3 9 .0 1 7 .2 2 3 .7 19 .2 10.5 9 .9 2 .5 4 3  1.3 2 .4 1 0 0 .0 5 7 2
4 4 .5 9 .3 10 .9 2 3 .9 2 5 .2 8 .4 7 .7 5.1 4 .3 0 .8 1 0 0 .0 5 3 7
5 4 .2 5 .8 6 .2 1 5 .4 2 3 .4 18.1 1 7 .6 4 7  4 .0 0 .7 1 0 0 .0 551
6 7 .0 4.1 5 .4 1 0 .0 9 .9 2 1 .4 17  8 16.5 4 .0 4 .0 1 0 0 .0 54 5
7 1.9 3 .2 6.1 8 .6 10 .3 2 1 .8 17.1 1.9 10.1 4 .0 1 0 0 .0 5 68
8 2 .8 3 .6 3.1 4 .7 5 .2 8 .9 1 7 .4 2 3 .8  19.2 1 1 .2 1 0 0 .0 5 4 9
9 2 .9 0 .7 1.2 2 .9 4 .7 5 .0 13 .8 17 .9  3 2 .3 1 8 .6 1 0 0 .0 531
T o p m o s t 0 .9 2 .4 2 .0 0 .0 1.6 1.8 3 .4 8 8 2 4 .7 5 4 .4 1 0 0 .0 5 4 4
T o ta l 9 .3 10 .2 9 .6 1 0 .0 9 .9 10.1 10 .2 10.3 10 .4 9 .9 10 0 .0 5 3 9 7
Table 14 Change of individuals' position in deciles from 1993 to 1994,
distribution of the 1994 deciles by the 1993 situation
D e c i le D e c i le
Low st 2 3 4 5 6 7  8 9  T o p m o s t T o ta l
L o w e s t 5 9 .4 18.3 13 .9 2 .6 1.1 0 .5 2 .4  1.1 0 .5 1.6 8 .9
2 1 3 .0 3 5 .0 23  2 1 0 .7 5 .9 3 .3 0 .9  1 .7 2 .6 0 .9 9 .7
3 10 .3 17 .9 26.1 2 0 .3 1 1 .2 10 .3 2 .6  4 .4 1.3 2 .6 10 .6
4 4 .8 9 .0 11 .3 2 3 .8 2 5 .2 8 .2 7 .5  4 .9 4 .2 0 .8 10 .0
5 4 .6 5.8 6 .6 1 5 .7 2 4 .0 18 .2 17 .6  4 .7 3 .9 0 .7 10 .2
6 7 .6 4 .0 5 .6 10  1 10.1 2 1 .3 17 .5  16 .2 3 .9 4.1 10.1
7 2 .2 3.3 6 .7 9.1 10 .9 2 2 .6 1 7 .6  17 .3 1 0 .2 4 .2 10 .5
8 3.1 3 .6 3 .3 4 .8 5 .3 8 .9 17 .8  2 3 .7 1 8 .8 11 .5 10 .2
9 3.1 0 .7 1 .2 2 .9 4 .6 4 .8 13.3 17 .2 3 0 6 18.5 9 .8
T o p m o s t 0 .9 2 .4 2.1 - 1.6 1.8 3 .3  8 .7 2 4 .0 5 5 .2 10.1
T o ta l 1 0 0 .0 100.0 1 0 0 .0 1 0 0 .0 1 0 0 .0 10 0 .0 100 .0  1 0 0 .0 1 0 0 .0 10 0 .0 1 0 0 .0
N = 5 0 0 553 5 2 0 5 4 0 5 3 6 5 4 8 5 54  55 2 5 6 0 5 35 5 3 9 7
Table 15 Change of individuals' position in quintiles between 1992 and 1995
Q u in t i le  in  1 9 9 2 Q u in tile in 1995
1 2. 3. 4. 5. T o ta l N
L o w e r  q u in ti le 5 7 .8 2 4 .6 8 .4 5 .2 3 .9 1 0 0 .0 8 6 9
2. 18.4 4 0 .3 2 4 .6 9 3 7 .3 1 00  0 8 6 8
3. 11.1 17 .2 3 1 .6 2 7 .4 12 .7 10 0 .0 8 7 0
4. 9 .0 12 .6 2 0 .5 3 7 .7 20.1 10 0 .0 8 6 6
U p p e r  q u in ti le 3 .6 5 .4 1 4 .6 20 .5 5 5 .9 10 0 .0 8 6 9
T o ta l 10 0  0 1 00  0 1 0 0 .0 100 .0 10 0 .0 - 4 3 4 2
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Table 16 The frequency of individuals' poverty in the case of different poverty 
thresholds from 1992 to 1994
Frequency Below In the lowest Below 50% Below the
of poverty subsistence income of the minimum
level quintile average pension
Never poor 58.0 6 6 .6 81.6 89.3
Poor in one year 19.5 16.7 11.7 7.7
Poor in two years 12.4 9.6 3.7 2.4
Poor in all three years 10.2 7.1 3.1 0 . 6
Altogether 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Table 17 Proportion of lasting and transitory poverty in the case of the lowest
quintile as poverty threshold by age group, social stratum
and ethnicity, 1992-1994
A ge g ro u p , s o c ia l s tra tu m , e th n ic ity U se d  to  be lo n g  to  th e  lo w e s t q u in tile  from  1992 to  1994
In  3 years  In  2  years In 1 y e a r N e v e r A Jtogeth  N =  
e r
A g e  g r o u p  
0 -2 17.2 2 0 .4 11.5 5 1 .0 100.0 144
3-6 12.7 15.2 25 .0 47 .1 100.0 3 1 2
7 -1 4 13.0 15.1 16.5 5 5 .5 100.0 6 4 2
15-19 11 .8 12.5 19.9 5 5 .8 100.0 4 4 7
2 0 -29 7 .6 10.7 19.2 6 2 .5 100.0 7 9 4
3 0 -3 9 8.1 10.6 18.5 6 2 .9 100.0 7 9 6
4 0 -4 9 6 .2 9.6 16.2 6 8 .0 100.0 7 7 8
5 0 -5 9 4 .6 6 .8 11.1 7 7 .4 100.0 6 6 8
6 0 -6 9 2.0 3 .7 12.2 82.1 100.0 711
7 0  +
S o c ia l  s tra tum  
H ig h e r and m ed iu m
2.2 5.7 17.8 7 4 .3 100.0 5 8 7
m a n a g er 2.0 2.1 6.1 8 9 .8 100.0 143
P ro fessional 0.0 0.0 9.3 9 0 .7 100.0 240
S u p e rv iso r 0.0 1.1 12.9 8 6 .0 100.0 121
C le ric a l 1.3 3 .7 15.3 7 9 .8 100.3 3 8 2
S e lf-em p loyed 6.3 7.1 2 6 .7 5 9 .9 100.0 168
S k il le d  w orker 2.8 6 .6 15.7 7 4 .9 100.0 529
U n sk ille d  w orker 
P e a sa n t, ag ricu ltu ra l
4 .5 11.1 20 .8 6 3 .6 100.0 527
w o rk e r 5 .5 2 1 .0 16.7 5 6 .7 100.0 116
U n em p lo y ed 18.6 14.8 19.7 4 6 .9 100.0 226
C h ild  ca re  a llow ance 12.5 18.5 2 3 .2 4 5 .8 100 .0 186
O ld  a g e  pensioner 1.5 3 .4 13.1 8 2 .0 100 .0 1165
D is a b il ity  pensioner 
P e n s io n e r  on w idow 's
11 .4 16.4 14.9 5 7 .4 100.0 261
a llo w a n c e 5.3 9 .2 2 5 .4 60.1 100.0 148
In  h o u seh o ld 2 1 .9 19 8 18.4 3 9 .9 10 0 .0 103
O th e r  dependen t 
E th n ic i t y
16.4 22.3 14.2 47.1 100 .0 207
N o n -R o m a 4 .2 7.2 16.7 7 1 .9 100 .0 5473
R o m a 4 8 .3 25 .3 6 .8 19.6 10 0 .0 2 77
T o ta l  p o p u la tio n 7.1 9 .6 16,7 6 6 .6 10 0 .0 5879
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Table 18 Proportion of the dissatisfied by income quintiles, 1993
Respondent's satisfaction with Proportion of the dissatisfied, percentage
1
Lowest
2 3
Quintile
4 5
Topmost
One's life up to now 37.0 24.1 20.0 15.0 10.2
Living standards 54.3 39.9 36.7 31.3 23.2
Income 68.7 54.1 50.1 45.9 29.9
Future perspectives 55.0 45.0 42.4 36.4 28.8
Work 9.6 6.3 9.6 5.4 5.6
Home 22.1 9.9 10.6 6.5 8.0
Enviroiunent of home 18.2 12.5 12.9 11.3 14.2
Family 6.1 4.4 2.7 2.2 4.3
One's health status 28.1 28.5 26.2 18.9 14.1
Relatives and friends 6.1 5.6 3.7 3.6 2.3
Colleagues 4.5 3.4 5.9 4.5 2.3
Public safety 29.4 27.2 27.7 26.4 34.3
Condition of natural 
environment 27.5 26.8 28.2 25.6 39.2
Economic situation 
of the country 77.0 71.0 74.3 74.0 73.8
Citizens' possibilities for 
a say in political decisions 50.5 45.1 47.8 41.1 42.2
Table 19 Somatic and psychological manifestations of the state of mind among 
people aged 16 and above who belong to the lowest and topmost 
quintiles, 1993
State of mind Of the lowest Of the topmost 
quintile the occurrence of the symptom 
referred to was mentioned, percentage
Often exhausted, in low spirits 67.6 53.6
Often has palpitations 37.3 26.0
Constantly agitated, nervous 38.6 21.5
Often has strong headache 36.2 22.7
Often trembles 26.1 12.6
Mostly feels unlucky 73.5 37.8
Worries a lot about condition of health 
Gets mixed up if several things have to be done
44.7 30.4
in a short time 38.6 19.4
Cannot get rid of fears and anxiety 27.6 13.4
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Table 20 Manifestations of anomie and alienation among persons of 16 and older, 
belonging to the lowest and topmost quintiles, 1993
Anomie and alienation Proportion of those who said the statement 
put to them was entirely true, percentage
Of those belonging Of those belonging
to the lowest to the topmost
quintiles
Anyone who wants to achieve 
something is forced to violate 
certain rules 41.7 39.3
Nowadays I can hardly find 
my way in the issues of life 32.8 15.9
I can hardly influence my 
own fate
28.4 9.9
I often feel lonely 12.7 9.1
28
Róbert Tardos
THE NETWORK APPROACH: A NEW  PARADIGM?*
When you have only the quantitative criteria in mind, you may tend to give a 
positive answer to the question in the title. Even a cursory glance at the 
international literature reveals that over the past two decades, social network 
analysis has grown into one of sociology's most dynamically developing and partly 
already institutionalised approaches. Indications of this include the several 
thousand publications, the growing number of authors specialising in the field and 
organised separately. Other indices of institutionalisation include the large number 
of conferences and symposiums held on the theme, the increasing number of 
methodological manuals, the university courses on the approach and last but not 
least, the appearance of journals such as Social Networks and Connections.
The extensiveness of the areas addressed by the approach is also a sign of its 
take-off. Without any attempt at reviewing all the areas covered by network 
analysis, let us mention a few examples to illustrate the diversity of its application: 
internal integration of settlements, neighbourhood and kinship relations, network of 
the relations of various institutions including the market and public opinion, the 
centre-periphery relations of the global economy, structural positions of power 
elites, the intertwining of economic and political organisations, parties and their 
coalitions, and even such traditional concerns of sociology as stratification and 
mobility. However, the institutionalisation of the social network approach does not 
necessarily mean the emergence of a unified paradigm in the strict sense of the 
word. Not only the themes but also the levels of examination vary widely. The 
actors of networks are not only individuals but also groups, organisations, even 
nations, even if the methodological apparatus provides a relatively unified 
framework for research.
The theoretical foundations are also diverse; the manuals list dozens of sources. 
The most immediate precedent is the sociometric school hallmarked by the name of 
Moreno. Various indices of network analysis and the different forms of graphic 
representation were introduced into the approach and fiirther improved mainly by 
scholars coming from the field of sociometry. Today, this school puts its stamp 
principally on micro-network applications. Network analysis also received 
substantial impulses from communications research. Models to be mentioned here 
include the 'two-step' flow of communication (Lazarsfeld, Katz), the differentiation 
of 'local' and 'cosmopolitan' group roles attached to different communicational
* The article is based on a paper read at a section on "New roads in economic, business and 
social science training" of the jubilee conference of the Budapest University of Economic 
Sciences (28-30 September 1995) held under the title "New paradigms in sociology and 
economic psychology". The overview of the social network approach is based at several 
points on the collection of studies Hidden network o f  societies edited by Róbert Angelusz 
and the present author (Angelusz-Tardos 1991b).
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groups (Merton) or the research field of the diffusion of novelties (E. Rogers). 
Besides the roots mentioned in Moreno’s work, social psychology contributed the 
theories of cognitive balance (Heider, Festinger) especially to the network 
researchers focusing on dyadic and triadic formations. Social and structural 
anthropology stimulated the description of formal organisations such as the system 
of kinship relations or the elementary forms of exchange relations. The work of 
Radcliffe-Brown, Nadel and Lévi-Strauss stands out in this regard. As for 
sociological precedents in the stricter sense, the first to emphasise is the formal 
sociology of the early 20th century. Simmel's and von Wiese's research provided 
starting points for network analysts undertaking the classification and theoretical 
systematisation of group formations. Last but not least, the role of the mathematical 
graph and matrix theories is growing in the analytic arsenal of the approach. The 
specific terminology emerging as a result also differentiates the network literature 
from other trends even in its language.
What promises, what theoretical-methodological perspectives can have attracted 
so many social scientists to the trend? One of the most obvious advantages of the 
network approach was that it offered something more than the 'individual-centric, 
atomistic' outlook of the traditional survey method of empirical data collection. The 
latter is justly accused of removing the subjects from their social context and 
reducing their determinations to direct individual attributes. By contrast, the 
network approach, by taking into account the micro-milieu and the macro-context 
as well, besides the individual traits, offers the possibility of multi-level analysis. 
(This holds true despite the fact that, as in a considerable part of the cases, the 
network analyses arrive at social network characteristics after starting out from 
individual, 'ego-centred' data.) The approach may help bridge the gap which often 
rigidly separated micro- and macrosociological analyses. By handling the 
techniques flexibly, the implications grasped at one of the levels can be located in 
the frame of reference of the other level.
It needs emphasising that while this possibility exists, it certainly cannot be said 
that micro- and macro-analysis is typically combined in the whole of the network 
research. Possibly the highest number of papers in the literature are those that try to 
tackle the network relations of an (ego-centred) small community or individual 
without taking a look at their broader social embeddedness. While such 
delimitations may appear fully justified for the examination of certain partial 
problems (e g. those belonging to social psychology), the sociological perspectives 
of network analysis can only unfold from the combination of investigations at 
various levels. I have in mind the sort of complex treatment placed in deep relief 
by, for example Coleman's monumental summary (1990) (its consistent application 
also helped supersede the methodological individualism otherwise so typical of the 
theory of rational choice). Today, numerous fine examples can be cited of the 
strategic exploitation of the interplay of levels. Most of them belong to researches 
operationalising the major theoretical problems at intermediate level and testing 
their models empirically as well. In such central problems of sociology as, for 
example, social structure, stratification and mobility Burt (1982), Breiger (1982), 
Nan Lin (1990) and Pappi (1981) start out from micro-level network data in their 
efforts to define larger social formations (blocs, structural boundaries, classes).
30
Another, relatively rarer application of multi-tier analysis is the combination of 
network analysis and the contextual approach (in the narrow sense) when various 
typical traits of networks are conceived as contextual variables influencing 
behaviour and mentality. (This 'network as context'-based research method was 
adopted by Róbert Angelusz and the author in the late 80s, early 90s in a joint 
research, see Angelusz-Tardos 1991a.)
Structure as a focal concept
Above, the notion of structure has been repeatedly mentioned. One of the 
significant, if not the most vigorous, currents of the network approach uses it as its 
central category, to such an extent that many of its exponents use 'structure' and not 
'network' as the identifying label (e.g. Wellman 1991). At the opening session of 
the jubilee conference of Budapest University of Economic Sciences, Rudolf 
Andorka discussed with emphasis the changing views on structure in today's 
sociology. One of the main points of his overview of the history of theories 
highlighted the gradual change starting in the seventies - mainly in the wake of the 
work of Giddens and Bourdieu - from the earlier, strongly deterministic concept of 
structure, the mainstream of sociology for decades - to an approach which ascribed 
a far greater role to individual action in changing, or even creating structures. The 
network approach treads a unique path in trying to solve the structure/action, 
part/whole problems differently from both the former and the latter traditions. 
Although no unified theoretical background can be found in this regard either, 
some distinguishing traits are taking shape, at least in the standard works. Unlike 
several influential figures of present-day sociology affiliated mainly with various 
ramifications of symbolic interactionism, the network approach places less 
emphasis on individual action in creating structures but stresses the structural 
embeddedness of action. This, however, does not mean a one-sided deterministic 
attitude. Network analyses do not question the scope of action, though their starting 
point is the inner tensions, incongruences of structures and not individual 
intentions. Viewed from this angle, structure is not a ready-made, immediately 
conceivable given, but a latent organisation to be deciphered from the web of 
relations and transactions. In actual fact, not a single structure but a set of 
structures, blocs built up by various criteria and overlapping to varying degrees are 
at issue. Some Leitmotivs in the conceptual apparatus of one of the current leading 
theoreticians, Ronald Burt are also centred around the space of action. For 
example, "structural autonomy" (Burt 1982), which can be derived from the 
varying degrees of concentration on the input and output sides of market 
transactions, directly relates to the different profit chances of the market actors. The 
more recent notion of the "structural hole" (Burt 1992) is based on the interruptions 
and vacuums in networks and blocs, when the brokers who fill these gaps, the 
"entrepreneurs" in the Schumpeterian sense who reshuffle the positions (e.g. in 
economic organisations) gain substantial advantages in mobility.
A further methodological advantage of the network approach is its ability to 
grasp empirically the structural compulsions embodied in group formation and
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those individual actions as a result of which these structural compulsions are 
constantly modified. Network analyses point out emphatically that such market 
formations as the oligopolies present a fundamental structural constraint for all 
market participants but at the same time shed light on processes by which the 
powerfully influential actors of the market may transform the existing market 
structures via actions within their networks of relations (e.g. mutual board 
memberships, manifest or latent co-ordination through various power circles).
Another aspect of the above is the superseding of the antinomy of the static and 
dynamic approaches. Although the network analyses aiming at describing structural 
forms imply a static tendency, the subject itself carries dynamism: the potential of 
restructuring is more obviously inherent in network formations than in more 
petrified institutional forms. Of course, the most direct exploration of the 
development and transformation of network relations could best be done by 
longitudinal analyses, but the most typically available cross-section investigations 
may also throw light on the nodes of tension, gaps within the network, 'irregular' 
relations which are predictive signs of changes within the group or intergroup 
relations. The systematic examination of weak bonds besides the strong bonds may 
also reveal intergroup relations and mobilities reaching beyond the dense texture of 
intimate networks and embodying the element of dynamism (Granovetter's theory 
of "the strength of weak ties" lays special emphasis on the instrumental value and 
dynamic potential of certain types of network positions, see Granovetter 1974).
Main approaches to social behaviour
There are two main approaches to the description of social behaviour: one depends 
on the similarity of structural situations, the other on the immediate interactions, 
the closeness of contact. Though not eliminating the differences, network approach 
integrates both trends into its own complex of problems and in theory, the two 
kinds of approaches can be applied in combination. For example, an empirical 
examination can be made of whose behaviours are more closely similar to each 
other: those who are positionally similar (not in immediate interaction with each 
other, spatially separated but in the micro- or macronetworks occupying identical 
positions) or those who are in communicative relationship (but in fundamentally 
different positions). Burt carried out the conscious differentiation of the two 
approaches and the categorisation of the related analytic and research techniques by 
confronting the relational and positional approaches at the levels of the individual, 
the group and the structured system. The procedures based both on structural 
equivalence and the principle of cohesion can be fruitful in their clear cross- 
reference.
That said, one may rightly raise the question of what place network analysis 
occupies in the field of such concurrent theoretical paradigms as functionalism, 
conflict theory and symbolic interactionism. The above has suggested that the 
flexibility inherent in network analysis, the concentration on the latent 
organisations instead of manifest institutional and group formations result in a 
surplus as compared to the often rigid approach of functionalism toward institutions
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and groups, and to the image of society presented by conflict theory by too sharply 
contrasting different parties as to position and interests. The actual network 
formations plotted by empirical researches disprove the degree of sharp delineation 
implied by rigid theoretical presuppositions as to institution, class or group. At the 
same time, the two main branches of network analysis, positional and relational, 
differ in their affinities with major theoretical schools. The relational approach 
relying on the concept of cohesion leans towards symbolic interactionism, while 
positional analyses are more closely related with interest-centred conflict theory. 
On the whole, however, network analysis intersects the traditional theoretical 
stances rather than identifies with one or the other.
In view of all this, the question must be asked again: is the network approach a 
coherent theoretical trend, similarly to those discussed above? Taking into account 
the normative requirements of a theory, for the time being initiatives, individual 
building blocks are at hand rather than a unified edifice. The revival of the outlook 
or approach is closer to the point than the creation of a new theoretical system - and 
that may constitute a new paradigm. And, of course, the methodology and specific 
techniques also differentiate the social network trend from other approaches to 
social science. The critical reviews warning of the danger of a sort of 
methodological formalism and arbitrariness implied by the sophistication of the 
technical apparatus are not altogether unfounded. Still in the critical tone, a sort of 
trap is implied by the fact that the boundaries of networks can rarely be tangibly 
conceived. The flexibility of the approach may easily slip into vagueness.
Some issues of content
There is a major dividing line in content between researchers interested in the form 
or formations of the network when approaching fields of contact or structural 
formations, and scholars going beyond the realm of networks, at times using the 
network positions as independent variables, who focus on such crucial issues of 
sociology as social stratification, centre-periphery relations, social integration, or 
various pressing social problems. Although the former approach is in general 
perfectly justified, the danger of self-contained formalism must however be avoided. 
I, for one, am drawn to the latter research approach, and the references made in this 
paper mostly belong to this current.
Since the social network approach is no longer so young, having a past of nearly 
two decades, it is not out of place to ask: to what extent have the actual works 
fulfilled the promise and exploited the possibilities implied by the approach. 
Undoubtedly, there are numerous programmes unrealised, fundamental works 
unwritten, initiatives broken off. One may have the impression that after the take­
off of the first decade when the practitioners of the approach joined forces to 
promote the institutionalisation of the discipline, the zeal has slackened.
In my view, research interest has survived but the emphasis has shifted from the 
peculiarities of the methodology to more substantive problems within each 
discipline of sociology. In numerical terms alone, papers using the approach at 
issue published in the leading journals of the profession (e.g. American Journal o f
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Sociology, American Sociological Review) have increased recently. Although for 
some time there was a lack of comprehensive standard works and synthesising 
monographs, positive developments can be observed in this regard, too. Burt's 
Structural Holes, published in 1992, the summary of research work for a decade 
was rightly called by Robert Merton the masterpiece of structural analysis, a path- 
setter both in theory, methodology and empirical research. That was also when one 
of the most creative personalities of the trend, and perhaps of present-day sociology 
in general, Harrison White published his volume. His Identity and Control, 
subtitled A structural theory o f social action (White 1992) may seem to formulate 
the questions and hypotheses for the sociology of the 21st century. Undoubtedly, the 
even more esoteric style than usual may hinder the reception of the author’s ideas, 
but since most initiatives of the trend can be traced back to this workshop, White's 
new work covering nearly the entire territory of sociology will certainly fertilise 
research for the next years and decades.
The influence of the network paradigm on sociology
The vitality of the network paradigm is also indicated by its strong influence on 
other disciplines of sociology. First and foremost, 'new economic sociology' must be 
mentioned. Its number one source, as Swedberg states in his recent overview 
(Swedberg 1995), was the social network approach. The genesis of 'new economic 
sociology' is itself linked with the programmatic article of network theorist 
Granovetter (Granovetter 1995). Burt and White, mentioned above, also regard 
several of their analyses of market structures or the research on interpenetration 
based on overlapping of directorial boards as integral parts of 'new economic 
sociology'. Besides economic sociology, important impulses were received by the 
sociologies of organisation, politics and history from network, structural and 
contextual analyses.
The network paradigm in Hungary
Let us briefly review the influence of the current in Hungary. Though far from 
being one of the most influential paradigms, network analyses have emerged in 
Hungarian sociology as well. One important field of application is the research of 
family, kinship and sponsorship relations; research findings, many of them from 
this approach, are summed up in a volume of studies published in the early 90s 
(Utasi 1991, see also Somlai 1992). In the works of Ágnes Czakó and Endre Sik, 
the network approach assumed an important role in the analysis of informal 
transactions of economic organisations and labour exchange relations based on 
reciprocity (Czakó-Sik 1987; Sik 1988). In this research line the concept of network 
capital has also been used (the self-organising network forms of the labour market 
are a major research field of Gyekiczky 1994). Several authors have introduced the 
network resources conceived in various ways as economic input factors. József 
Böröcz and his American co-author undertook the secondary analysis of research in
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Hungary from this angle; their findings confirmed the role of the network factors in 
economic prosperity and the achieved income level from another direction (Böröcz- 
Southworth 1995). György Lengyel and István János Tóth demonstrated similar 
correlations in the field of entrepreneurial recruitment (Lengyel-Tóth 1993). Zoltán 
Szántó made an attempt to pursue theoretically the implications of network analysis 
for the research of stratification and structure (Szántó 1991). At the end of this 
incomplete overview, let me mention the researches conducted by Róbert Angelusz 
and the present author. One of the pillars of our cultural-interactional stratification 
research was the network (and contextual) approach (see Angelusz-Tardos 1991a). 
Our two readers selected from the international literature of network analysis were 
aimed at promoting the reception of the trend in Hungary (Szociológiai Figyelő 
1988/2 and Angelusz-Tardos 1991b).
This very brief overview may also have revealed some focal points in Hungarian 
research, together with areas receiving less attention. The exponents of the 
approach seem to have devoted the profoundest attention to the individual approach 
to network resources in the investigation of the ways status positions are reached. 
So far little attention has been given to the exploration of structural relations and 
latent organisations between agencies and institutions. And while research into the 
overlappings and interpenetrations via multiple memberships is almost a 
commonplace in British and American social science research (at least in 
Swedberg's judgement), it is - not the only - white spot in Hungary. The slowly 
crystallising new socio-economic relations do offer remarkable nodes of problems 
for the expanding circle of the Hungarian practitioners of network analysis.
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Gabriella Fogarassy-Zoltán Szántó
PRIVATISATION AND THE LAUGHING THIRD1
Introduction
A central measure of the success of the change of economic system seems to be the 
transformation of the structure of ownership. State ownership can be dismantled 
(can disintegrate) and various forms of private ownership can be created (can 
emerge) in a variety of ways: from spontaneous privatisation through diverse forms 
of Management Buy-Out (MBO) and Employees' Part Ownership (EPO) to 
ownership by outside investors (professional and financial, domestic or foreign 
investors). In this investigation, our aim - among others - was the exploration of a 
usually hidden aspect of such processes of privatisation: the strategic interactions 
among the actors of privatisation. One of our aims was then to present, categorise 
and empirically illustrate the interactions (efforts to acquire annuity or influence, to 
protect or gain status, to create coalitions, bargaining processes, position fights) 
which may explain, at least in part, the outcome, success or failure, of various 
attempts at privatisation. To put it another way, our goal was to clarify the 
preconditions of privatisation processes in terms of interpersonal relations.
In this paper, the emphasis is laid on the importance of three-actor relations 
(’triads') among the preconditions studied.2 The fundamental objective is to outline 
the role of typical three-actor relations in the preparation and realisation of 
privatisation, and summarise some experiences of the investigation allowing for 
generalisation. These, in fortunate cases, may pave the way for further 
examinations and hypotheses. At first, as the point of theoretical-conceptual 
departure, we sum up the classic view of the triad as expounded by Georg Símmel 
and Theodore Caplow.3 Based chiefly on a case study of the research (Fogarassy 
1995), we then present various types of triadic interactions which fundamentally 
influenced the procedure and outcome of privatisation at the firm studied. The 
argumentation is closed with a brief summary.
Símmel and Caplow on the triad
The roots of the theory of three-party interactions reach back to the work of Georg 
Símmel (Símmel 1950: 118-169). In Simmel's definition, the job of the sociologist 
is to create the 'geometry' of society, to systematically analyse the social 
interactions. In his view, the subject-matter of sociological investigation does not 
include individual phenomena, but the interrelations of conflict and co-operation, 
sub- and superordination, centralism and decentralism. Símmel clearly regarded 
the examination of the formal aspect of social life as of central importance, which is 
also confirmed by the fact that the programme of sociology he proclaimed is still
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called formal sociology. This approach - belonging to the field of formal 
microsociology - is also reflected in the analysis of triadic relations.
Simmel describes the triad in comparison with the isolated individual and the 
dyad. The simplest social formation can arise involving two actors. Its essential 
feature is intimacy, its sociological significance being chiefly its extensibility. The 
most important dyadic relationship, in Simmel's view, is monogamous marriage in 
which the birth of a child, the appearance of the third party, may strengthen the 
relationship. The sociological significance of the third actor is that it may either 
reinforce or undermine the original dyadic relationship. The third may join the 
already established relationship between two persons (or groups): in a conflict as an 
arbiter, or as a counterweight to the contradictory claims of the other two parties. It 
may even capitalise on the strife between the dyadic parties. In this case, it is in the 
position of the laughing third - tertius gaudens - meaning that a third party takes 
advantage of the existing or emerging fight ('strife') between two actors 
(individuals, groups, parties, etc.).4 The buyer, for example, is in this situation in an 
economy in which the producers are truly competitive.5 The buyer, as the laughing 
third, enjoys the advantages that derive from the rivalry of the two economic actors, 
e.g. reduced prices, improved quality. From this situation Simmel distinctly 
differentiated the one in which the third intentionally kindles antagonism, rivalry 
or conflict between the two actors. That situation implies the relations of divide and 
rule - divide et impera. Typical examples of this can be cited mainly from politics 
in which one actor intentionally arouses (or enhances) the political, religious, 
ethnic, etc. conflicts between two or more groups, chiefly in the interest of 
reinforcing or improving its own power position.
Simmel's arguments had a fermenting influence on subsequent research, 
including on modem coalition theory. The formation of a coalition satisfying the 
definition of Caplow's coalition theory (Caplow 1956; 1959; see also Csontos 1985: 
118-127) largely depends on the initial distribution of power among the potential 
members of the coalition. The analysis highlights the possible variations of the 
relationship among three actors having different power.6 The theory rests on the 
following postulates:
А-l: the elements of the triad (the potential members of the coalition) differ as to 
the extent of power they have. The stronger actors may impose their will on the 
weaker ones.
A-2: all members of the triad make efforts to impose their will on the most 
possible partners in the game.
A-3: the power of the actors is additive, i.e. the strength of the coalition equals 
the sum total of the strength of its constituent members.
A-4: the coalition comes about in an existing three-actor situation. When the 
more powerful player tries to force the weaker into a coalition that is 
disadvantageous for the latter, then the weaker party will try to create a coalition 
that is advantageous for him, so as to offset the compulsion.
Starting out from these theorems, Caplow differentiated eight basic types of the 
triadic coalition situations. These eight types may occur in three different situations 
(Caplow 1959: 489-490).
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1. In continuous situations, coalitions aim to control the collective activity of the 
triad and to gain goods which derive from the situation itself.
2. In occasional situations, the aim of a coalition of stable composition is to solve 
occasional but recurrent problems of power division.
3. In life-and-death situations, the aim of the coalition is the final solution of the 
single problem of power division, even at the cost of the "annihilation" of one 
another.
Based on the above, Caplow formulated the following hypotheses concerning the 
outcome of situations in which triadic coalitions are to be formed:
Which coalition will emerge?
Type Features Continuous Occasional Life-and-death
1 . A=B=C any any any
2. A>B, B=C, A<(B+C) BC any any
3. A<B, B=C AB or AC any BC
4. A>(B+C), B=C none none none
5. A>B>C, A<(B+C) BC or AC any none
6. A>B>C, A>(B+C) none none none
7. A>B>C, A=(B+C) AB or AC AB or AC BC
8. A=(B+C). B=C AB or AC AB or AC BC
In the table, the potential members are designated A, В and C. The relations of magnitude as 
the characteristic of the coalition apply to the initial division of power in the coalition.
Privatisation and the triad
To illustrate the strategic interactions to be presented in a model, we used the 
example of the privatisation of the large enterprise ABC7.8 The last general director 
of the company was appointed in 1985. The top management of the enterprise 
comprised four persons in 1985: General Director I.G., Financial Director 
Mrs.F.K., Technical Director M.I., and Commercial Director K.I. In 1985, there 
was no trace of any conflict among the top leaders. Soon, however, it turned out 
that there were points of contention among them.
Conflicts among the top leaders prior to privatisation: divide and rule!
The disintegration of the team began with the departure of M I. "He didn't get on so 
well with the number one boss," K.I. said in the interview. M.I. received a 
favourable offer from a partner of the enterprise and as I.G. did not insist on his 
staying, he left. His leave made K.I. realise that no one was irreplaceable, and on 
the other hand, that the team was no longer the same. K.I. retraces the roots of the 
acrimonious conflicts among the leaders during the privatisation processes to this 
point.
39
The management of the firm thus comprised three persons before privatisation 
(I.G., Mrs.F.K., and K.I.). The relations between the three leaders had been 
deteriorating for years. Serious differences of opinion arose between I.G. and K.I. 
on professional issues. In K.I.'s view, the firm ought to have concentrated on the 
production of the best item, even at the cost of reduced output or staff cutback. The 
professional conflict was further deepened by the personality differences of the two 
leaders: K.I. is a venturesome, inventive, outspoken, autonomous person, while I.G. 
is a 'sly fox' who enjoys the security of a large organisation and is more of the 
employee type. Both had spent a long time with the firm, climbing the ladder of 
promotion. They had accumulated a great amount of firm-specific knowledge. They 
are the 'captives' of the organisation in a peculiar sense of the word: their 
enterprise-specific knowledge, their positions with the firm and the ensuing 
annuity-like income all tie them to the firm.9 Both are well acquainted with the 
firm and the employees, the majority of whom usually took K.I.'s side in disputes. 
So I.G. had to "keep his wits about him" to be able to preserve his prestige and 
influence in the firm. He had two tools to this end: dividing the leadership, which 
ensured that his colleagues (the other two top leaders, plus at times some groups of 
middle managers) would not join forces against him; and the retention of 
information, which made it hard to oppose him. I.G. resorted to both tools: conflicts 
became more and more aggravated in the leadership and by the time of the 
privatisation, nearly all middle managers and employees had committed themselves 
to one or the other top leader. The majority, as was mentioned, supported K.I. To 
monopolise information, I.G. more and more frequently conducted the talks about 
the future of the firm alone. During the privatisation process, he did not involve 
either of his colleagues. "The State Privatisation Agency (ÁVÜ) put me in charge 
of this job, made me responsible for ensuring that every candidate has identical 
information in the interest of fair competition," I.G. explained his strategy. This 
gave him information monopoly within the firm and enabled him to pick the future 
owner, in return for which, he could even hope for some compensation (e g. 
retaining his position).10
The role of the third leader, Mrs.F.K., is important because it is most probably 
her decision in the position fight between the other two parties that would tilt the 
scales in one direction. Mrs.F.K. is a reserved person, governed powerfully by her 
emotions and passions. She is an outstanding specialist but not an autonomous 
person. She likes to work under stable guidance. Besides, her authority and 
influence within the organisation are far smaller than those of the commercial 
director or the general director.
Prior to the privatisation, thus the typical triadic interaction was a 'divide and 
rule' game involving K.I. with the majority of middle managers and employees 
behind him, I.G. who was perceiving the rapid decline of his influence within the 
organisation, and the temporarily neutral Mrs.F.K. who had little authority within 
the unit. Having realised that he could not rival the authority and influence of K.I. 
in the company, the top leader of the company tried to deliberately aggravate the 
conflicts and block the potential K.I.- Mrs.F.K. coalition, hoping to improve his 
position thereby.
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Comparing this with Caplow’s situations, the closest analogy can be found with 
type 5, with the reservation that this situation is closer to the continuous case. In 
regard to influence in the firm, the unquestionable order is K.I., I.G., Mrs.F.K. It 
can be justly assumed, however, that K.I. did not have enough 'authority' to put 
through his ideas alone". First of all, because he was not the top leader. Second, 
because K.I.'s former propositions - apart from the establishment of the foreign 
trade company, which served the interests of the firm at least as much as the 
financial gain of the sales personnel - could be foiled by I.G. That said, the K.I.- 
Mrs.F.K. or the I.G.-Mrs.F.K. coalitions were the most probable, according to 
Caplow’s hypotheses. K.I. and I.G. both sought the favour of the third party, who 
tried to improve her own relative position in league with I.G. or to maximise the 
power of the coalition by ganging up with K.I. - with equal chances for the two 
options, as Caplow asserts. There are, however, two more arguments that support 
the better chances of the I.G.-Mrs.F.K. coalition (Csontos 1985: 123): 1. that is the 
cheapest winning coalition, 2. the third party knows that compared to the strongest 
member, her own bargaining power is smaller than compared to the medium-strong 
member. It follows from this that there is a greater chance for the I.G.-Mrs.F.K. 
alliance to develop.
Conflicts among the top managers during privatisation: 
the laughing (and weeping) third
The conflicts escalated among the leaders during privatisation. These conflicts, the 
lack of unified guidance had a major role in the decline of the company which 
became manifest by the early 90s in the drop in production, failure to develop, loss 
of markets and production with a deficit. A state of bankruptcy arose by summer 
1993: the applications invited for the privatisation of the enterprise all ended 
without success, and financially, a quasi-bankruptcy emerged. The problem was the 
most serious for the financing bank: the enterprise's stock of credit had risen to 
equal the value of its assets. The bank was not the owner but tried to acquire some 
ownership rights. To this end, it appointed bank commissioners to the helm of the 
firm. Another triadic game was on the rise: in addition to the two existing camps, 
another gang - the bank commissioners - appeared with the increasingly obvious 
goal of getting hold of the enterprise's assets together with the bank: "The real aim 
was to obtain the firm's shares jointly with the bank. Bank commissionership w'as 
the first step," Bank Commissioner B.B., today member of the board of directors, 
commented.
The inner strife foiled an in-house buy-out and the acquisition of ownership by 
the middle managers at several points. In the first attempt, I.G. asked K.I. to work 
out a buy-out project. In K.I.'s plan, the lower-ranking managers had to get shares 
as well because they were in immediate contact with the workers and had a 
significant influence on running the company. K.I. precisely named the 15 key 
persons who ought to have been co-opted among the shareholders. When, however, 
he told G.I. of his idea, it soon turned out that the director had other plans: he did 
not want to extend the circle of owners so wide. Thus the first attempt was baulked
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by I.G. The earlier professional conflict between the two leaders further deepened, 
and both set out along their own paths.
With two external board members12, I.G. submitted a leasing tender for 
privatisation, without informing the other leaders. This the SPA turned down, 
allegedly for formal reasons. The other side also took steps: K.I., together with 
K.K., tried to talk the leaders into concerted action and submitting a joint 
declaration to the SPA that they laid a claim to the firm. Naturally, they did not 
want to involve I.G. People were already inflamed, but then Mrs.F.K. (one of the 
three top leaders) refused to sign the declaration. She mentioned two reasons in 
explanation: first, she did not see an in-house buy-out possible without I.G. being 
involved. Second, in her view, the enterprise would collapse financially without the 
bank commissioners, so nothing ought to be done that might jeopardise the 
favourable relationship with the bank and its representatives. Mrs.F.K.'s behaviour 
disheartened the others: only one of the three top leaders supported the proposition, 
so the others backed out. The attempt failed.
The prognosis worded at the end of the previous subchapter - notably, that the 
coalition of K.I.-Mrs.F.K. indispensable for an in-house buy-out would not come 
about - seems to be verified. Instead, Mrs.F.K. allied herself with I.G.13 Apart from 
the logic of the situation - primarily conceivable in terms of the peculiar 
distribution of power inequalities in the organisation, other factors (e g. the 
personality traits and risk-taking willingness of the participants) also had a share in 
bringing about this league. At any rate, it is a fact that neither at this point nor 
earlier did the necessary coalition for buying out from the inside arise, and the 
conflicts in the top management largely contributed to the failure of all internal 
attempts to this end.
The last, and successful, competition14 to privatise the firm is associated with the 
bank commissioners. Seeing the rapidly deteriorating financial position, 
indebtedness of the enterprise, the lending bank appointed bank commissioners 'in 
the person' of the GHI Ltd. to audit the company. Thanks to the manoeuvres of the 
bank commissioners, they managed to acquire the enterprise in the so-called one- 
forint transaction, with the backing of the bank. The true beneficiary of the conflict 
within the top management was the third party, the tertius gaudens, the new owner. 
The wrangling at the top, partly taking the form of different opinions on 
professional issues and partly derived from conscious position fights, provided the 
third actor with the opportunity - indirectly, through the deteriorating performance 
and indebtedness of the firm, and directly, through the failure to buy out the firm 
internally, to acquire the enterprise's assets. The real loser of the situation (the 
'weeping' third) were the middle managers. Their situation was probably less 
favourable (both in terms of income and in terms of power position within the 
enterprise) than it could have been, had the MBO-EPO construction envisaged by 
K.I. earlier been successful.
Among the post-privatisation structural and personnel changes, the termination 
of the foreign trade company and the departure of the trade division leaders K.I. 
and K.K. have special relevance to our topic. The new owners decreed that the 
successful running of the enterprise was incompatible with its top leaders having 
private enterprises in the same line of business. Those who had such enterprises
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had to choose between their own business and remaining with the firm. K.I. and 
K.K. decided on their own firm.
Of course, it cannot be precluded that all this was merely a good excuse for I.G. - 
who remained managing director after the privatisation - to get rid of his old 
rivals.15 Most probably the new owners were also aware that K.I. and K.K., who 
enjoyed the backing of most middle managers, would have been 'tougher partners' 
than I.G. and Mrs.F.K. Whether such considerations were to be found behind the 
idea of the new owners or not, they were again in the most favourable position of 
the laughing third: those leaders of the defunct firm remained in position (first of 
all I.G. and Mrs.F.K., the new financial director) who did not have a strong 
bargaining position in face of the new owners since they were not supported by the 
majority of the middle managers. They were the ones who courted the favour of the 
new owners: "K.I. and K.K. had nearly all the middle managers behind them, as 
compared to I.G., who had only one or two loyal apparatchiks... That was also why 
our appearance at the firm was important for him," former Bank Commissioner and 
present Board President B.B. recalled. I.G. and Mrs.F.K. sought their allies among 
the new owners, and in league with them they have won over the middle managers 
with the passing of time.
Closing remarks
Strategic interaction among the top leaders, and conflict-laden efforts to get the 
right to annuity and position, as aptly illustrated by the above example, may 
fundamentally influence the process and outcome of privatisation. On the one hand, 
they may impede or even prevent internal buy-outs and the initiatives of the 
employees to acquire part ownership, and on the other hand, they may make things 
easy for the potential new owners. By clarifying the unintentional side-effects of 
differences and strife among the top leaders it may be possible to get closer to the 
exploration of interpersonal relations as preconditions of privatisation processes. 
An analysis of privatisation jointly in terms of economics and sociology might in 
fortunate cases promote the more thorough understanding of the microstructure of 
the processes.
Notes
1 The paper is part of an OTKA research (T006730) entitled "The economic sociology 
examination of hierarchic economic organisations". The research is headed by László 
Csontos (Central European University, Department of Political Science - Dept, of Sociology, 
Budapest University of Eeconomic Sciences) with participants Lajos Bódis (BUES, Dept, of 
the Economics of Human Resources), Hajnalka Fényes (BUES, Ph.D. student), Béla Janky 
(BUES, undergraduate), László Szakadát (BUES, Dept, of Microeconomics) and the authors 
of the paper. On the theoretical presuppositions and hypotheses of the research, see Csontos 
1994. On the preliminary studies and partial results, see: Bódis 1995, 1996; Fényes-Janky 
1996; Fogarassy 1995; Szakadát 1993; 1995. We owe thanks to the head of the research 
project and the participants for their valuable insights.
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2 Since the classic analyses of Georg Símmel (Símmel 1950) it is a sociological 
commonplace that the appearance of the third actor - in typical cases - brings about a 
qualitative change in interpersonal relations. The argument can also be extended to 
supraindividual actors (social classes, states, political parties, etc.). In Jon Elster's view, the 
Marxian analyses of the efforts of capitalists, workers and landowners to establish coalitions 
anticipated, embedded in a rich historical material, the classic theses of Símmel and Caplow 
(see Elster 1985: 379-390). In Hungarian research literature, thought-provoking 
argumentation can be found in Somlai's study (1992) on the triad.
3 In this brief overview, only the theoretical-conceptual issues conducive to the 
understanding of the paper are clarified. The detailed presentation of the theories in question 
would exceed the scope of this paper.
4 In the theory of the structural holes bom from the encounter of economic sociology and 
network analysis, the role of the laughing third is, among others, to bridge the structural 
holes as mediators or entrepreneurs (Burt 1992).
5 Símmel commented on market competition: "Since the tools of competition imply 
advantages enjoyed by a third actor, the costs of the agreement to renounce them must also 
be borne by these third persons, i.e. the consumers in the economy" (Símmel 1973: 290).
6 It should be noted here that Caplow's analyses were later to be generalised to four-actor 
(tetradic) situations as well (see e.g. Willis 1962; Segal 1979).
7 Fictitious name, designed to prevent identification of the firm. All names included are 
fictitious.
8 For more detail see Fogarassy 1995.
9 Nevertheless this statement applies more truly to I.G., than to K.I. Outsiders, first of all the 
potential new owners of the firm, can also perceive it and exploit it in the bargaining 
processes of privatisation.
10 ". . .for example, the bank asked my opinion if I would accept the bank commissioners, if I 
could work together with them. Had I said no, they would have sent someone else. I was 
completely calm to the end, I thought they were in a decision-making situation, they would 
tell me if they still needed my work or not," I.G. commented on the appointment of the bank 
commissioners who, as will be seen, became the key actors in privatisation.
11 Without the other two top leaders. Many of the lower-ranking leaders would have 
supported him, first of all K.K., the head of the foreign trade company, who had won as 
much influence in the company within a few years as his much more experienced superiors 
with a better insight into the local conditions. This is proved among other things by the 
single greatest change in the enterprise over the 80s, the establishment of the foreign trade 
company, which is to his credit in the first place. In this structural transformation his 
number one supporter was K.I.
12 The enterprise was converted into a joint stock company in 1991. The managing director 
and president of the board of directors was I.G.
13 This became even more obvious in :he light of later developments.
14 In the meantime, there were other unsuccessful attempts at privatisation. These, however, 
not being relevant to this theme, are not discussed here. 15
15 Facts can be put forward in support of both possibilities. Those involved naturally 
comment on this question from their own angle and interests. This makes the reconstruction 
of events more difficult.
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Éva Várhegyi
THE SELECTION OF BANK M ANAGERS IN H UNG ARY  
IN THE 80s AND 90s
The transformation of the Hungarian banking system is an important element of the 
development of a market economy. The banking sector, which used to have official 
and public administration functions, is increasingly becoming the scene of 
competitive business ventures. Presumably the transformation of the functions of 
banks sets new expectations towards the leaders: the meritocratic outlook and 
professional skills are being revalued, together with experts who are able to adjust 
to the quickly changing market environment by their openness towards the new.
The present paper tries to test this, apparently logical hypothesis by studying the 
changes in the composition of the bank managers, in their professional aptitude, 
and by exploring the possible motivations behind the recalls and appointments.' As 
the share of state ownership, and hence the influence of government has remained 
significant in the Hungarian banking system during the period under survey, the 
political aspects of the selection of bank managers cannot be disregarded either. So 
much so that the guiding factor chosen for the analysis was the changes of 
government besides the changes taking place in the institutions of banks.
The establishment of the two-tier system of banking: 
first generation bank managers
Antecedents: the characteristics o f  the one-tier system o f  hanking
In the one-tier system of banking, suited to the classical planned economy, the 
National Bank of Hungary (MNB) was at once a bank of issue as well as a credit 
(commercial) bank.2 In addition to the MNB, only the National Savings Bank 
(OTP), authorised to collect the deposits of the general public and to extend credit, 
the savings co-operatives, the Hungarian Foreign Trade Bank (MKB), established 
to handle the money circulation of foreign trade, and the State Development Bank 
(ÁFB), created to finance the central investments, performed the tasks of financial 
institutions. There was the curious symbiosis of the Central Financial Institute and 
the General Bank of Securities, which had a role partly of a financial institution 
and partly of an authority, handling matters related to foreign property.
MNB, in the role of the central bank, was an important economic organisation of 
the planned economy system as it had a significant role in the development of the 
plans of the national economy as well as in their implementation. The MNB 
participated in calculating the annual development plans of the different branches, 
together with the National Planning Office, the Ministry of Finance and the 
respective ministries, and also the necessary amount of money and credit, and
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fierce political battles and bargains stood behind those activities. The financial 
plans were adjusted to the development plans of branches defined in kind, of which 
the credit plan was derived by prognosticating the resources of enterprises. After 
the plan was finalised, the credit directorate of MNB was left only with an 
executive task: to be at the disposal of the various branches with the necessary 
credit.
The credit extension activity of the MNB was greatly refined over the years 
within the limitations of the planned economy. Selections were attempted among 
the companies belonging to different branches by an increasingly professional 
assessment of creditworthiness, naturally within the limitations of the branches. 
From the mid-seventies onwards the MNB evolved a scope of credit, independent of 
the branches, primarily to finance investments serving import substitution and the 
reduction of energy consumption. The assessment of credit given for such purposes 
was preceded by a more thorough preliminary investigation than usual, and the 
utilisation of credit was also controlled. In the 80s, during the course of the 
allocation of credit given by the World Bank, even the indices of up-to-date credit 
assessment were employed in the MNB, which further extended the expertise of the 
creditors.
Though the quality of credit extension was rather poor in the mirror of results in 
the 70s and 80s, the credit personnel of the MNB learned a significant part of the 
technical skills which are employed in the banks of market economies. The 
methodology of applying for and granting credit (for instance, the financial indices 
studied) greatly resembled the ones used in the Austrian and German banks. The 
differences in the quality of credit can be explained more by indirect, and often 
direct political pressure, than by the lack of skills. The creditors were forced to 
accept the fact that credit had to be allocated to certain politically important big 
companies, irrespective of the financial indicators.
However, beyond political pressure, prudent credit was also hindered by the fact 
that nothing was at stake when decisions were made about credit. If the indices 
necessary to prove that the applicant was creditworthy were arithmetically correct, 
the decision-makers could not be taken to task. True, it was nobody's interest to 
subsequently disclose the wrong decisions. If it became obvious that an earlier 
allocation of credit was a mistake, the creditors of the bank and the financial 
managers of the company taking the credit supported each other, proving that poor 
performance was attributable to the deterioration of external conditions.
By the 80s the MNB had a team o f  credit specialists which partially had the 
proper financial knowledge to perform correct credit assessment as the basis of 
decisions on credit allocation under adequate conditions of responsibility.3 
Naturally this knowledge was deficient, since the study of numerous factors (such 
as the ownership background of the debtor, his/her relationship to suppliers and 
customers, the quality of management) was indifferent or unimportant.
In addition to extending credit, another important field of the MNB of growing 
significance from the mid-70s onwards was foreign currency. Drawing credit for 
the country, the handling of debt and receivables and of currency reserves required 
special skills not possessed in other institutions. The foreign currency division of 
the bank was also surrounded by the curious atmosphere of secrecy which derived
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from the circumstances difficult to control from the outside which were 'produced' 
by currency arbitrage and for which the head of the field even reaped political 
laurels. (Naturally the losses that inevitably incurred in the case of such 
transactions were kept secret.)
The prestige of the foreign currency sphere was also enhanced by the fact that 
only specially reliable people  could be employed there. To a large extent the basis 
of recruitment was the circle of ambitious young men trained at the special 
universities (for example, the ones training diplomats) in the Soviet Union, or at 
the department of international relations of the Karl Marx University of Economic 
Sciences, and speaking foreign languages. It was expedient to support knowledge in 
the field of international relations with signs of political reliability (party 
membership, activity in the Young Communist League).
The mostly young and receptive experts working in this field acquired almost 
unique knowledge in important branches of banking. They also had the possibility 
to acquire professional practice in the foreign affiliates of the MNB and in the 
branch offices for durations varying between a few months and a few years, and 
they could even do responsible jobs, which helped this cadre in acquiring modem  
knowledge o f  banking. In addition they had the ability to negotiate in foreign 
languages - quite unusual in those days even in the sphere of banks - and they 
acquired familiarity with bankers' circles abroad which later on helped them find 
jobs (for instance, in Hungarian banks set up by foreigners). Opportunities to 
acquire similar professional skills were offered also by some fields of the Hungarian 
Foreign Trade Bank.
In the banking system of the 70s and 80s the role and responsibility of bank 
managers, and consequently their selection were strongly linked to the intermediate 
status filled by the banks. In addition to their administrative and official roles, they 
also had a business role, but the MNB as the bank of issue and the OTP as the 
master of state financing and distribution of housing, also performed a direct 
political function. The OTP, due to its quasi-monopoly position in collecting the 
deposits of the general public, was also the right hand of the MNB, since the 
deposits collected served decisively as the sources of credit granted by the MNB. 
The AFB, handling state resources allocated by government decisions, also co­
operated with the MNB. The MKB, participating in the drawing of credit in 
currency and in the financing of special export-import transactions, was also an 
extended arm of the MNB.
Thus it is understandable that the selection of the top leaders of banks used to be 
primarily a political decision in those days, and skills could only be considered in 
the second place. As the number of candidates possessing skills and regarded as 
politically reliable increased, better qualified people could be appointed. Parallel to 
the political changes and to the spread of a more liberal economic philosophy, 
technocracy in the positive sense of the term was also revalued. However, political 
loyalty  was a precondition of promoting even the best expert to a managerial 
position, and its existence could best be proved by party membership. (This does 
not contradict the practice that - similarly to other fields of public administration 
and to academic life - non-party leaders were also appointed in the second and third 
lines by way of declaring the importance of professional quality.)
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Political reliability and expertise acquired different emphases at the various levels of 
bank management. The top levels unambiguously represented political status (the 
President of the MNB and his deputies first and foremost, and the general directors of 
the other banks, particularly of the OTP and the ÁFB), whereas professional aptitude 
had a much greater weight at the lower, less 'political' positions.
The selection of the management of the MNB could differ in some respects from 
that of the other politically important organisations. In fact the MNB increasingly 
developed its links to the international world of banks from the late 60s and from 
1982 onwards, when IMF membership was acquired, these relations were further 
expanded. As the international prestige of the bank was an important political and 
economic interest of the country, it was felt important earlier than elsewhere to 
have managers on the topmost as well as middle levels who were able to conduct 
negotiations properly and to move in the international banking world.4
Two important traits of the personnel policy, characteristic of the banking 
system of the 70s and 80s, should be stressed so that the later processes may be 
easier to understand. One was that despite the strong politicisation of the selection 
of managers it was more difficult to exclude the consideration o f professional 
aptitude in the banking sector than in many other fields of public administration 
because of a broader publicity deriving from the domestic and international credit 
transactions. The other important trait, obviously related to the first one, is that the 
group of young experts who had grown up in the MNB had acquired knowledge 
which was indispensable in the subsequently emerging world of business banking. 
This explains how many of them were able to work successfully as top managers of 
foreign-owned banks.
New banks and bank managers
The first steps of building a multi-agent banking system were taken already in the 
early 80s, though a political decision on the dismantling of the single bank 
structure, separating the National Bank of Hungary as the bank of issue from the 
banks serving businesses was only made in 1984.5
Loosening up the framework of centralised capital allocation evolved in the 
monobank system began in the first phase of the modernisation of the banking 
sector. Financial funds were created out of various resources of companies and co­
operatives (development funds of foreign trading companies, technical development 
funds, funds of co-operative support and development). The specialised financial 
institutions, constituting the germs of the present small and medium sized banks, 
developed from them bylhe mid-80s.
This is how the predecessor of today's Inter-Europa Bank, the Lnterinvest Foreign 
Development Deposit Association was established in 1980; the Innovation Fund of the 
Building Industry, which was the predecessor of Ybl Bank; and the Financial 
Association for Technical Development, the predecessor of Investbank in 1983; the 
AGRIT Innovation Fund, which was the predecessor of Agrobank; the Industrial Co­
operative Development Inc., the predecessor of today's Iparbank; Technová Co. Ltd., as
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the predecessor of Corvinbank in 1984; then Konzuminvest Co. Ltd., the predecessor of 
Konzumbank and AGROSZÖV, founded by the deposits of the National Fund for 
Mutual Support which was the predecessor of Mezőbank. In addition the National Bank 
of Hungary set up the Fund for Innovation in 1980 as the predecessor of the Innofinance 
Financial Institute and subsequently the General Bank of Venture Financing in 1985.
The managers of the financial funds which can be regarded as the predecessors 
of the later small banks, were recruited basically from two circles. One was the 
Hungarian National Bank, the other was constituted by the economic organisations 
which were the clients of the funds. As contrasted to the banks established later, the 
managers of the majority of the financial funds established in the early 80s mostly 
came from the latter. This can be primarily explained by the fact that these 
financial funds were not really established for banking functions but for giving 
credit like banks for development purposes in particular professional spheres.
This outlook was well represented by the original 'philosophy' of Technová, 
established in 1984, according to which the objective of the company was to 
promote technical development, which meant the return of the loan was only a 
tertiary consideration and interest a necessary evil which was to be kept down to the 
minimum. The Fund for Innovation, established by the MNB, supported expressly 
innovative activities without the slightest hope and interest of returns. The 
'financial institutes' set up from the funds of mutual support, retained the 
philosophy of mutual assistance for a long time.
At the same time there were managers who had other ambitions in the germs of 
banks. The former foreign trading personality, György Iványi, who founded 
Interinvest, or Géza Lénk of the foreign trading division of MNB, appointed to 
head the General bank of Venture Financing (ÁVB), launched their financial 
institutions with a more meritocratic set of values. However, this was not yet the 
generally characteristic attitude at that time.
The first newly established real bank was the Central European International 
Bank (CIB), which was set up by the MNB with the co-operation of foreign banks 
in 1979 in off-shore status. One of the deputy heads of department of the currency 
division of the MNB was appointed as its top manager. Later, in 1985-1986 the 
MNB founded Citibank and Unicbank, two mixed banks of domestic status. The top 
managers of these banks were initially delegated by the foreign shareholders, and 
the Hungarian ones were recruited from lower posts.
Generally speaking the managers of the new financial institutions, founded in 
the first part of the 80s, did not come from among the top management o f the 
existing banks or o f  public administration. Presumably the reason was that the 
prestige of the new institutions was not yet as high as that of the existing ones, or of 
the top managerial posts of the MNB. This recruitment was advantageous also from 
the angle that the managers of the new financial institutes came not only from the 
top management of the MNB which was essentially bureaucratic and strongly 
politicised, but there was some fresh blood introduced as well. As managerial jobs 
in financial institutes were quite a novelty in those days, individual ambition, 
receptiveness towards novelty could acquire greater emphasis than in the usual 
bureaucratic careers.
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Another trait of the modernisation of the banking system was the development o f 
the two-tier banking system. After two years of preparation, the new system, in 
which the MNB, performing mostly the functions of a central bank, and the 
commercial banks, institutionally separated from it, entered into operation on 
January 1, 1987. Three new commercial banks, the General Credit Bank of 
Hungary (MHB), the Hungarian Commercial and Credit Bank (OKHB, later called 
Commercial Bank) and the Budapest Bank (BB) were carved out from the former 
credit directorates of the MNB.6
The majority of their managers came from the MNB and the personnel was 
'taken over' from the former credit directorates. The deputy president, supervising 
credit to the food industry (Pál Kis), was appointed as number one manager of the 
OKHB, and middle managers of the MNB got jobs in the second line. The number 
one manager of BB was also a former cadre of the MNB (Oszkár Hegedűs).
The number one leader of MHB, Sándor Demján was an 'odd man out’, as 
formerly he was the manager of the Skála company, who, though he corresponded 
to the reform spirit of the day, undoubtedly brought a new style to the world of 
banks. As contrasted to the prudent bank managers, who organised the apparatus of 
banks and the decision-making procedures hierarchically and bureaucratically, 
Demján represented the intuitive, dynamic manager of enterprising spirit, chasing 
ambitious ideas, with all the personal attractions7 and social risks. It is another 
matter - as it was subsequently proved - that bank managers who set out with a 
bureaucratic mentality were not always able to meet the ideal image of the prudent 
banker; each of the banks split off from the MNB, and the majority of the financial 
institutes developed out of the financial funds, got into a critical situation by 1991- 
1992 (cf. Várhegyi 1995).
It was not primarily the weakness of the managers that caused the crisis, but the fact that 
the banking industry had to be built almost from scratch, and that too in the period of the 
general decline of the economy. In the banks established without foreign help the 
internal regulations (for example, the manual on credit extension) had to be (should 
have been) elaborated without experience, while the development of the rules of bank 
supervision was also still in progress at that time. In the majority of the Hungarian banks 
the regulations of adequate standards were completed only in the first part of the 90s.
By 1987 a relatively colourful system of - at least formally - independent 
commercial banks was in operation, where specialised financial institutions with a 
more restricted range of activity could also be found besides the commercial banks 
authorised to perform a wide range of banking tasks. Subsequently further financial 
institutes were set up. Postabank was established in 1988 at the initiative of the 
state; a young associate of the MNB was appointed as its top manager (Gábor 
Princz), and retained his post even after the bank's partial privatisation.
Later on the already functioning financial institutes set up new ones. In 1989 the credit 
co-operatives set up the Hungarian Bank of Savings Co-operatives, or Savings Bank. In 
1987 the MHB established a Subsidiary of Investment and Turnover, which became a 
commercial bank in 1989 under the name Dunabank; and in 1989 it founded Investrade 
(later on МНВ-Daewoo Bank), jointly with the South Korean Daewoo. In 1988 the
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OKHB founded the Merkantil Bank. The managers of these institutions were appointed 
by the parent banks, mostly from among the younger generation.
The banks founded in the second half of the 80s and the germs of financial 
institutes which later became banks, operated in the form of joint stock companies. 
Though with the passing of the Act of 1988 on companies the operation of the 
governing bodies was already regulated by a legal norm, their role - not considering 
the mixed banks - was initially a formal one, as the majority owner was the state, 
and the minority owners were the state companies, the clients of the banks, whose 
interest was not prudent banking but the acquisition of credit.
The presidents and general directors, embodied by one person, who had 
unlimited authority in the internal affairs of the banks, had to meet the expectations 
of the state and the companies owned by the state, intertwined with the political 
leadership. This system of requirements not only fundamentally determined their 
selection, but also their subsequent operation.
The signs of the approaching systemic change
The signs of the approaching systemic change were manifest also in the major 
banks besides the state and party machinery. The Németh government not only 
replaced the top management of the bank of banks, the MNB, fulfilling an 
important economic and political function, but also that of the most significant 
commercial banks.
President Mátyás Tímár and first Deputy President János Fekete were sent into 
retirement from the top of the MNB. Ferenc Bartha in his forties, who studied first 
at the Ministry of Foreign Trade, and later worked at the Council of Ministers, was 
appointed as the new President, and though - in contrast to his predecessor - he had 
no financial background, he fitted better the composition of the new government in 
respect of generation. Imre Tarafás became the new first Deputy President. He had 
an excellent training and also previous experience in the MNB.
There were changes also in the top management of the biggest commercial 
banks, partly under the pressure of government, and partly by voluntary departures. 
The head of the OKHB was sent into retirement and his place was taken over by the 
young and ambitious Géza Lénk, the former ’founder' of ÁVB. Gábor Erdély was 
appointed to head the MKB. He had acquired experience as head of the London 
subsidiary of MNB. The master of the distribution of housing was retired from the 
top managerial job of OTP, and a new manager was brought from the apparatus of 
the then local councils. Elemér Terták in his thirties, an educated and versatile 
expert was appointed to head the ÁVB. Earlier he had worked at the National 
Planning Office, but in the last year before his appointment he acquired some 
banking experience at the MHB. Mrs Gusztáv Báger in her forties replaced her 
predecessor, involved in a lot of doubtful big investments, at the State Development 
Institute. There was rejuvenation also at the top leadership of the mixed banks: 
György Zdeborsky was appointed the new manager of CIB, and Péter Felcsuti as
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the manager of Unicbank; they had both learned banking in the foreign currency 
branch of the MNB.
During the last months of the Németh government the head of the Prime 
Minister's Office, Péter Kunos was transferred to head Agrobank, and the deputy 
finance minister, István Kollarik was appointed head of Iparbankház. Though 
neither of them had banking experience, they appeared to be suitable on the basis of 
their ability to learn the workings of that profession.
There was also a manager, Sándor Demján, the President and Director-general 
of MHB, who voluntarily gave up his job in March 1990, letting his place to be 
taken by a person more acceptable for the new government. Árpád Bartha, who had 
more than a decade of experience obtained at the credit departments for 
engineering and heavy industry of the MNB, was selected from several candidates 
to take over Mr Demján's place.
The replacement of bank managers by the Németh government obviously did not 
differ from the changes implemented in public administration and in the big 
companies. Visibly it served a dual purpose: partly to get rid of the compromised 
managers of the Kádár era, and partly to select better trained and more technocratic 
managers from the suitable generation.
The latter consideration did not mean that political loyalty was unimportant, but 
perhaps the requirements of a technocrat government, less ideologised than its 
predecessor, became softer. It is difficult to say whether MSZMP (Hungarian 
Socialist Workers' Party) membership was a precondition to selection, or was only a 
given fact. Though the majority of the bankers appointed to the topmost jobs 
continued to be members of the state party, presumably in those days it was difficult 
to find suitable people outside the party, as the majority of the ambitious 
technocrats, possessing professional experience, had joined the party earlier.
The bank managers appointed by the Németh government mostly came from the 
generation in their early forties, who started their professional career at the time of 
the 1968 reform or after. As a result they not only possessed more up-to-date 
knowledge than their predecessors, but their outlook also better suited the 
requirements of transformation into a market economy and to the way of thinking 
of a liberal economic philosophy.
The selection of bank managers after the systemic change
Next we study how the selection of bank managers and the system of requirements 
they had to meet changed after the first free elections of 1990, under the conditions 
of political pluralism. Understandably, at the time of systemic change the 
expectation was expressed that the dominance of political loyalty should give way 
to expertise measured in achievement.
Answering the question is not easy in two respects. Partly because in the 
transitional period of the late 80s expertise was significantly revalued, so if this is 
taken as a point of reference then one may easily get a negative answer. The other 
difficulty derives from the fact that attachment to parties remains much more 
hidden in the circle of professionals wishing to make a career in a multiparty
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system, when the political structure changes in each election cycle, than earlier, 
when MSZMP membership was believed to be a merit for eternity. Because of the 
hidden party sympathies, the motivations behind the changes of personnel can be 
unambiguously assessed only in the case of openly pursued political careers.
Replacement o f  managers during the Antall and Boross governments
Despite certain voices in the electoral campaign, the Antall government did not 
totally upset the already evolved structure of bank management, though there were 
changes in some important posts during the four-year term.
The first significant personal change was introduced at the top o f  the M N B , 
where György Surányi, still very young, well trained and enjoying high prestige at 
home and abroad, was appointed on the basis of a six-party consensus. Surányi’s 
appointment represented a kind of continuity with the governments preceding the 
systemic change as the new bank President, having a past in research, had held 
important posts under the Grósz and Németh governments at the Council of 
Ministers as well as at the National Planning Office. The new Deputy President was 
appointed from the bank itself and nobody was removed from among the old guard.
The next replacement of a leader - implemented amidst serious political 
overtones - at the bank of issue was linked to the passing of the bill on the MNB in 
late 1991. By that time the Antall government felt strong enough to appoint an 
MDF (Hungarian Democratic Forum) politician expert, the Minister of Industry, 
Ákos Bod Péter in the place of Mr Surányi, who had been appointed on the basis of 
a six-party consensus although he was subsequently constantly attacked by 
politicians of the governing party. As the nomination was not in violation of the 
law, the outrage of the various professional colleges, the broader public and the 
opposition could not hinder the appointment though it was contrary to the idea of 
an independent bank of issue - recently sanctified by the Act on the MNB.8 At the 
same time the former Vice-presidents of MNB were re-elected.
Changes in the operative leadership o f  banks with a majority state ownership
There were surprisingly few  changes o f  personnel, implemented relatively late, at 
the posts of president and director general of the commercial banks during the 
Antall government. However, this does not mean that the government had no way 
of exercising pressure on bank management. As the proportion of state ownership 
continued to remain significant in the most important banks, the possibility o f  the 
replacement o f  managers continued to be a threatening instrument in the hands of 
the government.9 A similar sense of being threatened accompanied the period of the 
consolidation of credit and banks when the management of practically all the 
consolidated banks could have been dismissed with good reason, as it was done in 
other countries. The managers of the Hungarian banks were aware of this, and so 
felt themselves under continuous threat.
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It is difficult to say whether the majority of the bank managers at that time 
remained in their posts as a result of the deliberate and sophisticated psychological 
game of the government, or no further change of personnel took place simply 
because of inertia, or the lack of new people suited for the operative management of 
banks.
It is almost natural that there was a replacement of the top management of OTP, 
the biggest bank. The chair of the former president and director general, who had 
been recruited from the sphere of the councils, went to Elemér Terták, who already 
had experience in bank management (MHB, ÁVB), but had to leave his post within 
a short time, in 1992, for an unknown reason. The new President and Director 
General was Sándor Csányi, a former head of department at the Ministry of 
Finance, who had acquired experience in banking as Deputy Director General of 
OKHB from 1989 onwards.
The top manager of MHB was replaced only in 1992: at the Prime Minister’s 
personal wish István Töröcskei was appointed Director General. He had learned his 
profession at the foreign currency division of the MNB in the 70s and 80s.10 István 
Szálkái, the eminent financial expert was elected president, but he left that post 
soon after.
There was no change whatsoever in the top management in OKHB, the third 
biggest state bank: Mr Lenk, who forged ahead from the MNB to become a top 
manager, was able to retain his post as President and Director General in his 
second bank as an experienced banker during the first political term. However, in 
the Budapest Bank surprisingly the former MSZMP MP, Mr Lajos Bokros was 
appointed President and Director General.11 The unusually young (only thirty years 
old) Zsolt Hernádi was appointed manager of the rather poorly functioning Savings 
Bank. Hernádi gave up his Deputy Director General's post at OKHB. There were 
only minor changes in the operative management of MKB, when the post of 
president and director general was split and Árpád Bartha, who was removed from 
the top of MHB, was given the Director General's job.12
The change of personnel at the top of smaller banks of less importance, where 
the state had a decisive share of ownership, could be professionally justified in 
general: the managers were removed from banks which got into grave liquidity 
situations. These included the Iparbankház, where the erstwhile deputy minister of 
finance of the former Németh government was replaced by an expert from the MNB 
in 1992, and the Konzumbank, where an old hand at agricultural financing was 
appointed in 1993. In the IBUSZ Bank too, where the top leadership was replaced 
in 1992, one year after its founding, there was again a multitude of professional 
problems. In the Mezőbank and Agrobank, both more significant than the former 
ones, and in the small Corvinbank and Investbank there was no change in the 
management during those four years.
Of the banks in mixed ownership, where the state had a considerable share, a 
replacement of the top manager took place only in the General Bank of Securities 
in 1990, while the head of the politically important Postabank remained in place 
throughout.
Based on the above survey, it can be stated that there was a moderate 
replacement o f top leadership in the operative managerial posts and in those of the
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general directors, and a clearly political motivation can be discovered only behind  
a relatively few. The operative management of banks was not in a worse position in 
respect of expertise during the Antall government than during the Németh 
administration: either because the same people were in place, or there was a flow of 
personnel only among the banks, or because the newly appointed managers also 
came from the same professional circle (former MNB, Planning Office, Ministry of 
Finance), as during the former government.
In relation to the cadre policy of the Antall government concerning bank 
managers one may raise the question of why the personal consequences of poor 
bank operations were not drawn in the case of some major banks. No replacement 
of managers took place either with the objective of punishment, demonstration or 
prevention as a corollary of the consolidation o f  credit and o f  the banks.n Though 
personal responsibility could not be identified in the crises of banks, since the crisis 
of the economy, faulty economic policy, the shortcomings of regulation and the 
former practice of intervention in the management of banks had a general role in 
them, yet the fact that the majority of bank managers were left in their posts, had an 
important message.
In addition the consolidation of credit and of the banks renewed the formerly 
well known bargaining processes between the bank managers and the government, 
while it also pointed out the schizophrenic position of the managers of state banks. 
Initially, during the consolidation of credit, the managers tried to demonstrate the 
existence of less than the actual bad credit, and later on, in the phase of the 
consolidation of banks, when privatisation had become a declared goal of 
government, and thus dependency on the state seemed to weaken, keeping in view 
the interests of their banks, they rather overestimated losses.
In 1992 the schizophrenia of the government was projected to the bankers' 
behaviour: when targeted reserves had to be built for bad credit under the 
provisions of the new Act on financial institutions, most of the state banks did not 
do so because the Minister of Finance rather encouraged them to pay taxes in order 
to increase the revenues of the budget (cf. Várhegyi 1993).
The composition of the governing bodies
The Antall and Boross governments of the first term after the systemic change in 
the majority of cases left the operative management of the state banks to the 
managers already in charge in the majority of cases, and only a part of the changes 
of personnel was clearly motivated politically. However, what considerations were 
asserted in the selection of the members of boards and committees of supervision, 
suited to represent owners' interests, how far it was attempted to exercise political 
influence through them, is another question.
In the board of directors of some banks with a significant share of the state in 
ownership, there were people who occupied their seats in those bodies as political 
'commissars', or held the post as a gift of their parties, but definitely not as experts 
representing the professional interests of the owner.
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In the case of OTP the state delegated an MDF politician only to the committee of 
supervision, whereas one representative of MDF was elected to the board of directors of 
MHB as well as of Postabank. No such people could be found in the two other big 
banks. Of the smaller state-owned banks, the MDF politicians were represented in the 
governing bodies of Takarékbank, Corvinbank, MBFB, and also of AEB, half of which 
was foreign-owned.
At the same time the two SZDSZ (Alliance of Free Democrats) politicians, 
formerly included in the committee of supervision of MKB and IBUSZ Bank, were 
not dismissed during the rule of the MDF government. In 1991, at the time of the 
first major changes of those bodies, even a Fidesz (Alliance of Young Democrats) 
expert, familiar with banking, was appointed to the board of directors of the biggest 
bank.
Despite some appointments of obviously political motivation, the composition of 
the governing bodies may be regarded as satisfactory from the angle of professional 
aptitude. Generally speaking about one third of the board of directors were bankers 
in the case of big banks, one third of them worked in academic fields (higher 
education or research institute), and one third were bureaucrats; in addition there 
was a representative of the governing party in some big banks (see Mátrai, 1994). 
Bank management represented a bigger proportion in the smaller banks and the 
entrepreneurial sphere in a few. People from companies had seats in the committees 
of supervision in the big banks, in keeping with the principle that the owners' 
control was exercised more by the committee of supervision whereas the board of 
directors was the organ of actual management.
The above description shows that open party control through the director general 
or membership in a governing body could not be traced in the case of all important 
banks. However, this does not mean that there were not other, more hidden ways of 
exercising pressure on the operative management of banks by the ruling parties, 
and by the dominant MDF in particular. Expectations communicated in closed 
session, by phone, or - during the last months - in letter continued to serve as 
instruments of influence for the political forces.
The hidden means of influence could naturally be used rather by the source and 
summit of power, but before the general elections the opposition of the day, who 
were expected to come into power, also had opportunities of asserting their 
interests. Presumably this will continue to be the case as long as the banks are 
owned by the state, since the managers of the state banks depend for their very 
existence on the political power behind the government in office. This has been 
proved by the two years passed so far of the term after the second free elections.
Bank managers in the first two years o f the Horn government
When the MSZP-SZDSZ coalition came to power, the ownership structure of the 
banking sector was more nationalised and centralised than at the beginning of the 
Antall period. The fact that the bank shares, owned by state companies, were 
centralised (initially into ÁVÜ, the State Property Agency, and later on into ÁV 
Inc., State Property Joint Stock Co., and into the Ministry of Finance), itself had
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enhanced the voting power of the state in the general assemblies. The power of the 
central state and government was further augmented by the significantly growing 
share of state ownership as a consequence of bank consolidation. In the most 
important Hungarian units of the banking system, taken over by the Horn 
government the state had a qualified majority, enabling it to direct these banks 
practically alone. This was the situation at the OTP, МНВ, K&H and in the BB, 
and in a number of smaller banks.
Despite the declared programme of the Horn government, it started to deal with 
the banking system late. Though the coalition agreement stated that the 
consolidation of banks should be terminated and banks should be privatised as soon 
as possible, not much was done for these goals in 1994. It completed the 
programme of consolidation, started by the previous government and determined by 
the end of 1994, and attempted to prepare Budapest Bank for privatisation.
Though the leaders of the more important state banks could expect changes in 
managerial posts from the summer of 1994 onwards, the majority of those changes 
took place only at the annual general assemblies held in May. The new government 
and the Prime Minister first and foremost concentrated his attack on Mr Bod, the 
President of the MNB, who had been elected for six years. Since under the Act on 
the MNB Mr Bod could not be dismissed and his mandate was valid for at least 
another three years, he could be dislodged from his position only by threats, by 
making his position untenable, by bribery, or by the amendment of the Act. It is not 
known for what reason, but Bod finally resigned in November and took up his new 
job at the post in the EBRD, to be filled by appointment of the Hungarian 
government.
It was a great surprise that while Gyula Horn had promised the reinstallation of 
Surányi as President of the MNB already during the election campaign, he did not 
reach an agreement with him for months after Bod resigned. Finally he gave in 
under the weight of an increasingly poor international assessment of the country 
and struck his forced bargain with Surányi, who was by then acting as a tough 
partner.
The most important commercial bank, where the change of personnel was rather 
significant and fast was the MHB. This obviously had political reasons, though the 
shaken situation of the bank could also have justified the replacement of 
management. Mr István Töröcskei resigned under the increasingly vigorous attacks 
and a large part of the management gave up their jobs with him.
This time too the Horn government - just as in the case of the MNB - was not 
prepared to install a new leader to the place of the resigned one. The new board of 
directors was recruited rather slowly, which decided on the person of the new 
director general by inviting applications. The new board of directors, whose 
members include an experienced banker as well as a theoretical financial expert, 
ultimately elected Piroska Apró, the recently resigned cabinet chief of Mr Horn, as 
President. Zsigmond Járai, deputy minister of finance of the Németh government, 
the young father of the Hungarian stock exchange and the first head of the 
Inspectorate of Banks won the competition and became Director General. He had 
spent the previous four years in London and Budapest as an investment banker.
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In addition to the MHB, changes in the leadership took place only in two smaller 
state banks at extraordinary general assemblies during 1984. Péter Medgyessy, the 
deputy prime minister of the Németh government was appointed to head the MBFB 
in summer. The president and members of the leading bodies of Corvinbank, 
owned by the Ministry of Industry and Trade, delegated by the Ministry, were 
replaced, but the director general kept his post. The new President was István 
Bihari, who was simultaneously appointed head of OMFB (National Committee for 
Technical Development); he was formerly the head of Chinoin, and the external 
expert, delegated by the Ministry of Industry and Trade was a researcher of banks, 
serving also as the expert of the SZDSZ, whereas the other external members of the 
board of directors were recruited from among the middle-level leadership of the 
Ministry of Industry and Trade.
The partial replacement of the leaders of the other state banks was planned by 
the government only for the regular annual general assemblies to be held in May 
1995. After the appointment of Bokros as Minister, Béla Singlovics, the former 
deputy, now acting as Director General, was elected as Director General by the 
general assembly of Budapest Bank, who learned the trade in the MKB. In keeping 
with the new theoretical stand, the former post of president and director general 
was separated here too, Ms Márta Sulyok-Pap, the Reader of the Department of 
Finance of the Budapest University of Economics was elected as President. She was 
experienced in the stock exchange and had functioned as member of the board of 
directors in the previous term. There were no changes of importance at the other 
places of the board of directors and of the committee of supervision.
The general assembly causing the biggest political storm was that of the OTP. 
Referring to a government decision of December, the Minister of Finance tried to 
separate the jobs of president and director general here too, and wanted to appoint a 
president beside Sándor Csányi. However, Csányi as the head of the biggest bank, 
exercised his influence at the two social insurance boards, enjoying the support of 
MSZOSZ (the Trade Union Council), which were allocated significant ownership 
shares in the bank (10 % each) from the State Property Joint Stock Co. a little 
before the general assembly. But even the State Property Joint Stock Co., owning 
40 per cent of the bank, did not support the immediate separation of the posts of 
president and director general as demanded by Bokros's ultimatum.
Though ultimately the representative of the State Property Joint Stock Co. came 
to the general assembly with a proposal to amend the constitution of the bank to 
make the change possible, the amendment could not be effected as the social 
insurance boards did not vote for the proposal.14 Incidentally no one was recalled 
from the leading bodies of OTP, only a few less known, new people were elected to 
them. The appointment of a very well trained and rather young former member of 
the board of directors as deputy president, who took up also the deputy director 
general's job after half a year, is worth mentioning.
The next power test came at the general assembly of the Commercial Bank 
(K&H), where the finance minister's will was victorious. Though it is true that here 
the Ministry of Finance had a large majority ownership, due to the consolidation oi 
the bank, so it did not require allies to divest the president and director general, in 
place since 1988, of all his titles. The former deputy director of the Institute of
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Foreign Affairs, László Láng became the new President, and the Director General's 
post was taken up by János Erős, the former Director General of ÁÉB, which 
strongly deteriorated under his leadership. With the exception of one person, the 
leading bodies of K&H were completely replaced. The general assemblies of 
Postabank and MKB took place quietly; there were no changes of personnel.
The mergers of banks, implemented in 1995, also caused changes in the leading 
jobs. The entire leadership of Agrobank, which practically went bankrupt and was 
only saved by the state, was replaced; the new leaders came from the management 
of Mezőbank, incorporating the former. The only change that has taken place in the 
leadership of Mezőbank is that the posts of president and director general were 
separated. Konzumbank was bought up by the MBFB, and Investbank was merged 
into the Centre of Financial Institutions.
There were hardly any personal changes in the 1996 general assemblies of state 
banks. The vacant seats of the president and director general of MBFB, who was 
appointed minister of finance, were taken up by a deputy secretary of state of the 
Ministry of Finance (Éva Hegedűs), and a former leader of ÁÉB (András Huszty). 
Láng, who was appointed hardly a year earlier, was removed without any 
explanation, and Mihály Kupa, the former Finance Minister (of the Antall 
government) was appointed in the rank of Deputy President.
During the first two years of the Horn government there seem to have been more 
significant changes in the management of banks than during the Antall 
government. The professional capability of the new leaders has not deteriorated in 
theory, but its improvement, if any, can be assessed only on the basis of experience.
The new government was also motivated to make more drastic changes in the 
management of banks because the former government had failed to take the 
normally expected step of removing the earlier leaders of banks that had been 
consolidated by the state with great effort. This step could have been taken on a 
moral basis even if the responsibility of bank managers cannot be unambiguously 
identified in the development of bad credit. This is why the promise of the first 
Finance Minister, Mr László Békési, that he would immediately replace the 
managers of the consolidated banks, was understandable. It is either due to the 
impotence of the government, or to the emerging tension within the coalition in 
other fields as well, that it was done with a delay of six months or a year, and not 
even fully in the case of the small banks.
Conclusions
The experiences of a decade of the two-tier system of banking are rather interesting 
also from the angle of the selection of bank managers. Despite the many 
uncertainties in the individual acts, certain common features can be identified 
which lend themselves to drawing some general conclusions. In the following an 
attempt is made to summarise the accumulated experiences from two angles. One is 
the 'quality' of bank managers, their training and professional aptitude, and the 
second is their political dependency.
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The 'quality' o f  bank managers
It is not easy to assess the managers on the basis of qualitative requirements in the 
case of such a newly developed branch as commercial banking. Yet the important 
question of what role has been played by professional aptitude in the selection of 
bank managers cannot be avoided in the period under survey. It is particularly 
important in a country where there has been a counter-selection in the appointment 
of economic managers for several decades, with assumed or real political reliability 
often in inverse proportion to professional qualifications.
However, it was a favourable starting point for the Hungarian banking sector 
that in the mid-eighties, when the majority of the new state banks were established, 
professional skills were already in the forefront, even in leading economic posts 
where the appointees were selected on a political basis. By that time the 
professionally well qualified group of specialists, speaking foreign languages as 
well, and coming from a wide range of backgrounds, had emerged and was also 
able to show the adequate signs of political loyalty. The broad range of technocrats 
in their 30s and 40s, who matured by the 80s, had a fairly pragmatic relationship to 
politics: they accepted the rules of the game which were prescribed by the unwritten 
but commonly known scenario of official career.
Under such conditions it is not surprising that in the MNB (and in other places 
of public administration as well), the main source of cadre of the new commercial 
banks, experts were available who - under the Hungarian conditions - were suited 
for managing the newly established banks relatively skilfully as managers in the 
first or second line.
Nevertheless, at the time of the selection of the first round of managers of big 
banks, mostly the traditional career was characteristic: the heads of MNB divisions 
were appointed as the top managers of the new banks. The representatives of the 
new generation, mentioned earlier, were appointed to the smaller banks, and even 
to the bigger ones after a few years. Moreover, many of the newer generation of 
people in their 30s have had an opportunity to make significant careers in banking. 
Today there is an increasing number of well trained young technocrats in the 
'second line' who have mostly come from the special colleges of the universities 
where there has been much political as well as professional activity.15
After the systemic change there was no 'landslide' in the operative management 
o f banks. The government and the parties behind it considered it sufficient if 
suitable people were delegated to the leading bodies. The operative leaders (general 
directors and their deputies, acting managers) continued to be drawn mostly from 
the banking profession, and to a lesser extent from public administration (Ministry 
of Finance, National Planning Office, ministries of the different branches), and 
from the sphere of company managers to an even lesser extent. Presumably it was 
accepted that bank management was a delicate profession which could not be left 
entirely to untrained people.
The recognition of expertise is reflected by the method of the change of 
personnel subsequently effected, when the new managers of big banks were either 
selected from among the top leaders of smaller banks, or by promotion within the
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banks themselves. In the case of small banks, knowledge of banking was less 
important, as people who had a background either in the Ministry of Finance, or in 
other jobs of economic management, were also regarded as suitable for the job. 
Usually managers, trained at the foreign currency division of the MNB were 
delegated to the top position of banks of mixed ownership where the Hungarian 
state also had a share, and these people enjoyed the confidence of the foreign 
owners too.
Summing up it can be stated that expertise has gained an important role in the 
selection of the top operative leadership of banks. However, having professional 
qualifications, which can be considered fairly good under the Hungarian conditions, 
does not necessarily mean that all the bank managers, or at least the majority of 
them are really good bankers. Partly because this is a profession which can really be 
learned only in practice and so far few people have had the opportunity to do so. 
And partly numerous instruments of direct or indirect, institutionalised or informal 
political and economic influence were in operation, obviously limiting the 
development and assertion of careful, considered banker's behaviour.
The composition of the leading bodies of the banks was professionally not bad as 
in the majority of them there were bankers and researchers, or - in the state banks - 
bureaucrats representing the owner. The persons elected to represent the parties 
could not formally influence the decisions of banks due to their numerically little 
weight.
The extent of political dependency
The theoretical professional aptitude of the operative managers and the leading 
bodies does not mean in itself a decrease in the political dependency of banks. In 
fact this is not necessarily assessed on the basis of the quality of the elected persons, 
but on the basis o f the method o f selection.
In my view neither of the governments in power after the systemic change has 
weakened the formerly obvious dependence of the state banks on politics. Of course 
today this dependence is more hidden and more difficult to document, since it is no 
longer manifest in the managers' party membership as it was before the systemic 
change. Today every bank manager is a technocrat, and even most of the members 
of the governing bodies are also technocrats.
However, it continues to be among the rights of the government to select, or to 
leave in their posts the operative managers and governing bodies of banks owned 
(partly) by the state. When and which governmental organ, or person represents the 
state is almost indifferent in so far that usually the 'cadre politicians' of the coalition 
parties are also behind these decisions.
At the time of the Antall government it was not only the expert Minister of Finance, Mr 
Mihály Kupa, who could interfere in appointments to the top posts, but a series of MDF 
politicians too: directly the ministers responsible for the banks, at first Katalin Botos, 
and next Tamás Szabó, and directly other politicians who were experts to a lesser extent. 
In the background of the changes of managers during the Horn government there was the 
bargain of the two coalition parties, besides the open struggle of Finance Minister
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Bokros and Privatisation Minister Suchman, together with the fight of the wings inside
the MSZP (one should remember Csányi's case).
Only a single meaningful difference can be discovered between the behaviour of 
the two kinds of part)' coalitions: as contrasted to its predecessors, the Horn 
government did not appoint MPs and party functionaries to the governing bodies of 
banks. This is a merit beyond doubt, as at least the obvious appearance of direct 
political dependency and influence can be avoided.
It cannot be documented but it is commonly known that the mutual dependency 
of banks and politics has also survived, even though the method has changed. Prior 
to the systemic change it was clear how the credit of politically important big 
companies could be helped by 'a phone call from the top'. After the systemic change 
the situation (may) have changed in many respects. On the one hand the stakes 
have become broader: in addition to big companies now the parties have also come 
to the banks for support. The method may also have changed: in the case of 
coalition governments it is conceivable that even the banks are divided up between 
the coalition parties.
Those who thought and advocated the idea that it was possible to reduce the 
excessive politicisation of the economy under the Antall government without the 
radical decrease of state ownership, entertained illusions. Perhaps it is surprising, 
but the naive faith that the change of government is in itself enough to reduce the 
formerly criticised influence of the political state in the economy could be found not 
only among the socialist but even among the liberal politicians and their 
supporters. While for a long time the new government did hardly anything to speed 
up privatisation, it did not change an iota in the method of state control. Similarly 
to its predecessor, it keeps the most important economic posts, the top jobs of big 
state enterprises and banks under its influence by appointments and dismissals with 
political overtones.
In my view this is inevitable. State ownership not only gives a possibility, but at 
times it means a temptation impossible to fend off, and occasionally even 
irresistible pressure on politics to exercise its economic authority by ownership. The 
possibility is obvious: the economic manager, depending for his livelihood on the 
government of the day and the political forces behind, is exposed to political power, 
and hence he can be encouraged to offer services in return for keeping his post. The 
temptation is also understandable: the possession of economic authority may help 
in clinging to political power for a while; it may be manifest in the service of 
economic objectives, or ultimately in the strengthening of the material background 
of the party. Finally, there may occur an exigency, for instance in the case of bad 
relations between the coalition partners, when neither of the parties trusts the other 
one not to utilise state ownership in the interest of its own political goals, so it 
wants to 'make its own position sure'.
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Notes
1 The method employed in the study merges the analysis of documented facts with the 
personal experiences and information of the researcher as participant observer. The changes 
of the personnel of bank leadership can be followed in the volumes of the Magyar pénzügyi 
és tőzsdei almanach (Almanach of Hungarian Finance and Stock Exchange), published 
annually since 1990, and on the basis of the press releases following the general assemblies 
(the professional biography of the newly elected leaders is read out at the general assembly). 
Further information concerning individuals is based on personal acquaintance, or verbal 
communication. Hence 'soft' hypotheses are also worded at times, which carry the possibility 
of mistake in themselves.
2 On the operation of the one-tier banking system see Hagelmayer 1976; Asztalos-Bokros- 
Surányi 1984; Antal-Várhegyi 1987.
3 According to Tamás Bácskai, one of the 'grand old men' of Hungarian banking: "Of the 
2900 employees of the MNB there were, let’s say, 500, and about 50-100 people at the OTP, 
who had the knowledge needed in a real bank. This knowledge partly derived from the fact 
that many of them used to work in banks before 1945, and others had read about how a bank 
operated" (cf. Becsky 1996).
4 Besides János Fekete, favoured even by the top political leadership, such a role could be 
performed by the highly educated and internationally acknowledged Tamás Bácskai, who 
was incidentally regarded as the ’enfant terrible' of the bank in the eighties because of his 
liberal views and outspokenness.
5 On the transformation of the banking system see first of all: Bácskai 1986; Bokros 1987; 
Antal-Surányi 1984; Antal-Várhegyi 1987.
6 The three banks, made autonomous, were set up with a marked profile of branches, which 
only slowly melted away during the course of years. Heavy and engineering industries 
mostly concentrated in the MHB, whereas the OKHB financed the major part of agriculture. 
The servicing sector and mining were concentrated in the BB. The branch concentration of 
credit increased the credit risk of banks and their dependency on powerful lobbies of 
branches.
7 On the basis of literature and films (and not comic papers and pamphlets of bad taste) the 
Hungarian public had an image of the banker who was a middle-aged rigid, introverted man, 
wearing a dark suit and demanding respect with his behaviour, which Demján could not, and 
presumably did not want to emulate. It was not only the issue of age, as many other, younger 
bank managers soon learned the forms of behaviour well known in the international banking 
world, and could develop relatively fast the closed, inaccessible world of Hungarian bankers, 
strictly observing the rigid hierarchy of contacts the formal traits of which closely resemble 
the world of leading statesmen.
8 Though no one challenged Bod's professional skills, the representatives of the financial 
profession were worried about the appointment of a politician to head the MNB who called 
attention to himself by participation in the subsequently infamous GAM programme (a 
programme in conflict with the officially announced programme of the government, as a 
rather voluntaristic programme for strengthening the economy). And 'political' public
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opinion objected to the political motivation of replacement, which was corroborated by the 
Prime Minister himself stating that Surányi should not have signed the Democratic Charter.
9 Prior to the annual general assemblies there was anxiety among the managers of the banks 
in majority state ownership, and conjectures concerning replacements were frequently made 
in the profession at that time.
10 Well-founded attacks (primarily by the HVG - a weekly journal of world economy) were 
directed against Töröcskei and Imre Boros, appointed by him to the deputy director-general's 
post of MHB, who used to be the managers of Kultúrbank founded with the participation of 
the Ministry of Culture because of the transformations of the ownership, transactions of 
Kultúrbank and their related personal incompatibility. This, however - apparently - did not 
threaten the good business reputation of the two bank managers as required by the Act on 
financial institutions.
11 Possibly the Antall cabinet wanted to suggest with this gesture that bank managers were 
not selected by political considerations. But even that assumption cannot be excluded that 
Antall's sympathy was evoked by the role Bokros took up in attacking spontaneous 
privatisation and in defending the temporary state ownership of the major banks.
12 It is worth noting that the split of the post of president and director general was raised 
even as a theoretical issue in 1992. As ultimately there was no theoretical answer formulated 
to this question, the two solutions were applied in practice subject to the need of either job 
for a new person.
13 On the methods of the consolidation of credit and banks see Balassa 1996.
14 The following 'technical flaw1, committed by the Ministry of Finance is only mentioned to 
characterise the bureaucratic apparatus of the state. The Ministry forgot to print its block of 
shares representing 18 per cent, therefore it was not allowed to participate in the general 
assembly of OTP, to which it attached such importance.
15 Though it is difficult to document, a significant part of these successful young men are 
first generation intellectuals from the countryside who have been able to bridge over the 
social and cultural gap separating them from the lifestyle of bank managers by serious 
efforts, learning and diligence.
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István János Tóth-András Semjén
TA X  BEHAVIOUR OF SMALL 
A N D MEDIUM-SIZE ENTERPRISES*
Introduction
It is of great importance in a period of economic transition what entrepreneurs 
think of certain norms' accepted in market economies and to what extent they are 
able to enforce these in their business transactions, and to what extent they 
themselves are willing and able to act in accordance with these. One of these norms 
is financial discipline which, in our interpretation, includes the discipline of 
payments (as part of contractual discipline, a broader concept which also implicates 
the abidance by the terms of performance and delivery) and fiscal discipline, 
mainly denoting tax abidance (in the broad sense) as an obligation to the 
public/govemmental sector. The strengthening of financial discipline is a necessary 
condition for the successfid transition to a market economy (Komái, 1993). Komái 
claims that the spread of private enterprises and the strengthening of financial 
discipline are closely correlated: the growth of private firms, and the increasing 
consolidation of the private sector have a beneficial effect on the strengthening of 
market and financial discipline, because the budgetary constraint of private firms is 
harder, and "in new private enterprises the obligation of financial discipline must 
be imprinted from the moment of their birth" (Komái, 1993). It is, of course, an 
open question to what extent this is effective in the initial years of the transition to 
a market economy in Hungary, and whether the undeniable improvement in the 
discipline of payments in market relations goes together with a parallel 
improvement of tax abidance.
This paper examines the validity of this assumption by analysing the attitudes of 
entrepreneurs towards taxation and investigating two segments of financial 
discipline: (a) tax abidance and (b) discipline of payments (as a proxy of 
contractual discipline) on a sample of 275 private small and medium-size 
businesses ('private' here means that in all these businesses there is at least a 
majority stake in private ownership, or the whole business is privately owned). The 
above relationship (private ownership equals improving tax abidance) is far from 
being true automatically for all groups of private enterprises as far as tax discipline
’ The empirical research our paper was based on was made possible by grants from OKTK 
and ICEG (San Francisco, USA). The present paper was also supported by a French 
government scholarship. The English version of the paper was supported by OTKA. The 
first findings of the research project were published in the authors' earlier works (Semjén, 
1995 and Tóth, 1995). In this paper, we have further deepened our earlier investigations on 
the one hand, and analysed a new (cleaned and differently weighted) variant of the sample 
on the other.
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is concerned. On the contrary, it can probably be presumed that the opposite 
statement - private ownership does not necessarily strengthen, but in certain cases 
even weakens tax discipline - can be proved.2 Two factors may have a formative 
role in that: a) the experiences and behavioural norms acquired by the private 
enterprise owners and company executives in the former second economy may 
weaken tax abidance; b) firms in crisis regularly breach the obligations of 
contractual, financial and fiscal discipline since the tactic of delaying their 
obligations - including tax obligations - plays an important role in their survival 
strategies (Laki, 1991 and 1993). This latter device is used more frequently in 
recession, and is at least as much at the disposal of Hungarian private firms3 able to 
adjust to market and institutional conditions flexibly, as it is available to foreign 
and state-owned enterprises. This seems to contradict the assumption that private 
ownership in itself plays a positive role in consolidating financial discipline.
Another question to be clarified is whether the ownership structure and pattern 
makes any difference in financial (and especially fiscal) discipline. Does every 
private firm contribute to the spread of norms prevalent in a market economy, or is 
there a difference in this respect between private companies owned by Hungarian 
owners and firms owned by foreigners or foreign companies? It may be the case 
that it is not private ownership in general but a specific form of it - foreign 
ownership - that promotes fiscal discipline, since foreign owners mostly come from 
advanced countries where the norms of financial discipline are observed and they 
run their firms in Hungary in compliance with the requirements valid in their 
countries.
The relationship between various enterprise characteristics (number of 
employees, form of ownership, market position) and the differences in the specific 
forms of reducing tax liabilities (tax avoidance) as a form of adjustment to 
institutional conditions of the economy is also worth examining. How often and to 
what extent do specific groups of private firms apply tax planning, and take 
advantage of the numerous legal ways of avoiding taxation? This is expected to be 
closely correlated with the enterprises’ market and financial situation, with the 
poorly performing firms resorting to these means more frequently. On the other 
side, significant differences are expected to be found between private companies 
with majority Hungarian ownership and those owned by foreigners. In the survival 
strategies of the former, exploiting the loopholes in the system seems to be far more 
important than in the case of the latter. The size of the enterprise may also be a 
decisive factor here: smaller firms may rely on tax avoidance to a greater extent (as 
compared to their total costs).
Last but not least, there are enterprises that not only make use of the legal 
possibilities of tax avoidance but, taking the benefits and the risks of breaching tax 
rules into consideration, evade taxes. There are (and there can be) no direct 
statistical data available on the incidence of this phenomenon, only estimations, 
suspects and guesses. The problem is, however, highly important: tax evasion, if it 
occurs frequently, erodes the development of financial discipline. Indirect statistical 
evidence, however, can be provided, and it is worth trying to achieve so as to have a 
more precise picture on the prevalence of the norms of the market economy.
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Besides attempting to show the entrepreneurs' attitude towards taxation, the 
present study is aimed at testing the validity of the above hypotheses. In addition, 
the incidence of tax evasion is to be estimated within the group of enterprises 
studied.
The main characteristics of the sample
Company executives or manager-owners of 275 small and medium-size enterprises 
with a more than 50 % stake in private ownership and a maximum of 200 
employees4 were interviewed for the survey. The firms were selected as a random 
sample from the database of APEH (Tax Administration Authority) data base 
containing the enterprise balance sheets and corporate tax return data for 1992s. 
The size distribution within the sample was found to differ significantly from the 
statistics of the respective enterprise population, since larger firms were over­
represented in it. This distortion was corrected by weighting. The results published 
below are based on weighted data.
As far as the ownership pattern is concerned, the major stake-holders within the 
enterprises surveyed were Hungarian private persons, the firms' managers, other 
Hungarian firms, or foreigners (for the distribution of proprietors, see Table 1). In 
1994, most of the enterprises had existed for only a few years. Over 74 % of firms 
were founded after 1989, 17 % in 1989, and 9 % before 1989. In nearly 80 % of the 
companies the 1993 net sales did not exceed HUF 100 million (1992 net sales 
below HUF 100 million was used as a criterion for selecting the sample); net sales 
were below HUF 50 million in 68 % of the firms. A high percentage (over 
one-fifth) of the company executives questioned declined to answer our question 
inquiring into after-tax profits in 1993, and 80 % of those who answered registered 
only a relatively small profit below HUF 5 million.
Table 1 Types of proprietors in the firms surveyed*
Type of owner Number
Frequency
% rate
Hungarian private person 214 77.8
Hungarian private firm 35 12.8
Hungarian state-owned bank or firm 11 4.1
Management 38 13.8
Employees 22 8.2
Foreign firm, bank 37 13.6
Foreign private person 44 16.1
SPA or national holding (ÁVÜ, ÁV Rt). 6 2.2
Local authority 6 2.3
Hun. firm in joint (private + public) ownership 10 3.6
* More than one answer could be given
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M arket relations and taxpayers’ opinion on the tax system
Sound market relations play an important role in the success of enterprises’ 
adjustment to the requirements of the economy in transition. There is a 
considerable number of small and medium-size firms that produce goods, which 
have a long-term market, produce efficiently, so the growth potential of the 
enterprise seems assured. However, the insolvency of their clients draws them into 
a liquidity crisis or bankruptcy, or the uncertainty of their suppliers’ market (i.e. 
the lack of financially sound and reliable subcontractors) prevents them from 
establishing themselves in the market.
Two questions were asked about market relations. One inquired about the firms’ 
own performance in this field, asking the incidence of failures in meeting 
contractual obligations6, while the other asked the opinion of the company 
executives/owners about the reliability of their contractual partner companies. The 
responses reveal that within the circle of entrepreneurs surveyed contractual parties 
are frequently unable to meet their contractual obligations or to fully trust their 
partners. Seven % of entrepreneurs admitted having problems with meeting their 
contractual obligations on more than three occasions in 1993, 18 % had fewer than 
three such cases, and 75 % declared they had no such case in the year studied.
The respondents' opinion about their business partners seems to give a far darker 
picture. Only 16 % of the entrepreneurs stated that their contractual partners were 
always reliable, 60 % said they were "mostly reliable" and 11 % could rarely if at 
all trust them. No significant correlation could be detected between the answers to 
the two questions. Nevertheless, one may risk the opinion that meeting contractual 
obligations by the entrepreneur and his partners is more or less symmetrical: those 
who deem their business partners reliable are probably more likely to fulfill their 
own contractual obligations than the average.7
A considerable number of entrepreneurs considers not only the behaviour of the 
contractual partners but also tax regulations as a factor contributing to the increase 
of uncertainty. The majority of the respondents had a negative opinion on the 
functioning of the tax system. Nearly all said the Hungarian tax rules changed too 
often (93 %), and not many fewer (81 %) claimed that the extent of changes 
endangers the security of their business calculations.
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Table 2 Breach оГ contractual obligations and reliability of business partners
Do you think that Breach of contractual obligation
your contractual in the previous year
partners are... 0/0
more than 3 times less than 3 times never total N
...always reliable 5.3 8.9 85.8 100.0 43
...mostly reliable 7.3 20.7 72.0 100.0 186
...rarely reliable 2.8 17.2 80.0 100.0 26
...unreliable 13.9 13.9 72.2 100.0 11
Total 8.7 18.2 75.1 100.0 269
The heaviness of the tax burden imposed on the entrepreneurs by the different taxes 
seems to vary by tax type. The heaviest burdens are claimed to be the VAT (30 %), 
one of the payroll taxes, the employer contribution to the pension insurance fund 
(PIF) (24 %) and the corporate income tax (13 %) (see Table 3). By adding the 
percentages in the first 3 columns (referring to the first, second and third most 
burdensome tax) of the table it is possible to determine the cumulative frequency of 
mentioning a given tax amongst the three taxes imposing the heaviest burden. 
Nearly half the entrepreneurs mentioned VAT, the PIF contribution and the 
corporate income tax amongst the heaviest burdens.
The functioning of a tax system can be characterised not only by the complexity 
of the tax rules, but also by the clarity of these rules and the relationship between 
the tax-payer and the revenue office. The uncertainty stemming from the possibly 
mind-boggling tax rules and the lack of their transparency as well as settling the 
problems due to these very features may create additional costs for entrepreneurs. 
The way disputes about the interpretation of tax rules can be settled or erroneous 
tax returns can be corrected, the characteristics of the operation of tax 
administration are not negligible factors when determining the influence exerted by 
the tax system on the enterprises. To minimise the ensuing uncertainties, an 
entrepreneur has to reckon with more than just the cost of settling a moot question, 
he must also face the costs incurred by trying to prevent such cases (e.g. by 
employing a tax consultant).
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Table 3 Ranking of taxes by the heaviness of burden they impose 
on the entrepreneur
First Second
Heaviest
Third
One of the three 
heaviest
Value added tax 30.0 13.3 12.1 49.0
PIF contribution 24.3 16.3 13.9 47.6
Corporate income tax 12.9 23.3 17.5 45.6
Health insurance contribution 7.3 16.6 8.5 28.0
Customs duties 4.3 3.5 7.0 12.2
Local taxes 0.9 1.6 5.4 6.1
Contribution to UI* 0.1 1.5 7.0 6.3
Other taxes 1.5 1.8 3.0 2.3
N= 261 251 191 275
* Contributions to the Solidarity Fund, used to finance unemployment insurance benefits at 
the time of the survey
To test these factors we examined the incidence of tax disputes over the 
interpretation of tax rules and certain characteristics of the procedures to settle 
these. We have found that a broad stratum of entrepreneurs is forced to reckon with 
extra expenses incurred by the uncertainty of tax rules.
Nearly half (42%) of the respondents reported having some disputed affair with 
the tax authority (APEH) arising from a difference in interpreting some tax rule or 
tax authority resolution. 50 % of the above had more than one such affair. 61 % of 
those faced with this problem consulted the relevant tax administration office 
personally more than once. 70 % of the cases of this kind were settled within half a 
year, 14 % required a year, and in 17 % of the cases it took more than a year to 
settle the moot question.
The above view is also supported by the frequent occurrence of the opinion that 
the settlement of disputed matters with the tax authority depends heavily on 
personal connections (see Table 4). It is confirmed again that the complexity of the 
tax rules and the imprecise information issued by the tax authorities cause 
headaches for a great many of the entrepreneurs.
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Table 4 Opinions on tax rules and the way the tax authority operates
Fully
agrees
('true')
Partially agrees 
('there is some 
truth in it')
Disagrees
('false')
Tax regulation is extremely complicated, even 
accountants can hardly cope with it
69.3 23.7 7.0
Tax forms are hard to understand 60.3 29.9 9.8
Much depends on personal connections in 
arranging disputes with APEH 59.1 27.7 13.30
APEH provides sufficient and timely information 
to entrepreneurs concerning their tax obligations 18.1 25.9 56.0
Since there is no correlation between opinions concerning the importance of 
personal contacts or the complexity of tax rules on the one hand and the previous 
occurrence of tax disputes between the enterprise and the tax authority on the other, 
one may conclude that these opinions are not just (perhaps biased or over­
generalised) inferences drawn from direct personal experience but widely accepted 
views.
Determinants of tax behaviour and the attitude towards taxation
When planning the sample, we selected private firms with a more than 50 % stake 
in private ownership. There were, however, no restrictions on firms according to 
the characteristics o f minority owners and/or majority private proprietors, and the 
enterprises in the sample show a varied ownership pattern.8 In the following, the 
impact of ownership pattern on tax behaviour and contractual relations is 
examined, by defining certain ownership types (foreign, managerial and/or 
employee, state, and mixed ownership). Our hypothesis is that contractual 
discipline and tax moral are more rigorously observed in firms with a stake in state 
or foreign ownership, whereas in firms with some employee and/or managerial 
ownership there is a slacker attitude.
Four variables were created based on the type of the ownership pattern: foreign 
(KLFD), state (ALLAM), management and/or employees (MEDO), and mixed 
ownership (VGYS).9
We used statistical methods to examine whether ownership types as well as the 
size of the enterprise (net sales, number of employees), the incidence of plans to 
dismiss some workers, and net profit form a statistical relationship with some 
indicators characterising the stability of market norms and the entrepreneurial 
attitude to taxation. These indicators were the following: the incidence of tax 
arrears (ADOTART), the incidence of VAT-evading sales among business partners 
(AFAPAR), the incidence of employment at minimum wages10 (MINLF), the share 
of employees paid at minimum wages within the whole staff (MINLR), the share of 
fringe benefits in total labour remuneration (JUTTARA), the occurrence of a
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significant reliance on paying fringe benefits in order to diminish personal income 
taxes (JUTTAR) and the incidence of breaching contractual obligations (SZERSZ).
Before presenting our findings, let us briefly summarise the main features of the 
enterprises grouped into the four ownership types described previously. 21 % of the 
enterprises were partly owned by foreigners, 4.3 % by the state, 13.5% by the 
employees and management, and 6.3 % were partly owned by a mix of owners 
belonging to different categories.” The firms in the sample with foreign owners 
usually have better market positions with net sales above the average. Nevertheless, 
regarding the size of their labour force they do not seem to differ from the others. 
They plan fewer lay-offs and more investment than the rest of the firms. Their 
offices are better equipped and they have a more advanced business infrastructure 
and administrative background than the average.’2 28 enterprises in the sample 
were partially owned by the state (through its specialised agencies or through 
another state-owned company). They do not deviate radically from the average 
according to any of the characteristics analysed here. They tend to plan staff 
reductions more often or to a greater extent and have a slightly larger workforce 
than the average of the sample. Their profit and net sales do not differ significantly 
from the average either, but they are better equipped than the rest of the enterprises. 
The firms (wholly or fully) owned by the management and/or the employees tend to 
be smaller than average concerning net sales. The share of firms with only minimal 
profits is somewhat above average among them, and their infrastructural 
background is also less developed than that of the rest of the firms. The distribution 
of enterprises in the mixed ownership category according to the size of labour force, 
net sales and profit is similar to that of the rest of the sample.
Let us now see what statistical relationships could be detected between the 
characteristic features of the enterprises and the factors examined. The incidence of 
tax arrears (ADOTART)13 did not show any noteworthy association with either net 
sales or profit. Tax arrears were slightly more frequent amongst firms with a 
medium-size workforce (employing 11-25 persons).
A positive association was, however, found between plans to cut back 
employment and the incidence o f tax arrears or delayed tax payments. This 
corroborates the assumption that the joint reliance on two different types of crisis- 
management methods, notably the deferment of obligations (e.g. postponing the 
problem) and a real answer to the crisis, i. e. a reduction of costs by some means 
(e.g. by employment cut-backs) can be observed among entrepreneurs (Laki, 1993), 
however, there also might be a trade-off between these two strategies (postponement 
vs. resolving the problem).
None of the listed ownership-type variables seems to be significantly associated 
to the incidence of tax arrears. However, if we use a broader definition of partial 
state ownership14 (ALLAM2), a significant positive association can be found 
between state ownership and delays in the payment of taxes due. Firms partly 
owned by the state are over-represented among the enterprises delaying their tax 
payments or having tax arrears. This seems to support the widely held view that 
state ownership implies slacker discipline of payments.
VAT-evading sales among business partners (AFAPAR) are more common 
among the contractual partners of smaller firms. The incidence of such sales seems
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to be less likely among firms in which the state or foreigners (foreign companies) 
have a stake (cf. Table 5). This might, however, be partly due to a cross-effect 
between company size and ownership type: above average net sales and labour force 
are typical in these two ownersiiip categories.
Table 5 Connection between VAT-evading sales (AFAPAR)
and some enterprise variables
Variable Gamma
Size of labour force -0.33878
Net sales -0.39924
State ownership (ALLAM) -0.17009
Foreign ownership -0.37498
In the logit model examining the interrelation between the incidence of VAT- 
evading sales (AFAPAR) among contractual partners and some features of the 
enterprise, the effect of the ownership type (ALLAM2) disappears. On the basis of 
the results of the complete logit model (see Table Al), a significant relationship 
could be found between company size (measured here with net sales) and the 
incidence of VAT evasion in the close business environment of the company: VAT- 
evading sales are more likely to occur among the contractual partners o f smaller 
enterprises (with net sales below HUF 10 million) than in the case of the bigger 
companies. However, as the size of the enterprise (measured with net sales here) 
increases, this relationship practically phases out. If we omit from the complete 
model the tertiary interaction represented by the three-factor product 
(AFAPAR*ALLAM2*NARBEV), the model will no longer fit the data at an 
acceptable level15. This means that the probability of VAT-evading sales is not 
independent of this complex 'tertiary factor1.
Substituting the foreign ownership variable (KLFD) for the previous ownership 
type variable (ALLAM2) in the logit model it is found that only the secondary 
effects (2-factor products) are significant. There is again a significant relationship 
between company size measured by net sales and the incidence of VAT- evading 
sales among contractual partners. VAT-evading sales seem to be less likely to occur 
among the partners of foreign-owned firms, however, this effect is significant. The 
association indices show a slightly weaker relationship than in the previous case.16 
As far as the other two ownership type variables (MEDO and VGYS) are 
concerned, in the models using one of these variables similar results are obtained: 
neither seems to have an impact on AFAPAR, with company size being the only 
demonstrable influence in both cases.
Planning the remuneration package appropriately (by employing workers at a 
low wage level) may represent another - in this case legally accepted - way to 
minimise or diminish tax burdens. It is not infrequent that small and medium-size 
firms employ some part of their labour force for the legal minimum wage or a wage 
just exceeding this, and at the same time they remunerate these workers in other 
ways (e. g. with fringe benefits or unreported 'from pocket to pocket' payments, or
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by subcontracting work to their small businesses, etc.). The survey revealed that 
11% of the respondents had employees with a reported monthly salary below HUF 
9000 (just slightly exceeding the minimum wage in 1993) and 47% employed 
workers below a relatively low HUF 15,000 a month. The number of these workers, 
however, did not exceed 5 in three-fourths of the valid cases.
Comparing the number of employees at wage levels low enough to arouse the 
suspicion of tax avoidance through remuneration planning, that is with a monthly 
income below HUF 15,000 (MINLR) to the size of the entire workforce of the 
enterprise, it is found that the rate of those employed at low wage levels is higher in 
smaller firms than in bigger ones. The value of the correlation coefficient (r = 
-0.6102) resulting from logarithmic data reveals a strong inverse relationship 
between the two factors.
Even if we include such different factors as expected lay-offs, frequency of 
breaching contractual obligations, state or foreign proprietorship and the 
importance of tax planning through planning the remuneration package (measured 
with the share of fringe benefits and other tax-free payments in total labour 
remuneration) in the regression model used to explain MINLR, it is again found 
that only the number of employees (LNLTSZM) has a significant effect.17 
According to the regression model, the estimated share of employees hired at 
'substandard' (close to minimum) wages within the entire workforce is 22 % in a 
firm of 20 employees, while it is 13 % in a firm with 50 employees and estimated at 
only 5 % in a company employing 400 people (see Table A2 for the regression 
results).
The role of fringe benefits in tax planning has already been mentioned. We 
expected the extent of their use to be related positively to the incidence of 
employment for 'substandard' wages, that is, we expected that smaller firms (known 
to rely on employment at 'substandard' wages to a greater extent) take advantage of 
these loopholes more frequently than the big ones.
Accordingly, we included the logarithm of the share of employees at 
'substandard' wages within the total workforce as a dependent variable in the 
regression model estimating the share of fringe benefits within total labour 
remuneration (JUTTARA). A weak inverse relationship could be detected between 
JU H  ARA and the size of the total labour force. The results of the regression 
analysis also underline the decisive negative effect of company size on tax 
behaviour. In addition, a variable (SZERSZ) used to measure the incidence of 
violation of contractual discipline seems to have a significant effect as well: firms 
that violate contracts tend to have a higher share o f fringe benefits within total 
labour remuneration (see Table A3).
Now we are going to investigate how the occurrence of the above phenomena 
(employment at 'substandard' wages; significant tax planning through reliance on 
fringe benefits, etc.) are related to the characteristics of enterprises. This may be 
justified by the assumption that the occurrence (or the lack) of employing a specific 
device to avoid taxation or diminish the tax burden need not be related to the same 
enterprise characteristics that explain the extent to which that particular device has 
been employed. The dependent variables in this analysis included the occurrence of 
employment at 'substandard' wages (MINLF) and a categorical variable indicating
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the significant (or insignificant) role of fringe benefits in labour remuneration 
(JUTTAR), while the formerly used dichotomous categorical variables (or: 
dummies) and the number of employees indicating the size of the enterprise were 
used as explanatory variables. The same explanatory variables were also used to 
explain variables indicating the frequent or rare occurrence of tax arrears and 
breach of contract (SZERSZ)18
We have found that those companies where the management was planning staff 
cut-backs were more likely to have some employment at substandard wages 
(MINLF) than the others (see Table A4). Foreign ownership seemed to have an 
inverse effect on this, that is, this phenomenon (employment at substandard wages) 
is less likely to occur in firms partly owned by foreigners than it could be otherwise 
expected19. Unlike the share of fringe benefits within total labour remuneration, the 
categorical variable showing the significant role of such benefits within labour 
remuneration (JUTTAR) does not seem to be related to company size. By contrast, 
a close positive association could be detected between either the occurrence of plans 
to lay off workers or the probability of breaching contracts on the one hand and 
JUTTAR on the other. While the model containing these two factors fits the 
complete model well20, it also explains a relatively high share of total variance (see 
Table F5).
Our findings confirm that in the sphere o f small and medium-size enterprises the 
incidence o f taking advantage o f loop-holes or 'backdoor-strategies' (e.g. 
employing people for minimum wage) and tax avoidance are closely correlated 
with the market position o f the enterprise. These strategies are more likely to be 
resorted to i f  the firm is worse off and frequently breaches its contractual 
obligations.
The incidence of breaching contractual obligations (SZERSZ) shows a 
significant association with plans to reduce workforce and, similarly to our former 
findings, to tax planning through taking advantage of loop-holes associated with 
fringe benefits. Foreign ownership seems to have a negative effect but that is not 
significant at acceptable levels. The results reveal (see Table A6) that those 
companies in which the management contemplates lay-offs and resorts to a wide 
use offringe benefits (or other forms o f remuneration with low tax cost) in order to 
avoid taxes are more likely to breach contracts than the others.
Tax arrears and plans to lay off workers in the near future show a significant 
positive relationship. The models showing the interaction between tax arrears 
(ADOTART) and lay-off plans (ELBOCS) and between tax arrears and fringe 
benefits (JUTTAR) do not significantly differ from the saturated model (see Table 
A7).
The first relationship shows the importance of the connection between the 
short-term market position of the enterprise and the 'survival tactics' it resorts to. 
The second implies that firms using delayed payment of taxes as a temporary tool 
of maintaining operations have too limited means at their disposal to afford 
remunerating their employees through fringe benefits (above the wages they already 
pay).
Our results suggest that differences in ownership patterns within small and 
medium-size enterprises with a privately-owned majority stake have only little
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impact on tax behaviour and attitude towards contractual discipline of enterprises. 
(Only a broadly defined partial state ownership showed some significant association 
with delayed tax payments.) The size of the company seems to be related to the 
composition of the mix of available tax-planning or avoiding activities chosen by 
the company. It has been shown that VAT-evading transactions between partners, 
employment for 'substandard' wages and wide use of fringe benefits (probably 
aimed at reducing the tax wedge) are more prevalent amongst smaller enterprises. 
Foreign ownership correlated only with the occurrence of employment for 
'substandard' wages. Otherwise, contrary to expectations, the probability or the 
extent of employing different tax planning measures or survival tactics did not 
differ significantly by types of private ownership. This seems to disprove the 
assumption that foreign property would have a distinguished role in helping create 
the norms of a market economy.
By contrast, close statistical relationships could be detected between the various 
survival measures applied by enterprises. Frequent tax arrears go together with a 
higher than average probability of having plans to lay off workers. Also, the 
violation of contractual discipline increases the probability of lay-off plans and the 
incidence of tax planning through fringe benefits.
The findings confirm the relationship between the uncertain market position o f 
a firm and the loosening o f its financial and contractual discipline. As a result, the 
insecurity of the enterprises undermines financial and fiscal discipline, and hinders 
the successful transition to a market economy. The analysis allows for the 
conclusion that uncertain market and contractual relations as well as the insecurity 
of the regulatory (fiscal) environment have a greater affect on smaller firms, hence 
they are more strongly motivated to resort to legal and illegal modes of minimising 
their tax payments.
Estimating the share of tax-evading enterprises
An attempt is to be made now to estimate the number of enterprises in our sample 
which have committed tax fraud21. It is known from everyday experience that 
non-legal techniques of minimising tax liabilities (e.g. non-reporting or 
underreporting of sales, employing unregistered labour, etc.) are frequently used by 
small enterprises in the Hungarian economy. However, owing to the illegality of 
these actions, no exact data can be collected on the occurrence and incidence of 
these techniques, so one has to rely on estimations.22
The occurrence of tax fraud (or the share of tax-evading businesses) among 
small and medium-size enterprises can be a significant indicator, showing the 
extent to which the norms prevailing in market economies are accepted, or 
inversely, it can indicate the existence of an uncontrolled 'wild capitalism'. 
However, what it also shows is how tax-payers perceive and interpret their relation 
to the given tax conditions and political circumstances.
Needless to say that tax evasion cannot be estimated in a direct way, so some 
indirect method must be chosen. Here, the randomised response technique was 
used. This technique allows the researcher to estimate the frequency of replies to
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especially delicate questions in the sample and draw consequences for the 
population the sample was selected from. This way delicate questions referring to 
such matters as AIDS infection, drug abuse, or for that matter, tax fraud may be 
incorporated in a survey.
The respondent is given a pack of cards containing two opposite statements. 
Here: Al: "I have never committed tax evasion in running my firm”, A2: "I have 
committed tax evasion in running my firm”. He is then asked to shuffle and draw a 
card randomly and tell the interviewer, without showing it to him, whether the 
statement on the card is true or false in his case. The proportion of cards with the 
delicate statement/admission on them, p, is determined beforehand. This p must not 
be equal to 0.5; in our survey p = 0.7 was used. The essence of the technique is that 
it allows the researcher to determine the incidence of the studied phenomenon 
(represented by the statement A2) in the population using an estimator based on the 
relative frequencies of 'true' and 'false' responses and the known share of cards 
containing the delicate statement within the set23.
The estimator is determined by the following formula:
1
Acs = — (X/n + p - 1) (1)
2p- 1
where Acs is the estimated rate of tax-evading businesses in the sample, 
p is the rate of cards admitting tax fraud, 
n is sample size (number of enterprises in the sample)
X is the number of 'true' responses to the question.
The variance of this can be estimated as follows:
1 1 - f  X X
V(Acs)= — ( — — (1 — )) + p( l-p)/N (2)
(2p - 1)2 n - 1 n n
where V(Acs) is the estimated variance of the share of tax-evading businesses,
N is the size of (enterprise) population from which the sample was drawn 
f  is n/N
There were 44.3 % 'true' and 45.7 % 'false' answers to our question concerning tax
evasion. Using these survey results and the above formulas we arrive at the
following estimations:
Acs = 35.8%, V(Acs) = 0.0046362
Based on this the 95 % confidence interval for Acs is 35.8 + 13.4 % at. Hence, the 
share o f those entrepreneurs who have evaded taxes at least once during their 
business activities is 35.8 % + 13.4 % in the population studied. Though this is a 
rather wide range, it certainly allows us to venture the statement that tax evasion is 
a fairly widespread phenomenon among small and medium-scale entrepreneurs.
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Even in the lowest case one gets 20 % of the entrepreneurs who have already 
evaded taxes at least once at 95 % probability level. When interpreting this figure, 
one must take into account the relatively short history these businesses had: an 
overwhelming 91% majority of the enterprises surveyed started to operate only after 
1988 and 45 % had less than three years in business behind them at the time of the 
survey.
It is difficult to interpret this figure. Should the estimated share of tax-evading 
businesses be considered high or low, acceptable or undesirable? To answer this 
question, one ought to think over the sociological and economic consequences of 
tax evasion first. There is a debate going on in the literature on taxation about the 
extent to which tax evasion is desirable or undesirable.
Here we restrict ourselves to pointing out that on the basis of the constitutional 
model of fiscal choice developed by Brennan-Buchanan, in 1977, tax evasion may 
be desirable for the individual if he sees no legal possibility for restricting the fiscal 
power of the state-Leviathan (Spicer, 1990). If entrepreneurs consider the state's 
hunger for taxes excessive or unjustified - such a perception might have been 
triggered by tightened tax rules or tax administration at the time of the survey - this 
might lead to the spread of tax evasion.
Research on the underground economy has also come to similar conclusions 
while describing the causes leading to the decision to enter (or to remain in) the 
black sector. This decision is triggered not only by the high tax rates, but also by 
the subjective costs of cumbersome and overly complicated regulations (the 
complexity of tax rules) and the extent of such regulations. The level of 
participation in the visible labour market and tax morals, attitudes towards taxation 
also play a role in this (Lackó, 1995).
The rate of tax evasion found among small and medium-scale entrepreneurs can 
probably be attributed to these factors, also investigated in the present paper, 
especially the high tax rates and the extra difficulties caused by the complexity of 
tax rules.24 These factors, as our findings have verified, affect the smaller 
enterprises more strongly. It seems to be likely that the share of tax evading 
businesses would have been lower had the survey also covered larger enterprises.
Notes
1 Of course, these norms are not fully observed in advanced market economies, either. The 
violation of contractual discipline and abidance by payment terms is, however, efficiently 
sanctioned by the market. For further details on tax planning, tax avoidance and tax evasion 
in market economies see Spicer, 1990 and Forte-Peacock, 1981.
2 "... precisely those enterprises will have a dynamically growing market share that are the 
most difficult to tax” (Tanzi, 1991).
3 Though the enterprises with the greatest outstanding debts to the Social Insurance Fund are 
almost exclusively state-owned firms, there is no contradiction involved here.
4 The survey conducted in spring 1994 was based on a questionnaire answered by top 
company executives. The sample was based on the following selection criteria: a) the annual 
net sales for 1992 did not exceed HUF 100 million; b) the enterprises belonged to one of the
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following sectors: manufacturing; construction; commerce and trade; road vehicle and 
commodity repair and maintenance; hotelling and catering; transportation and warehousing; 
post and telecommunications; education; c) the ownership share of private capital (including 
stakes held by foreign owners and employees & managers) exceeded 50 %.
5 This database contained for 1992 all enterprises with single-entry and full double-entry 
book-keeping, filing tax returns. As a significant part of the selected enterprises were not 
found at the given address, we selected 139 firms satisfying our criteria from business 
indexes and the Hungarian Yellow Pages. We figure that two factors must have been 
underlying the fact that a great many of the selected enterprises could not be located: a) 
some of the enterprises existed only formally, if at all, at the time of the survey; b) many 
were run at different addresses from the official ones, mostly in private homes. We found 
that only 10-15% of the companies employing 10 or less persons and registered in Budapest 
could be reached at their 1992 addresses. This coincides with the findings of several other 
enterprise surveys, including the Enterprise Panel Survey by the Department of Sociology at 
the Budapest University of Economic Sciences, and a joint survey of entrepreneurs with the 
Central Statistical Office (Czakó et al., 1994).
6 The question referred to the unilateral violation of a contract, triggering negative 
consequences ("Did it happen to you last year that for various reasons you were unable to 
satisfy your obligations undersigned in a contract and this caused you problems?"). As 
diversions from the original terms laid down in a contract might also occur with the mutual 
agreement of the contracting partners, or minor infringements might not trigger negative 
consequences, our question covers only some part of all contract violations.
7 86% of those considering their contractual partners reliable also said that they always 
satisfied their contractual obligations, as compared to an average of 75%.
8 The sample being relatively small, it would have been pointless to ask about exact 
ownership shares. Most probably, there would have been no significant correlation between 
these and our variables describing enterprise behaviour. This was suggested by other 
research findings as well (Tóth, 1995).
9 For the definition of variables, see Appendix.
10 At the time the survey was conducted, the minimum wage was 9,000 HUF/month. 
However, as this has been raised considerably every year since then, and as in the private 
sector far better remuneration could be achieved than this, wages below 15,000 HUF are 
considered here to signal employment at 'substandard' wages.
11 The rest of the firms are exclusively owned by Hungarian private persons or companies.
12 On the basis of the questionnaire six variables wfere constructed describing the level of 
technical equipment, infrastructure and office conditions. These were not asked but filled by 
the interviewers after the interviews. They included the quality of office space (private flat, 
private flat converted into office, office building older than 10 years, new office building), 
how many people worked in the office, whether there were telephone, fax, computer, Xerox 
machine in the office. These replies were aggregated to produce a continuous variable 
indicative of the “seriousness” of the firm.
13 The following question was put to one of the company executives: "Has your enterprise 
ever been late in paying its taxes?" (Choices: 1 - no, 2 - yes, once, 3 - yes, more than once).
14 When not only those cases are considered as partial state ownership where foreign, 
managerial or employee ownership is not included (see the definition of the variable
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ALLAM in the Appendix!), then the variable (ALLAM2) will indicate any case when 
state-ownership is also represented in a company.
15 The value of Likelihood Chi Square was 7.90990, with p=0.048.
16 The value of entropy is 0.056609, that of concentration is 0.061245.
17 It was tested with regression analysis. The logarithms of the number of employees 
receiving 'substandard' wages, the share of fringe benefits in labour remuneration and the 
number of employees (LNLTSZM) were included in the model together with categorical 
variables describing other factors.
18 In the variable of foreign ownership, the former 0 value was re-coded as 2, denoting the 
lack of the combination of foreign and Hungarian private owners.
19 It should be noted here that foreign ownership meant in our sample foreign private 
persons as owners in most cases.
20 The value of the Likelihood Chi Square was 59.41919, with p=0.253.
21 A special word of thanks is due at this point to István Varga, senior lecturer at the 
Department of Sociology at the Budapest University of Economic Sciences, who called our 
attention to the method applied below and the relevant literature.
22 The Institute for Economic Research (GKI) estimated the weight of non-registered 
economic activity (not all of these activities automatically entail tax evasion) at 27% of the 
official GDP (Árvay - Vértes, 1994).
23 For a brief description of the method and the mathematics of the estimator, see Sámdal et 
al„ 1992.
24 However, it must be noted here, that this is a self-reinforcing phenomenon: if it happens 
frequently, it may encourage the entrepreneur to choose tax evasion even in otherwise 
neutral decision-making situations, thus eroding the tax morals further.
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Appendix
Definition of variables
ADOTART
AFAPAR
MINLF
ELBOCS
JUTTARA
1 - tax arrears several times in the past
2 - no tax arrears or tax arrears only once in the past
1 - VAT-evading transactions are typical among
contractual partners
2 - VAT-evading transactions are not typical among
contractual partners
1 - there are employees at substandard wages
2 - there are no employees at substandard wages
1 - plans to lay off workers in the near future
2 - no plans to lay off workers in the near future
share of fringe benefits in total labour remuneration
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JUTTAR 1 - share of fringe benefits in total labour 
remuneration exceeds 30 %,
2 - share of fringe benefits in total labour 
remuneration below 30 % ;
SZERSZ breaching contractual obligations occurred
1 - more than three times
2 - less than three times
3 - not even once
NARBEV net sales are:
1 - below 10 million HUF 
2 - 1 0 - 5 0  million HUF
3 - 50 - 100 million HUF
4 - above 100 million HUF
KLFD 1 - if there are foreign owners but no state, 
managerial or employee ownership in the 
company,
0 - otherwise;
ALLAM 1 - if there is state ownership in the company but 
no foreigners, managers or employers have a 
stake in it,
0 - otherwise;
ALLAM2 1 - when there is any form of state ownership
(stake held by ÁVÜ, ÁPV Rt, or state-owned enterprise),
2 - otherwise
MEDO 1 - when there is some manager or employee ownership 
and no state or foreign stake in the company,
0 - otherwise.
VGYS 1 - if two or more different ownership categories
(from foreigners, state and management & employees) 
are represented amongst company owners;
0 - otherwise.
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TABLES
Table A1 Saturated logit model of VAT-evading transactions (AFAPAR), 
number of employees and ownership type
Effect Parameter* Coefficient Standard
error
Z value
AFAPAR
1(1) -0.59394 0.17755 -3.34523
AFAPAR * ALLAM2
2(1,1) -0.03559 0.17755 -0.20047
AFAPAR *NARBEV
3(1,1)
4(1,2)
5(1,3)
0.82209
-0.22217
-0.15626
0.33317
0.27265
0.29453
2.46745
-0.81483
-0.53055
AFAPAR* ALLAM2 *NARBEV
6 (1,1,1)
7 (1,1,2)
8 (1,1,3)
0.52020
-0.48006
0.02416
0.33317
0.27265
0.29453
1.56136
-1.76071
0.08202
Variance Entropy Concentration
Model-dependent 
Residual-dependent 
Total (d. f.: 247) 
Association
10.139
138.027
148.165
0.06843
7.666
93.224
100.890
0.07598
*: the numbers in brackets show the actual value taken by the relevant categorical 
variable (or if there is a product of variables, the variable on the given place). For 
data sets and definition of variables see previous page).
Table A2 Regression on employment at 'substandard' wages (MINER)
Dependent variable В Standard 
error of В
Beta T significance
ofT
LNLTSZM -0.50102 0.06934 -0.57809 -7.225 0.0000
Regression constant -0.00974 0.18333 -0.053 0.9577
R = 0.57809
R2= 0.33418 F = 52.20599
Adjusted R2= 0.32778 significance of F= 0.0000
Standard error = 0.69925 N=106
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Table A3 Regression on the share of fringe benefits in total labour remuneration 
(JUTTARA)
Dependent variable В Standard 
error of В
Beta T Significance
ofT
LNLTSZM -0.34923 0.10199 -0.31540 -3.424 0.0009
SZERSZ 0.44672 0.21933 0.18759 2.037 0.0442
Regression constant -3.11043 0.27412 -11.347 0.0000
R = 0.35844
R2= 0.12848 F = 7.59290
Adjusted R2 =0.11156 significance of F= 0.0008
Standard error = 1.02705 N=106
Table A4 Relationship between the occurrence of employment for 'substandard' 
wages (MINLF) and some enterprise characteristics (logit model)
Effect Parameter* Coefficient Standard Z value 
error
MINLF *KLFD
l ( U ) -0.16860 0.07814 -2.12756
MINLF*ELBOCS
2(1.1) 0.16667 0.07814 2.13284
Variance Entropy Concentration
Model-dependent 2.918 2.860
Residual-dependent 148.683 106.395
Total (d. fi: 218) 151.601 109.255
Association 0.019248 0.026173
* The numbers in brackets show the actual value taken by the relevant categorical variable 
in the order of variables in the relevant products given in the first column of the table.
Table A5 Relationship between the occurrence of tax-planning through fringe benefits 
(JUTTAR) and certain enterprise characteristics (logit model)
Effect Parameter* Coefficient Standard Z value 
error
JUTT AR * SZERSZ
HU) 0.32043 0.09321 3.42784
JUTTAR*ELBOCS
2(U) 0.68755 0.09321 7.37672
Variance Entropy Concentration
Model-dependent 14.688 11.195
Residual-dependent 94.773 58.747
Total (d. fi: 218) 109.461 69.942
Association 0.134186 0.160055
* The numbers in brackets show the actual value taken by the relevant categorical variable 
in the order of variables in the relevant products given in the first column of the table.
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Table A6 Relationship between the incidence of violating contracts (SZERSZ) 
and certain enterprise characteristics(logit model)
Effect Parameter* Coefficient Standard Z value
error
SZERSZ*ELBOCS
K M ) 0.33038 0.09321 3.54465
SZERSZ * JUTT AR
2(1,1) 0.32043 0.09321 3.43784
Variance Entropy Concentration
Model-dependent 7.687 6.689
Residual-dependent 120.357 79.892
Totalfd. f.: 218) 128.044 86.581
Association 0.060036 0.077260
* The numbers in brackets show the actual value taken by the relevant categorical variable 
in the order of variables in the relevant products given in the first column of the table.
Table A7 Relationship between tax arrears (ADOTART) and some enterprise 
characteristics (logit model)
Effect Parameter* Coefficient Standard Z value 
error
ADOTART*ELBOCS
1(1,1) 0.47246 0.11150 4.23743
ADOTART*JUTTAR
2(1,1) -0.26803 0.11150 -2.40395
Variance Entropy Concentration
Model-dependent 6.138 5.568
Residual-dependent 140.202 98.473
Total (d. f.:218) 146.340 104.041
Association 0.041944 0.053520
* The numbers in brackets show the actual value taken by the relevant categorical variable 
in the order of variables in the relevant products given in the first column of the table.
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Miklós Tomka
CHANGES IN THE STRUCTURE OF DENOM INATIONS 
IN  EAST AND CENTRAL EUROPE
Two trends have emerged in the sociology of religion lately which have closer 
relevance to the present topic. One addresses the changing socio-political role and 
weight of religions and denominations also in relation to one another. While a 
pluralistic society and the transformation of symbolic goods into market 
commodities are altering the field of religion, the competition between the churches 
as macrosocial formations and the potential change in the proportion of 
denominations as a result are also worthy of note. This competition may lead to far- 
reaching conclusions as to the functions and functionality of the churches. So far, 
research has mainly highlighted their relevance to social organisation and politics.
The relative weight and proportions of denominations as different cultures and 
socio-political agencies and institutions are often part of a global question 
(Clévenot 1987; Hunyadi 1995; Lacoste 1990; Sontag 1991; Szigetvári 1991). The 
starting point in this case is that religions are the representatives of cultures and 
cultural spheres. Their expansion or retreat is the symbolic means and expression 
of the increase or decrease of cultural (and political) influences. The view is 
spreading that at a time of globalisation and economic and communicational 
unification, possibly the major source of regionalising the world is cultural 
tradition. Religions are the vehicles in which the goals, values, motivations, ideas 
of social organisation are most deeply rooted and which encompass most of culture 
as such. In this sense, it is reasonable to speak of the regional division of the world 
by religion and to derive the existing differences in culture and life strategies from 
religious and ideological traditions. It is justified to assume that these differences 
entail different degrees of competitiveness, or, to put it in another way, they 
lastingly determine the future development, the possibilities of integration into the 
whole of the world as well as the tensions and conflicts between the regions (Abe 
1994; Huntington 1993a; Nakajima 1994; 1993b; Robertson 1994; Szűcs 1983).
The same approach can be applied within a single region as well. The 
Protestantism thesis of Weber and his circle (Schluchter 1988; Troeltsch 1923; 
Weber 1982) could be used to interpret the processes of differentiation within 
Europe. Religious or denominational affiliation appears to be a weighty factor even 
in today's efforts for European unification, both at the level of explicit political 
intentions (Greschat-Loth 1994) and in scientific interpretation (Baubérot 1994; 
Davie 1994; Vincent-Willaime 1993). One may choose to approve or criticise the 
socio-political relevance of denominational culture and the churches, but it would 
be narrow-mindedness to ignore it.
The denominational structure and its changes are of course instructive within a 
single country as well, apart from the international perspective. This means
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countries in the first place where substantial social transformations are taking place 
also affecting the symbolic sphere. It is a recent insight reached by American 
religious history and sociology that the current extensive church membership and 
practice of religion is not the legacy of the 'Founding Fathers' or first settlers but the 
result of extensive missionary movements in the last century. The emergence of the 
denominational and religious distribution and map of the USA has not been linear 
but an outcome of several stages of dramatic changes in proportion (Finke-Start 
1992; Mulin-Richey 1994). This recognition leads to the question of which 
denominations increased or decreased, and why. The answer is identical for both 
the earlier times and the past 20 or 30 years. The 'liberal', 'increasingly secular’ 
churches focusing on social and welfare goals are spectacularly shrinking. By 
contrast, the churches that preserve their other-worldliness more persistently, assert 
harder internal norms, require strict ecclesiastic discipline, that is, the more 
'conservative' churches were and are growing both in the size of attendance and 
significance (not only in relative but also in absolute terms in America, even after 
the elimination of factors like immigration) (Hoge-Roozen 1979; Kelley 1972; 
Roozen-Hadaway 1993).
The other mentioned branch of sociology of religion examines what role religion 
and the churches had in resisting the state socialist regimes in East and Central 
European countries and in the collapse of these regimes, and also, what share the 
churches have taken in the social transformation since the collapse. The effect of 
the Vatican's 'Eastern policy' is documented in detail in both political history and 
sociological terms. The primary and explicit aim of this was obviously the 
extension of the liberty of religion and first of all the Catholic church. In the 
meantime, the policy of the Vatican tried to weaken the totalitarian, and 
authoritarian power not only unconsciously but also deliberately, supporting the 
social, cultural and political alternatives. It is possible that the Vatican was more 
effective in supporting and encouraging social autonomy, civil society and cultural 
pluralism than any other factor criticising communism from the outside (Dupuy 
1980; Stehle 1983; Winter 1972). Experts fully agree that religion constituted a 
counterpole to the centralising efforts and claims to ideological hegemony of the 
one-party state. This cultural otherness proved to be a force of social organisation. 
Possibly it was the only force that reached considerable masses and survived during 
the entire communist period, the centralised regime being unable to fully assimilate 
it. Ideologically-based integration and social organisation became the source of 
cultural self-education, mutual assistance, the emergence of a group consciousness, 
a certain degree of division of labour and the rise of information organisations, both 
in congregations and parishes, and in religious small and base communities, 
religious movements and 'underground churches' (Beeson 1982; Bociurkiw-Strong 
1975; Michel 1988; Walters 1988).
Naturally, the question can be formulated at the level of formal politics as well. 
Did the official church leaders openly turn against the prevailing regime? (Gönner 
1995). From the aspect of sociology, however, it is more informative to know how 
religiousness, the practice of religion (also fostered and protected by the official 
church leadership), the largely informal religious organisation and the secular 
activities of a religious community - in other words, "religion as an autonomous,
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parly formal and partly informal system" contributed to the slackening and 
dismantling of the social monopoly of the one-party state. It took an enormous 
share, e.g. as the model and precedent of any 'second society' (Grabner-Heinze- 
Pollack 1990; Michel 1992; Nielsen 1991; Giycz 1988; Tomka 1995); as a living 
social network and texture which preserved its ability after 1989, too, to become a 
constitutent element of a rising civil society (Borowik-Szyjewski 1993; Grycz 1991; 
Koprowski 1989).
At the juncture of the two research approaches the question arises as to what 
differences can be demonstrated in the social role of various denominations in the 
countries of the former East bloc. Within this very broad research field, the focus is 
now on the influence the communist age had on the denominational proportions. 
To put it somewhat differently: is the comparative weight of the different churches 
the same today as it was prior to the socialist-communist period? One of the most 
intriguing lines of investigation would inquire into the rise, survival and even 
growth of small churches or sects grouping hundreds or at most a few thousand 
people. Another problem of special interest is the extent to which the Protestant 
communities of Poland, Croatia or Slovenia constituting a minority below a few per 
cent have been able to preserve their size. However, both questions can be separated 
from the mainstream of research concerned with the major historical churches. 
They are either face-to-face groups or minorities given special treatment by politics 
as well. In addition, there is a lack of empirical research material which is 
indispensable for the interpretation of the situation. The former GDR with its 
Catholics amounting to some 6 % is a borderline case. All that can be stated for 
want of detailed investigations and any conclusions drawn is that in European 
comparison, the loss of religion reached the highest rate in the former GDR, but 
while the adherents of Protestant churches dropped to one-third of the former rate, 
that of the Catholic Church only decreased to half of the former proportion over the 
forty years (Mechtenberg 1985; Zulehner-Denz 1993).
The areas chosen for study include four countries in which both the Catholic and 
the Protestant churches are of substantial size: Latvia, the Czech Republic, Slovakia 
and Hungary. The topic of investigation is the social proportion of the 
congregations of the two kinds of churches and their relative weight. Since only the 
relative size of the major churches is examined, the question of the Jewish 
population is only touched on in passing (ignoring here the effect of the holocaust 
and emigration to Israel or other countries). Also disregarded are the old and new 
small churches and denominations with few believers. The population segment not 
affiliated to any denomination is present not as a research subject in itself but as the 
social boundary of the two religious communities analysed.
Latvia
No official statistics are available on the religious distribution of present-day 
Latvian society. As some central statistics from the 30s reveal, the majority of the 
population were Protestant (56.3 % in 1930, 61.6 % in 1935), mostly Lutherans, 
but the Roman Catholics and Greek Catholics were also sizeable minorities (32.5%
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in 1930, 24.5% in 1935). Members of the Orthodox Church (5.1% in 1930, 8.9% in 
1935) and Jews (4.9% in 1930, 4.8% in 1935) were far fewer. People belonging to 
no denominations practically did not exist (Latvijas 1938; 1939).
Significant concomitants of the Soviet era were the scattering of Latvians 
throughout the Soviet Union and the even more distressing fact of settling other, 
chiefly Russian, people in the country (Bremmer-Taras 1993). If the newcomers 
had any religious affiliations, they were almost exclusively followers of the 
Orthodox Church of Old Believers (one of the branches or sects of the Orthodox 
Church). The fact that the Latvian Orthodox Church enjoyed far greater freedom 
than any other church in the country on the one hand or than the Orthodox Church 
in the rest of the Soviet Union was certainly in connection with ethno-political 
considerations. At any rate, the exercise of religion dropped to a very low rate by 
the sixties and, at least until the independence of the country, it continued to 
decline (Table 1).
Table 1 Percentage of baptisms and church weddings in the total of births 
and weddings in Latvia in 1963-1992
1963 1965 1972 1975 1981 1983 1984 1992
Baptism 29.3 27.9 24.0 22.4 20.6 19.1 18.5 -
Church wedding 9.2 7.6 5.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.6 26.0
Source: Benz 1995
This low rate of religious practice was distributed very unevenly among the 
churches. Though statistics on the practice of worship are only available for the last 
decade, the immense differences suggest that similar tendencies must have existed 
earlier. In the 80s the great majority of baptisms and weddings took place in the 
Catholic Church. As for baptisms, even the nominally majority Lutherans were 
surpassed by the Orthodox Christians (Table 2).
Although in 1992 Lutheran baptisms outnumbered Catholic ones, the number 
was far lower than their pre-1945 share would have justified. In the same year, 
Lutheran weddings tripled (but still lagged behind the rate of Catholic weddings). It 
is still a question whether the sudden rise in the Lutheran rates is to be attributed to 
the drive to make up for the missed baptisms and church weddings, whether the 
rate is stable and lasting for some time, or whether it marked only the beginning of 
an upswing. What is a fact is that some 70-80% of children born in Catholic 
families while only 4-5% of children born in Lutheran families were baptised in the 
(original) religion of the parents in the 80s. The pre-1990 figures of religious 
practice indicate a transformation of the country's denominational structure. It is 
possible that the formerly predominantly Protestant country will gradually turn 
Catholic (Benz 1995).
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Table 2 Distribution of baptisms and church weddings by denomination in Latvia 
in 1981-1992 (in %)
1981 1982 1983 1984 1992
Baptism
Catholic 58.7 61.5 62.5 61.2 30.0
Lutheran 11.2 10.4 11.5 12.7 40.5
Orthodox 17.8 18.6 16.5 15.5 16.2
Old Believers 9.5 7.7 7.9 7.9 2.8
Other 2.8 1.8 1.6 2.7 10.5
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Church wedding
Catholic 83.0 82.1 84.3 85.4 56.5
Lutheran 9.5 11.0 9.2 10.1 32.0
Orthodox 5.5 4.4 3.8 2.4 9.2
Other 2.0 2.5 2.7 2.1 2.3
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Benz 1995
Czech Republic and Slovakia
In Czechoslovakia, especially in the Czech Republic, denominational traditions 
carry exceptionally strong political charges. In Czech and Moravian areas, both the 
national resistance to the Habsburgs and the bourgeois liberal opposition to 19th 
century papal centralism inspired anti-catholicism. As a consequence, the Czech 
Hussite traditions were revived and developed into a national myth, and in the 
interwar period, the Catholic Church was consciously pushed into the background. 
With the slight increase in the rate of the Protestants, the predominance of 
Catholicism decreased in this period. Nevertheless, it can be attributed solely to the 
political climate, despite spectacular departures from the Catholic Church and the 
foundation of the Czech national church, that the Czech Republic remained 
predominantly Catholic. (The increase in the numerical share of the Protestants by 
1951 was due to a considerable extent to the expulsion or internment of some two 
million Germans from the Sudetenland who were all Catholic.)
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Table 3 The denominational distribution of the population of Czechoslovakia, 
the Czech Republic and Slovakia in census statistics between 1921 
and 1991 (in %)
1921 1930 1951 1991
1991 a s  a  
p e rc e n ta g e  
o f  1951
C ze c h o s lo v ak ia
N = 1 3 ,6 1 3 ,1 7 2 14 ,7 2 9 ,5 3 6 1 2 ,3 3 8 ,4 5 0 1 5 ,5 7 6 ,5 5 0
C a th o lic 8 0 .2 7 7 .5 7 8 .4 4 7 .5 6 0 .6
P ro te s ta n t 11.1 13.1 16 .4 5.3 3 2 .6
O th e r 3 .3 3 .6 0 .7 0 .9 124 .2
N o  o r  u n k n o w n  
d en o m in a tio n 5 .4 5.8 4 .5 4 6 .3 1029 .6
T o ta l 10 0 .0 100.0 10 0 .0 100 .0
C a th o lic s  a s  %  
o f  P ro te s ta n ts 7 2 0 .5 5 9 3 .7 4 7 8 .6 8 8 9 .6
C zech  R ep u b lic
N  = 1 0 ,0 0 5 ,7 3 4 1 0 ,6 7 4 ,3 8 6 8 .8 9 6 ,1 3 3 1 0 .3 0 2 ,2 1 5
C a th o lic 8 2 .0 7 8 .6 7 6 .7 39.1 5 1 .0
P ro te s ta n t 9 .2 12.0 16 .4 4.1 2 4 .9
O th e r 1.6 1.6 0 .8 0 .7 9 0 .3
N o  o r  u n k n o w n  
d e n o m in a tio n 7 .2 7 .8 6.1 56.1 9 1 9 .2
T o ta l 10 0 .0 100 .0 1 0 0 .0 100 .0
C a th o lic s  a s  %  
o f  P ro te s ta n ts 8 9 2 .4 6 5 5 .8 4 6 8 .4 9 5 7 .5
S lo v a k ia
N  = 3 ,0 0 0 ,8 7 0 3 ,32 9 ,7 9 3 3 ,4 4 2 ,3 1 7 5 ,2 7 4 ,3 3 5
C a th o lic 7 7 .4 7 8 .0 8 2 .7 6 3 .8 7 7 .1
P ro tes tan t 17 .7 17.1 16 .4 7 .8 4 7 .5
O th e r 4 .6 4 .4 0 .5 1.2 2 4 0 .6
N o  o r  u n k n o w n  
d e n o m in a tio n 0 .3 0.5 0 .4 2 7 .2 7 8 2 5 .0
T o ta l 1 0 0 .0 100.0 1 0 0 .0 100 .0
C a th o lic s  a s  %  
o f  P ro te s tn a ts 4 3 6 .1 4 5 7 .9 5 0 4 .9 8 2 0 .0
The population of Slovakia is also preponderantly Catholic. This rate further 
increased in the interwar period, and then as a result of the holocaust and the 
'exchange of populations'.
Then came the democratic elections and the communist takeover. Apart from the 
brief intermezzo of the 'Prague spring' the political power carried out the most 
violent and lastingly effective persecution of churches in East Central Europe, 
which on the opposite end led to the emergence of the strongest 'underground 
church'. In this conflict situation, the previously latent irreligiosity became 
manifest: nearly half the population of Czechoslovakia (56 % of the Czech society 
and 27 % of the Slovak population) became undenominational. Undoubtedly, the 
lack of religion on a mass scale is the most distinctly characteristic feature of the 
two countries' religious profiles. However, the shift in the proportions of the 
denominations is also noteworthy (Kucera 1994, Scitánie 1924; 1934; 1957; 1992;
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Srb-Andrle 1994). The Catholic predominance increased to an unprecedented 
extent over the past forty years (see Table 3).
Hungary
The percentage of Catholics has been gradually growing to the detriment of 
Protestants for over a century now. This tendency applies to both pre-Trianon and 
post-1920 Hungary. Decennial censuses between 1869 and 1910 show 254.8, 262.9, 
272.1, and 280.5 Catholics for every 100 Protestants. The denominational 
distribution of the dismembered country considerably differed from that of former 
Greater Hungary (first of all, in the almost complete lack of Orthodox Christians). 
The tendency, however, remained unaltered. The decennial census figures in the 
post-Trianon Hungarian territory show a rise from 233.8 Catholics for 100 
Protestants in 1910 to 243.9 in 1920, 248.9 in 1930, 254.5 in 1941 and 260.1 in 
1949 (Kovacsics 1963). The trend continued after 1949. A comprehensive data 
analysis for the 80s involving an aggregated sample of 100,000 persons revealed 
280.7 Catholics for every 100 Protestants (Tomka 1994). The survey of the Central 
Statistical Office (KSH) conducted in 1992 also to obtain information about 
denominations found a lower rate of 270.5. However, this research was not 
extended to the Greek Catholics, possibly subsumed under the category of 'other' 
(Bukodi-Harcsa-Reisz 1994). If the KSH figure is accepted, it also confirms the 
tendency outlined. This applies even more pronouncedly to the denominational 
research initiated by Parliament and the Ministry of Culture in 1992, whose 
empirical survey showed 357.7 Catholics for every 100 Protestants (Kozma et al. 
1994).
The Hungarian investigations not only document the growth of the Catholic 
preponderance but also inform researchers about its demographic and cultural 
nature. A comparison of the denominational structure of different age groups 
reveals that when a change of generations takes place, different churches retain 
their congregations to varying degrees. Both the survey of the 80s and the one 
conducted in 1992 show that with the decrease of age the percentage rate of 
Catholics increases and that of Protestants decreases. By comparing the data for the 
80s and 1992, it can be found that not only those professing no religion or 
denomination rise in number, but the differences between the denominational 
structures of various age groups also increase. In the 80s, the predominance of 
Catholics was 'only' 1.13-times higher in the youngest age group than in the oldest. 
By 1992, the social share of every denomination had decreased. Within this 
tendency, however, the Catholics outnumber the Protestants 1.19-times more 
among the youngest than among the oldest (Table 4).
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Table 4 Denominational distribution of the Hungarian society by age group
a) average of the 80s and b) in 1992 (%)
D e n o m in a tio n
18-29 3 0 -3 9 4 0 -4 9
y e a rs  o f  ag e
5 0 -5 9 60
1 8 -2 9  
a s  a
p e rc e n ta g e  o f  
th o s e  6 0 +
a) N =  24 ,8 9 6 19 ,3 6 7 16 ,703 1 5 ,8 7 7 19,122
C a th o lic 69.5 7 1 .8 72 .3 7 1 .8 7 1 .5 9 7 .2
C a lv in is t 19.5 2 1 .2 22 .0 22 .2 2 1 .4 9 1 .1
L u th e ra n 3.3 3 .9 4 .5 4 .7 5.1 6 4 .7
O th e r 0.3 0 .3 0 .5 0 .7 1.4 2 1 .4
N o  d e n o m in a tio n 5.9 2.3 0 .5 0 .4 0.3 1 9 6 6 .7
U n k n o w n 1.4 0.5 0 .2 0 .2 0.3 4 6 6 .7
T o ta l 100.0 100 .0 100 .0 10 0 .0 100.0
C a th o lic s  a s  % 30 4 .8 286.1 2 7 2 .8 2 4 7 .5 26 9 .8
o f  P ro tes t.
b ) N =  29 ,0 0 0
C a th o lic 61 .3 6 7 .3 6 7 .0 69.1 6 8 .8 89 .1
C a lv in is t 18.0 20 .3 22.3 22.3 22.5 8 0 .0
L u th e ra n 3 .0 3 .3 4 .2 5 .0 5.5 5 4 .5
O th e r 1.8 2 .7 2.8 2.5 2.9 6 2 .1
N o  d e n o m in a tio n 14.1 4 .4 1.8 0 .5 0 .4 3 5 3 5 .0
U n k n o w n 1.8 1.9 1.9 0 .7 0 .7 2 5 7 .1
T o ta l 100.0 100.0 100 .0 100 .0 100.0
C a th o lic s  a s  % 291 .9 2 8 5 .2 2 5 2 .8 253 .1 2 4 5 .7
o f  P ro tes t.
Sources: a) Tomka 1994; b) Bukodi-Harcsa-Reisz 1994.
The fact that those professing to be Catholic represent the overwhelming majority 
of the population obscures some minor differences. It seems of secondary 
importance whether the average share of Catholics in groups of educational levels 
was 69 or 72 % in the 80s. Actually, the European tendency showing the decrease 
of the share of Catholics with the rise of the educational level can also be 
demonstrated here. As regards their position in social competition, this 'lag in 
culture' is not negligible.
The differences are more pronounced if we approach the question from the other 
side, and especially if we take a look at the two Protestant churches separately. 
Although everyday experience suggests that the upward mobility of Calvinists may 
assure them significant public and political presence, an examination of schooling 
indicates that the Calvinist population is not only aged well above the average but 
also that their presence is more marked in low educational groups. By contrast, the 
adherents of the Lutheran church, known to have an urban and middle-class basis, 
have a higher share of tertiary education graduates than of people with low 
schooling (Table 5).
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Table 5 Denominational distribution of groups in Hungarian society by level
of education (%)
School education
Denomination Less than 
8 grades
8 grades Secondary
school
College,
univ.
Total Tertiary 
educ. as a 
percentage of 
8-graders
N = 23,629 43,103 20,630 8657 96,019
C ath o lic 72.1 71.8 70.3 69.2 71.3 95.9
C alv in is t 22.7 21.6 19.1 19.4 21.1 85.6
L u th e ra n 4.3 3.7 4.8 5.4 4.3 123.7
J e w is h 0.2 0.3 0.5 1.0 0.4 615.9
O th e r 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.2 153.2
N o
d en o m in a tio n
0.2 1.8 4.3 4.4 2.2 1834.1
U n k n o w n 0.2 0.6 0.6 0.2 0.5 116.2
T o ta l 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
C a th o lic s  as % 267.0 283 .8 294.1 279.0 280.7
o f  P ro test.
Source'. Tomka 1994.
The KSH figures for 1992 show a rise in average educational level and an 
unchanged denominational situation. Differences in educational level are naturally 
reflected by the varying chances of launching a career and by the occupational 
structures. In groups of leaders, intellectuals and other white-collar workers the 
non-religious have a particularly high share. Differences by denomination are also 
manifest. Lutherans are overrepresented among intellectuals and other white-collar 
workers while Calvinists (and Catholics) are underrepresented. In 1992 23.5 % of 
the Lutherans, 21.7 % of the Catholics and 19.7 % of Calvinists (as against 29.1 % 
of non-religious people) began their careers as white-collar workers (Bukodi- 
Harcsa-Reisz 1994).
The topic studied has another important dimension to it which has been ignored 
so far. What does denominational identity mean? So far it has been tied to two 
things: self-reporting, that is, what religion the respondent professes to have, and 
the practice of religion according to the ritual of one or another church. It is 
instructive to compare the two approaches. This helps clarify the question whether 
denominational identity means exclusively the affiliation with a certain religion, or 
it also implies a cultural self-interpretation partly independently of religiosity. 
Another question it touches on is whether the subjective criteria of self-definition 
are identical in different denominational subcultures.
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Table 6 Distribution of denominational groups by manner of religious 
practice (%)
Manner of religious practice
D e n o m in a tio n T h ro u g h  ch u rch  
R e g u la r ly  R are ly
O w n  w ay N o  p ra c tic e
B e l ie v e r  N o n - b e lie v e r
U n know n T o ta l
C a th o lic 15.1 22.6 9.9 30.4 19.2 2.8 100.0
C alv in is t 8.2 19.7 12.8 30.9 24.2 4.3 100.0
L u th e ran 10.3 21.5 11.4 32.5 20.5 3.7 100.0
O th e r 29.8 9.8 9.8 30.1 18.4 2.1 100.0
N o  d e n o m in a tio n 0.4 0.4 0.7 5.9 84.9 7.8 100.0
U n k n o w n 1.1 2.6 0.8 8.4 35.0 52.1 100.0
T o ta l 12.7 20.6 10.0 29.0 23.6 4.0 100.0
C ath o lics  a s  % 476.9 305.2 212.8 263.5 219.0 180.1
o f  P ro te s ta n ts
Source: Bukodi-Harcsa-Reisz 1994.
Several basic facts can be inferred from the KSH figures (Bukodi-Harcsa-Reisz 
1994). First, in one-fifth of the cases, denominational identity is clearly not 
equivalent to religion but means the determination of a secular (not religious) 
cultural place. Secondly, both regular religious practice and adherence to the 
church characterise Catholics in the first place, being rarer among Lutherans and 
even less frequent among Calvinists. Thirdly, a Catholic's self-identity is more 
religious than a Lutheran's and even more than a Calvinist's. This statement can be 
quantified if within the social groups differentiated by religiosity and irreligiosity, 
and religious practice, the size of the Catholic population is defined in percentage 
of the Protestants. Among those practising their religion within their church 
regularly this proportion is more than twice that of those who practice their religion 
in their own way or in no way at all (Table 6). Practically the same conclusions can 
be drawn if denominational identity is examined by increasingly stricter criteria of 
religiousness (Table 7).
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Table 7 Denominational distribution of groups professed to have varying degree 
of religiosity (in %)
Crietrion of group’s religiously
Entire
society
Religious 
in one of 
many ways
Overtly
religious
Religious 
’according 
to the teachings 
of church’
N= 96,019 35,628 19,323 8100
Social weight 100.0 59.5 40.3 13.5
of group (%)
Denomination 71.3 75.1 77.0 78.6
Catholic
Calvinist 21.1 19.2 18.1 15.5
Lutheran 4.3 4.4 4.2 4.6
Jewish 0.4 0.3 0.1 0.2
Other 0.2 0.4 0.3 0.9
No denomination 2.2 0.5 0.1 0.2
Unknown 0.5 0.1 0.2 0.1
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Catholics as % of 280.7 318.2 345.3 391.0
Protestants
The starting point can be the entire population with the question of religiousness or 
irreligiosity being left open, as earlier experience has shown that denominational 
identity may exist independently of religiosity. A group smaller than the entire 
population - 59.5 % of it in the 80s and 72-73 % in the 90s - is constituted by those 
who claim to be religious in some way, aware of the fact that there are innumerable 
forms of religiosity. (The social-cultural characteristics of this group are most 
diverse. As for research technique, this group can be formed by adding up those 
grouping themselves with any point of a multiple-choice religious typology survey.) 
The members of the third group claim to be religious without reservation, 
limitation or explanation. Their rate in the 80s was 40.3 %, and 45-50 % in the 
90s. (Methodologically, this group results from the dichotomous yes-no-type 
answers.) Finally, a small group - 13.5 % of the society in the 80s and 15-17 % in 
the 90s - say they are religious 'according to the teaching of the church'. The groups 
listed are not the outcome of preliminary theoretical considerations. The logic of 
their formation is not perfectly consistent. In spite of that, they help differentiate 
various segments of society in a way that is relevant for the denominational 
structure. The comparison of groups thus compiled reveals that the more rigorous 
the criterion of religiosity, or the narrower the group 'religiousness' is applied to, 
the higher the rate of the Catholics in comparison to Protestants (see Table 7).
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Interpretation
Researches into denominational structure reveal two tendencies which mutually 
weaken each other. On the one hand, the share of Catholics is increasing within 
Christianity all over the world (Barrett 1982), and owing to numerical decrease, 
Protestantism is threatened with extinction in places (Bauberot 1988). On the other 
hand, the differentiating role of the denomination is weakening. Various major 
international comparative researches, including the European Value Study (Barker- 
Halman-Vloet 1992; Ester-Halman-Moor 1994) and the International Social Survey 
Project (Greeley 1992) bear out that religiosity-non-religiosity (especially church 
membership) is a significant determining factor of society and behaviour, while the 
determining power of denominational identity has been decreasing almost to the 
verge of disappearance. (There is unfortunately no space here to discuss the 
theoretical contradiction in the phenomenon.) Modern industrial society seems to 
dissolve the traditional denominational subcultures (but not the large regions 
designated by the major world religions). It is not impossible that modernisation 
will lead - inevitably - to a similar result everywhere. East Central Europe is still 
far from this outcome, but it cannot be proved that we are not progressing in the 
same direction. Quite the contrary. The transformation of the denominational 
structure can also be interpreted as the emergence of the religious market 
(Iannaccone 1992). This conclusion is especially feasible when not only the 
historical churches but the new religions and sects are also taken into account.
The post-war four decades, so specific in this region - transformed the 
denominational structure more substantially in Eastern Europe than elsewhere in 
Europe or the world. Loss of religion was far more extensive than anywhere else. It 
shrank the Protestant churches in the first place, decimating them far quicker here 
than elsewhere. The question is whether it is possible to formulate - no matter how 
hypothetically - at least a seemingly tenable explanation.
There is a traditional 'explanation' in Hungarian society, one also discussed by 
the literature in detail: notably, the lower birth rate among the Calvinists and 
Lutherans - perhaps connected to the Protestant ethic (Pezenhoffer 1922). That, 
however, is not a true explanation but the replacement of an unknown by another 
unknown. Yet nothing contradicts this extrapolation of historical experience. The 
problem is that a lower Protestant birth rate can hardly explain a denominational 
landslide of a magnitude and speed characterising the Czech Republic or Latvia. 
The fertility of a denomination can therefore only explain a part of the changes in 
proportions.
Another hypothesis also formulated in the Hungarian context is that the forceful 
modernising attempts of the one-party state had the most devastating effect on the 
social-cultural medium of the small and middle peasantry a significant part of 
whom were Calvinists. According to the hypothesis, this group was therefore most 
intensely motivated to move and secularise. This, however, needs to be verified in 
Hungary, too. It is strongly questionable if it can be applied to Czechoslovakia and 
Latvia.
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Even more limited research material is available to prove the assertion that the 
presumably greater affinity of Protestant culture and the Protestants as a social 
group to the socialist-communist movements is the real cause of the erosion of 
religiosity and the loss of denominational identity. There might be speculative 
grounds for pointing to the individualistic nature of Protestantism, to the allegedly 
more extensive uprooting of social and cultural traditions in this group and to the 
similarly alleged stronger 'Protestant social sensibility', yet all this, similarly to the 
supposed greater share in the leadership of the one-party state, remains 
hypothetical awaiting empirical verification or refutation.
At the 23 rd World Congress of the Sociology of Religion (Quebec City 1995) 
another possible approach to the question arose. In the world historical process of 
modernisation, Protestantism is way ahead of the Catholic culture and population. 
From this starting point, two diametrically opposed prognostications can be 
reached. It can be argued that the drop in the number of Protestants over the past 
few decades is simply the outcome of accelerating modernisation, and the same 
tendency will soon prevail among the Catholics as well. In this interpretation, the 
Catholic church is simply lagging behind.
The American statistical data cited in the introduction suggest an inference to 
the contrary. It might be the 'conservatism' of the Catholic church (tighter 
communal and organisational order, stronger social control, anti-individualism, 
more explicit dogmatic order, the emphasis on the primacy of the supernatural 
mission, etc.) that explains the tighter grip on its believers. Of course, that is also a 
mere research hypothesis. Checking this hypothesis, however, promises exciting 
research possibilities. The shift in the denominational structure to the benefit of 
Catholicism is a hard fact of social statistics, after all.
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Árpád Tyekvicska
LOCAL REVOLUTION
Self-organisation in the village of Nógrád in 19561
By 29 October 1956, revolutionary councils had emerged under different names in 
only six villages of the Rétság district of Nógrád county. All six villages are along 
the Vác-Balassagyarmat railway line which also touches on Nógrád. Owing to their 
geographical position, these villages had already opened out at the beginning of the 
century, sending dozens of commuters - rising to hundreds in the 50s - to the 
factories and plants of nearby towns (especially Vác and Budapest). Their society 
gradually changed, with local railwaymen's communities emerging and 
strengthening in each of the six villages.
In this paper, an attempt is made to define the main dynamic factors of the 
events, the major motives of the actors, the operative intentions and wills in the 
revolutionary events of a small village in Nógrád county.
The major conclusion of the research is that in the six villages concerned, the 
revolutionary self-governing bodies were set up exclusively from their own 
energies, determined by the personalities, goals and information networks of the 
actors. No order or directive from above or from outsiders was involved in these 
cases.2
One of these villages is called Nógrád.
Information network, locality, dynamics of action
Most fresh news from the outside arousing interest inside was mediated by the 
railwaymen and commuters working in the factories of Budapest, Vác and 
Dunakeszi.
They included Sándor Haász, 24, a track-repairer at Budapest West Station and 
János Srám, who worked at the MÁV (Hungarian State Railways) plant in Vác at 
the time of the revolution. János Hébel, a worker of the Dunakeszi plant, later 
became one of the prime movers and organisers of the local events. Apart from the 
events he witnessed and the information he heard, other main motives of his role­
taking must have been his past as a social democrat, the withdrawal of his working 
permit in 1950, his trial in 1954 ending with a sentence, and the public activity of 
his father-in-law, who was the president of the national committee of the village 
during the coalition period.3
The first segment of the information network thus comprises the centres of 
forces and models whose revolutionary events reached the village sphere via 
personal mediation. In the case of Nógrád, this role was played, besides Budapest, 
by the early and vigorous events of Vác where the villagers went to shop. (The 
district seat, Rétság was only a village of about 1000 inhabitants, where the slow 
power erosion of the local centres of force - the district council, the party
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committee, the police and the armoured batallion - only allowed for the formation 
of the Provisional District Revolutionary National Council in the early morning of 
29 October.)
Besides personal experience, the radio conveyed the most information to the 
village. Until 28 October, Kossuth Radio aired the news and commentaries of the 
government which was engaged in armed conflict with the insurgents and declared 
the majority of events to be counter-revolutionary. The polarising duality of the 
consequent 'legimation trap' can be shown for Nógrád as well: on the one hand, the 
slogan "Long live the students, the radio is lying" was already included in the 
demonstration of 26 October, and on the other, the participation and role of the 
president of the Popular Front in electing the revolutionary council proves the 
search for legitimation, as will be shown.
Radio Free Europe played an important dynamising role in the rural events but 
its extent has still not been determined. As the broadcast material is not available 
for this research, one can only register its large audience.
The spread of the news within the village also meant the evolution of the events, 
of the idea of demonstrating, the selection of the leaders and their propulsion to the 
centre of events. This process can be comprehended by a local overview (Figure 1).
Increased density in the Figure signifies the closer contact among those living 
next door or close to each other. As the map suggests, their exchanges of news and 
opinions must have contributed significantly to the subsequent events. Visits to 
neighbours and relatives - more frequently than usual - all gave impulses to take on 
certain roles.
Another venue of comparing wills and intentions further away from the intimacy 
of the family household was the wine-house or wine cellar which in October, after 
the vintage, was a forum of meetings by friends and relations. Our respondents also 
recalled these gatherings with much wine, heated debates, and the confrontations of 
sober opinions.
There are certain public buildings in the nodes of density.
The pub had been a traditional centre of public affairs, of the political self- 
expression of the village. This function came to an end in the fifties when it became 
almost exclusively a place of entertainment and drinking. This time-honoured 
institution was again made the centre of information and local exchange of news by 
the revolutionary upheaval of 1956. Numerous documents reveal the revolutionary 
atmosphere seething in debates and the narration of experiences in the pubs of the 
district. These gatherings often changed into spontaneous demonstrations, followed 
at times by iconoclastic events and book burnings. These actions are none other 
than the repetition on a smaller scale of events, behavioural forms and attitudes 
witnessed or experienced in the model centres, often rethought, severally narrated 
and embellished. This was prepared by the pub discussions among 'socialising' men 
which motivated them and politicised their environment.
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Figure 1. Residence of the active participants in the revolutionary events4
Legend:
Participant of Lutheran religion 
Participant of Catholic religion 
Church 
Pub
Council house 
Cultural centre
The railwaymen and factory commuters returning to Nógrád also shared their views 
and experiences in the pub. That was where railwayman János Burik distributed 
among his friends some copies he had brought with him of the Sixteen Points, 
laying the amorphous but existing ideological foundations of the local events. The 
organisers so far forming smaller groups also met here and designed the 
choreography of the demonstration of 26 October.
Another major centre of information exchange was the church. Villagers 
attending the evening litany exchanged their news, learned the opinion of the 
parish priest and their 'men-of-the-world' fellows. Relatives living far apart could 
also meet and compare their news and opinions in church. The parish 
representatives also discussed the events at the vicarage. Having considerable 
prestige, they had a significant role in shaping the local public opinion (and, as will 
be seen, the flow of events as well).
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The council house became a major venue of events on account of its location and 
function. Those living in its vicinity kept watch on the events, and before the 
demonstration some of the people gathered there and demanded the release of the 
documents concerning compulsory delivery of produce (in Nógrád these records 
escaped annihilation, owing to the good organisation of events).
The packed hall of the cultural centre was the venue for election of the 
revolutionary council members.
The organisers
It is not possible to identify exactly all the masterminds of the demonstration and 
the series of events, but some portraits of people who definitely played some leading 
role should be added to that of János Hébel.5
- Márton Molnár (aged 49 in 1956, a medium-scale farmer cultivating 17 
cadastral acres), a converted Catholic member of a large Lutheran family with 
extensive landed property, who became a member of the vestry, then from 1940 an 
elected representative. He headed the pasturage committee and the common land 
committee. Despite his past in the Small-holders' movement, in 1950 he became a 
member of the EC of the village council and the district council, holding these 
posts up to 1956. However, in 1956 he faced a series of conflicts. He was constantly 
in arrears in the compulsory delivery of produce, he stopped attending the council 
meetings, and finally, alone in the village, he refused to deliver produce, and in 
September he was summoned to give account. On 27 October he was elected to the 
national council.
- János Pásztor was a close kin to the last judge of the village, and the council 
president of the 50s was the brother-in-law of his wife. He first joined the National 
Peasant Party, then the Hungarian Democratic Party, holding various posts until 
1951. He was president of UFOSZ ((National Association of New Farmers and New 
Landowners), then DEFOSZ (National Association of Working Peasants and 
Cultivators), and member of the national committee and the council of 
representatives. Then, however, his career was broken: in 1951 he gave up his 
trade, in 1954 legal procedures were initiated against him for a plan violation, and 
his brother Vince was declared to be a kulak. Despite his initial participation, he 
was not elected into the revolutionary bodies, but he remained the president of the 
reorganised UFEK (Forest Community of New Farmers and New Landowners).
- Ferenc Bajnai, born in 1932, was working for MÁV. In 1952 he chose to 
withdraw from being nominated to party membership. His brother was a council 
member in the first council term, János Pásztor (above) was his uncle. In the early 
50s a sharp personal conflict evolved between him and the party secretary of the 
village, which strongly motivated his role-taking. He became a member of the 
national council and commander of the national guard.
- Ferenc Ádám, 24, a forester - his father was the forest warden of the forests of 
the diocese - became the village president of MÖHOSZ (Hungarian Voluntary 
Defence Association) in 1956. During the revolution, he was elected to the national 
council and the 16-strong national guard.
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- Sándor Pólyák was one of the oldest among the active participants. He 
cultivated 14 cadastral acres and became a member of the council of representatives 
already in 1941, becoming the treasurer of the local authority in 1944. He was 
taken to the Soviet Union as a POW. In 1951 he was elected to the peace 
committee, but later he did not hold any posts. In 1954, he was brought to court for 
economic matters. He was only called to a public office again in 1956, when he 
became a member of the committee of summary offences. On 27 October he became 
the president of the nominations committee and a member of the national council. 
(About the Piroska and Rottek families, see later.)
The events
On 26 October the organisers of the demonstration who had stayed at home waited 
out their comrades coming from work. The crowd gathering in front of the FMSZ 
pub only set out for the council house at 7 p.m. They called on the EC secretary to 
join them and then went on to call the council president, party secretary, director of 
the cultural centre, president of the agricultural cooperative and the accountant, two 
former MDP (Hungarian Workers' Party) secretaries and the official in charge of 
compulsory deliveries. (In the interviews it could not be made quite clear what the 
aim of this action was: some interpreted it as a gesture of forgiveness, the majority 
saw it as a punitive element.) The demonstrators also passed by the party office 
where they destroyed communist symbols and books. Back at the council house, a 
young worker István Piroska jr. read the Sixteen Points and called on everyone to 
refrain from revenge or extremist action. Finally, after singing the National 
Anthem, the crowd dispersed.
The demonstration involved several hundred people, about a quarter of the 
population, with the others watching the passing crowd outside their gates, as is 
customary in villages. The primary significance of the action was that it made 
everyone aware of the nature of the revolution, and showed up the participants, the 
organisers in the vanguard, the contents and main aims of the revolution. With this 
rite, the community itself became initiated into the revolution. The election was 
also preceded by a certain co-ordination of views.
The organisers going from house to house calling the people to a general 
assembly had the opportunity to influence the events by determining the direction 
of the conversations, mentioning certain persons, leaving out some families, 
households, relations. These invitations, however, also served to co-ordinate 
interests and opinions. These conversations helped to formulate and reveal 
numerous ideas, which were then manifested in the composition of the nominations 
committee in the first place.
The elections were determined primarily by the 'trap of legitimation' already 
mentioned. "On behalf of the Nógrád branch of the Patriotic People's Front, and at 
the appeal of the government, we have summoned the workers of Nógrád to elect a 
workers' council to join the village leadership until the legally announced new 
elections," said the president of the People's Front in his introduction.6
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His involvement itself implies continuity, a search for legitimation. Also, it was 
obvious that the government's appeal applied only to the industrial workers' 
councils while the so-far established organs of local self-rule were still illegal 
organisations in the eyes of the government. The peculiar turn in the cited text was 
meant to bridge the gap in legitimation.
The president of the People's Front had only a sort of advisory committee in 
mind, but those present already superseded the will 'to preserve and change': they 
decided to eject the representatives of the party and the EC from the nominations 
committee. The inner dynamism of the crowd, the escalating atmosphere, the 
powerful speeches of the spokesmen propelling the events and intentions 
transcended the question of legitimation, and the situation was solved by the 
volitions that had been maturing and were shaped on the spot according to a new, 
revolutionary principle. They persuaded the council leaders to resign and elected a 
new revolutionary council on the preliminary recommendations of the nominations 
committee.
The eight-member revolutionary council, however, was only a provisional, 
transitional body: at the first meeting after the elections, they coopted another 
thirteen members. The National Council of Nógrád implied a duality even in its 
name. It alluded to the national committees in the coalition period on the one hand, 
and to the changed conditions of the fifties, on the other.
The external news and local opinions motivated the participants within the 
internal spaces and institutionalised forms of communal existence (relations of 
kinship, friends, neighbours, job, and principally family-household). Obviously, the 
chances of getting information and taking part in the action were not equal. They 
encouraged some groups and individuals more powerfully than others to act, 
complementing their volitional-emotive motives rooted in their individual life- 
paths. The inclusion in an elected organ, however, did not merely depend on the 
will of the individual to play a role, but required acceptance by the community, 
competence for the task, the appropriate background of friends and relatives.
These were the main points of view in examining the motivational basis of the 
participants, trying to find the principles and factors that promoted an individual to 
a position of forming or representing the community.
The sample
Various types of documents enable the scholar to take a full sample and 
differentiate the various participants of the revolution in Nógrád. These participants 
include the organisers of the events, the members of the nominations committee, 
the revolutionary and national councils, the national guard, and all those who 
played a decisive role in any of the events related to the revolution.
The sample thus created comprised 78 persons. All the members could be 
identified, nearly all the personal particulars and major details of their life-paths 
are known.
This database is the foundation of the investigation.
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Age, occupation7
The distribution of the total male population and the sample by age and occupation 
is summarised in a table:
Table 1 Male population of Nógrád and the sample by occupation and age
Age F L R A О
group T P T P T P T P T P Та Pa
15-19 18 - 23 2 10 1 - - 21 1 72 4
20-24 5 - 52 7 12 2 2 - 19 2 90 11
25-29 7 1 47 8 18 1 2 - 29 1 103 11
30-34 17 3 33 5 21 6 3 1 12 1 86 16
35-39 8 5 5 - 19 3 6 1 13 - 51 9
40-44 21 4 9 - 13 2 2 - 7 1 52 7
45-49 39 8 9 1 19 3 3 1 6 - 76 13
50-54 35 2 10 - 6 - 6 - 3 1 60 3
55-59 31 2 10 - 4 - 1 - 10 - 56 2
60- 74 1 2 - - - 3 - 22 1 101 2
To 255 200 122 28 142 797
Po 26 23 18 3 8 78
F: fanner
L: industrial labourer 
R: employee of the railways 
A: artisans and their employees 
O: other occupations
T: total number of males by age and occupation
P: number of participants (sample) by age and occupation
Та: number of males by age group
Pa: number of participants (sample) by age group
To: number of males by occupation
Po: number of participants (sample) by occupation
As the table shows, the farmers - though the largest single group in the society of 
Nógrád - did not play an unambiguously dominant role. In 1950, a mere 200 
villagers of both genders worked with the Railways and in industry,8 while in 1956 
they made up nearly half the village population of 1900. The number of male 
labourers was close to that of the peasants. Apart from them, many found work in 
other places.
The age bracket of those below 30, born between 1927 and 1936 is numerous 
and compared to their advanced age, so are those born between 1907 and 1912. The 
smallest age group contained those born between 1912 and 1921, that is, in the 
period including the war years.
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Occupations are partly correlated with the age groups. This is most sharply 
shown by the groups of peasants and labourers. The age composition of the railway 
workers reveals that the first larger group to seek employment outside the village 
was hired by the Hungarian Railways.
All in all, a tenth of the male population of the village took an active share of the 
events of the local revolution (78 out of 797).
The activity of each age bracket is indicated by the ratio of the participants by 
age and the total of male villagers by age (Pa/Ta):
Table 2 Rate of participants by age group
A g e
g ro u p
(y e a r )
1 5 -1 9 2 0 -2 4 2 5 -2 9 3 0 -3 4 3 5 -3 9 4 0 -4 4 4 5 -4 9 5 0 -5 4 5 5 -5 9 6 0 -
P a /T a 0 0 .6 0 .1 2 0.11 0 .1 9 0 .1 8 0.13 0 .17 0 .0 5 0 .0 4 0 .0 2
Figure 2: Rate of participants by age group
Pa/Ta
Age group (year)
Compared to the population size of their own cohorts, the highest rate of 
participation in the revolutionary events was among the 30-39-year-olds, especially 
among those aged 30-34. Most of the latter were young married couples with two or 
three children and living with their parents. They adopted the family traditions, 
roles and motivations most closely, since after the departure of their siblings, they 
were left to help their ageing parents who were mostly farmers.
The cohort of the 45-49-year-olds provided an almost identical rate of 
participants. This cohort contained self-employed farmers, family heads who had 
filled some important public or political post in their lives. In 1956 nearly all lived
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together with some of their children, single or married, in the same household. 
(Among those already introduced, János Hébel, Márton Molnár and János Pásztor 
belong here. This group also included the president of the national council, István 
Piroska and two of its members, József Czerman and András Molnár, as well as the 
teacher Pál Németh, who was to have been elected notary on 27 October.)
The distribution of the sample by occupation is interesting. The degree of 
activity (Po/To) varies greatly by age group clusters.
Table 3 Rate of participants by occupation
Occupation Age group
15-60 years___________ 30-49 years___________ 15-29 years
To Po Po/To To Po Po/To To Po Po/To
F 255 26 0.10 85 20 0.24 30 1 0.03
L 200 23 0.12 56 6 0.11 122 17 0.14
R 122 18 0.15 72 14 0.19 40 4 0.10
A 28 3 0.11 14 3 0.21 4 0 0.00
О 142 8 0.06 38 2 0.05 69 4 0.06
Figure 3 Rate of participants by occupation
Po/To
0.26
0.24
0.22
0.20
0.18
0.16
0.14
0.12
0.10
0.08
0.06
0.04
0.02
0.00
О
Occupation
Legend:
E 2 Z 2  Participants aged 15-60
1 I Participants aged 30^19
И [ ИМ 11 fil Participants aged 15-29
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In the sample, the most active occupational group was the railway workers (0.15), 
followed with almost identical figures by the peasants (0.10), labourers (0.12) and 
artisans (0.11), while the high degree of passivity in the group of other occupations 
is conspicuous.
The РаЛГа quotients of the cohorts above fifty (0.05, 0.04, 0.02) show that in 
older age groups the public activity largely decreases in every occupational group. 
If they are disregarded, the rates of participation by occupation change greatly. 
Among those below fifty, the farmers come to first place (0.18), especially in the 
age groups of 30-49 (0.24). In this way, only in the youngest generation (aged 15- 
29) did the activity of the labourers top the list.
A more subtle picture of the sample is gained if the distribution by age and 
occupation is summarised on the basis of Table 1.
Figure 4 Number of participants by occupation and age
No.
17
F L R A О
Legend:
C: member of the national council 
N: member of the nominations committee 
G: member of the national guard
(Horizontal letter sequences refer to one and the same person.)
The columns of the figure contain the occupational distribution of an age group.
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The most characteristic group of participants comprised industrial labourers below 
35, most of whom had little political experience but the protagonists of the events 
came from their large subgroups. As for the railway workers, similarly to the 
peasants, the middle-aged between 30 and 39 were the most active. It can be seen as 
a tendency that the farmers aged 30-49 who traditionally played a decisive role in 
the public affairs of a rural community were also massively represented among the 
revolutionary actors.
Certain age groups are conspicuously largely represented, including the farmers 
aged 35-39 and 45-49, and the railwaymen aged 30-34 providing four members for 
the national council. The solidarity implied by friendship and peer pressure is the 
easiest to detect among them.
Size of land holding9
A traditionally central determinant of the value relations of a rural society has been 
the size of the land holding. A large land holding by local standards increased the 
prestige not only of the family head but also of the entire family and influenced 
their position in the village society. It also determined the family's way and form of 
life, and the potential individual life-courses. Land-owning families not only had a 
peculiar and strong sense of coherence and awareness of kinship relations, but 
usually also assumed communal roles often for generations.
For these reasons the size of the land holding per villager was examined. Two 
approaches were applied:
- first, in Figure 5, the land holding of each of the sample members is indicated,
- second, in Figure 6, the land holding of the father or father-in-law is indicated 
for those who had no land of their own (combined land holding).
Figure 5 Size of own land holding of participants by occupation and age
Age group
60- 0 F
55-59 OF
50-54 OF F
45-49 AF RRL RFF FFF OF
40^44 ORRFF FF
35-39 ARRRF FF F F
30-34 OARRRRRLLLLLFF RF
25-29 RLLLLLLLLF О
20-24 ORRLLLLLLL
15-19 ORLL
0 cad. acre 
Landless 1 cad. acre
Larger tharn
5 cad. acre 10 cad.acre 15 cad. acre
Legend:
F: fanner L: labourer R: railwayman A: artisan O: other
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Figure 6 Combined land holding of participants by occupation and age
Age group
60- 0 F
55-59 FF
50-54 О F F
45-49 RRL ARFF FFFF FF
40^t4 OF RR F F F
35-39 F ARRF RF F F
30-34 OLL ARRRRL RR LF LFF
25-29 OLLL RLF L LL L
20-24 ORRLL L LLL L
15-19 OL R L
0 cad. acre Larger than
Landless 1 cad. acre 5 cad. acre 10 cad. acre 15 cad. acre
As Figure 5 reveals, 61 of the 77 participants had land holdings of less than 5 
cadastral acres, and only 16 had larger holdings. The second approach shows a 
relatively even distribution of the two categories, with twice as many owners of 
more than 10 cad. acres.
The difference between the two approaches suggests that although half the 
participants originated from the formerly poorer groups of villagers, the other part 
lived in (or derived from) families with locally substantial land holdings in 1956 
(in 1956, 290 persons had land holdings of less than 5 cad. acres and 131 had 
larger holdings). Their weight is enhanced by the fact that several land-owning 
families were represented by more than one, at times by 4 or 5 members, in the 
sample (e.g. the Rotters, Klucsiks or Molnárs). This fact necessarily modifies the 
emerging image of the ideal type of the revolutionary as a young labourer or 
railwayman working in town and stresses the motivational potential of the family 
background and origin.
The elected persons
The nominations committee was based on two age groups: labourers below 35 and 
peasants above 40. The latter is the largest single group of oldest age and largest 
land holding. Seven had holdings above 5 cad. acres individually and 14 of the 17 
had this size of combined land.
Their recommendations, the village assembly and the ensuing cooption partly 
lowered the average age of the national council and partly made its combination 
more mixed. Three generations are markedly present: the decisive weight was 
represented by the 30-35-year-olds, especially the middle-aged railwaymen, then 
there were the representatives of the generations in their early twenties (the juvenile 
character of the events is due mainly to their presence), and the third group 
included those above 45 who had a considerable political past, not infrequently in 
the coalition or pre-war periods (nearly all also being members of the nominations
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committee). As for occupation, the national council included a forester, a teacher 
and an army officer, six railwaymen, three artisans, seven peasants and two 
labourers. Only six of this group had land holdings larger than 5 cad. acres, and 
even when the combined land holding was taken into account, only an artisan and a 
labourer, as well as the 7 farmers exceeded this land size.
The data also reveal that inclusion in the national council depended on other 
factors (activity of participation, background of kinship-age-occupation, solidarity, 
the representational nature of the body) rather than on land size.
The youngest age composition was in the national guard, half of them being 
young labourers. None had any fortune of their own, and the father or father-in-law 
of only 5 belonged to the category of land holders above 5 cad. acres.
Family status, size of household
It is not by chance that there are hardly any unmarried men in the sample (Table 
4). This possibly follows from the principle of social organisation which takes 
marriage as a main criterion of adulthood and an indicator of a person's capability 
of performing some function.
Tabic 4 Distribution of participants by family status
Family status
F
Occupation 
L R A О
Total
Single - 6 1 - 2 9
Married family member 5 8 3 2 2 20
Married fam. head* 21 11 12 1 4 49
*By differentiating 'married family member' and 'married family head', the clerk must have 
registered relatives living at a single street number in common or separate households.
Typically enough, no single men were among the farmers and only one in the 
nominations committee, and two in the national council.
The motivating force of the broader family is obvious from the fact that nearly 
all the participants lived in families of intricate pattern involving several 
generations. In the village at that time 4.6 persons lived on the average at each 
street number. The same figure for the sample is 5.7!
It is instructive to take a look at those who kept aloof of the events. They 
included, for example, the 30 peasants under 30. Only 5 of them were married. 
They also included the young men who had finished school but had not found 
employment yet and worked in the family business.
More surprising is the absence of labourers above 35 and those pursuing some 
other occupation. The latter included the officials of the party and state organs, 
employees in commerce, and the local intellectuals. The largest single group is that
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of the professional soldiers who mostly lived removed from the village in an 
isolated community and played little part in the local events.
Distribution by religion10
During the fifties, the emotional resistance of the community found its outlet in 
publicly avowed religiousness. Denunciations, repeated petitions by the party 
organisations reveal the cohering, opinion-forming role of the Catholic parish 
priest, or the reserved silent self-organisation of the economically powerful 
Lutheran community making up a quarter of the population: "The Lutherans 
continue to hold their religious evenings, which leads to the following: they do not 
take part in the news service, on party days they are like a swarm of bees - they 
stick together - not within the party or the Independent People's Front, but outside 
it. They refuse to take part in communal work, one can feel they withdraw from 
building socialism, they constitute, as it were, a state within the village state," the 
village clerk noted back in 1949."
Although the EC secretary's retrospective report overemphasises the role of the 
Catholic church leaders in organisation ("...prior to and during the revolution, dean 
Antal Bea moved about in the village more than usual, going from house to house, 
while dean József Csáki stood outside his gate accosting the passers-by and chatted 
with them"12), in actual fact they did not intervene in the events directly. Yet their 
opinions had a role, especially through the members of the representative bodies of 
the denominations. The Lutheran presbytery and the Catholic vestry often 
exchanged their views, so it was almost certainly not merely due to their authority 
that several members were included in the nominations committee and the national 
council alike: six of the presbyters are in the sample, three of them as members of 
the national council. The Catholic parish council also had three representatives in 
the body, so a sort of balance can be found in this regard.
Interestingly enough, Nógrád differs from the surrounding villages in that no 
religious symbols were put up in the school, and no grievances or slogans of a 
religious nature appeared in their documents.
The religion of 76 participants could be established. 64 were Roman Catholic 
and only 12 Lutherans, so they were underrepresented. In the nominations 
committee, however, the ratio was 12:4, in the national council 14:4. The role of 
the Lutherans was enhanced by their economic weight (the average combined land 
holding of the twelve participants was high, around 10 cad. acres each) and by the 
strong cohering force of their kinship relations.
Political attitude
The former non-communist political involvement or party membership was a 
frequent charge in the post-revolution reports of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' 
Party (MSZMP). The motivating role of this past was indeed demonstrable among 
the participants.
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Very few were former, or still active, members of the MKP (Hungarian 
Communist Party) and MDP, or the agricultural cooperative. None can be found in 
the nominations committee, the national council and the national guard.
There had always been families of a firm and distinct political attitude and 
willingness to take on public roles, who were often each other’s rivals joining 
different parties (the Klucsiks, Molnárs, Bangels, Dobos’s joined the Small-holders' 
Party, the Czermans and Buriks aligned themselves with the Peasant Party, some of 
the artisans were social democrats, others joined the MKP). The four coalition 
parties were represented by the same number in the national committee and the 
local government. This fact itself enlarged the circle of the actors as it reshuffled 
the local political life compared to the pre-war state.
For lack of reliable sources, the question of political continuity could only be 
examined for the national council. Two members belonged earlier to the National 
Peasant Party, four to the Independent Small-holders' Party, one to the SDP. This 
circle could have been considerably extended if the political affinities of their 
immediate relatives had also been taken into account (e.g. the father of the 
president of the national council, István Piroska, a judge, was also the president of 
the Independent Small-holders' Party).
However, neither the recollections nor the documents examined inform us of the 
revival of party life or the conscious assertion of party interests, so it remains an 
open question what role this important factor may have played in the local events of 
1956.
Public role - kinship motivation
The traditional rural community was organised along definite lines of cohesion. By 
the mid-fifties, these traditional factors had considerably slackened, yet they 
contributed to the shaping of the local events. This section analyses the role of 
kinship relations in forming the events.
Most of the sample belonged to some distinct but related groups of relatives, 
clustering around a few numerically large families playing important roles in the 
socio-economic life of the community (e.g. the Rotteks, Klucsiks or the Lutheran 
Molnárs). This important organising principle can be illustrated with some details 
of the Rottek family tree.
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Figure 7 The family tree of the 'farming' branch of the Rottek family 
(indicating only the marriages within Nógrád up to 1956)13
г------------
П. Ferenc:
Varga Erzsébet 
Table L
I. Ferenc
—Ц
I. János:
Zsemberi Magdolna 
Table II.
1. András: 
Kovács Verona 
Table III.
Table I.
1. II. F e re n c : V a rg a  E rzsébet
2. — III. F e re n c  1988: —
В 1930-1933
3.
4.
5.
6 .
7.
8 .
9.
10. 
11. 
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20 . 
21 . 
22. 
23.
— II. Ján o s  1890:'
- M á r i a  1893 : -  
-  M ih á ly  1896:
— V e ro n a  1898:
—  I. J ó z s e f  1903: -
—M árton 1908: -
«• II. A n d rá s  1906
-  Pál 1 9 1 0 :---------
R ezsn ák  J u lia n n a
---- István 1920: C h o v an y ecz  E rzséb e t
—  E rzsébet 1912: Piroska István 
-[ H u g y ecz  M ária
— M ária  1916: Mészáros Pál Péter
—  V ero n a  1922: Sztruhár István
CKlucslk JánosJán o s  1915 : M észáros  M ária  
— M o ln á r E rzséb e t 
— M ária  1933 : F ricz  István  
— E rzsé b e t 1925:
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1 S z láv ik  M ária  
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1—  E rzséb e t 1928: F ricz  M ih ály  
■—  K ata lin  1931 : E m m er J ó z s e f  
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-  M ária  1927: IJrPZPYlh JÓZSCf
j Z im a  M ária
'— F eren c  1930 : M acskás  E rzsébet
1. R ezsnák  J ó z s e f
2. Zima Ferenc
Table II.
1. I. Ján o s : Z se m b e ri M ag d o ln a
2. —R o z á lia  1873 : -  K lu csik  M ih ály
В 1930-1933 M ihály  1897 : G y e n es  E rzsébet
3. B1946-1950
- M á r i a  1881: P iro ska  Is tván
4. B1921-1923,1927-1929.1940-1943. 1944-1946
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Table Ш
1 . 1. A ndrás: K ovács  V e ro n a
2. L_ и. J ó z s e f  1874:
3.
4 .
B ab icska  E rzsé b e t
III. Jó z se f 1903 : M é sz á ro s  R ozá lia
E rzsébet 1909: C z e rm a n  F e ren c
Legend: member of the national council
twice underlined: member of the sample 
underlined: e.g. B1930-1933 former judge
Over the decades, a distinctive local authority cycle evolved with the Catholic 
Rottek and the Lutheran Molnár families as the protagonists. It was by communal 
consensus that for three judicial terms (nine years) the Catholics provided the 
judges, followed by one term with a Lutheran judge. The family tree also shows that 
back to 1921 it was always the Rotteks or a close relative who held the post of judge 
in the Catholic periods. (The family tree does not include József Hugyecz, the 
brother of Mária Hugyecz in Table I, line 5 of the figure, who held this post in 
1934-36.) István Piroska stands out with his four terms as judge.
Though this rhythm was interrupted in 1950, the above dynamism can be 
detected in the decisions taken in the fifties, too. Let us mention the most 
characteristic example with relevance to the present theme. Two sons of István 
Piroska, the judge, were included in the first council. Owing to his marriage, János 
came into conflict with his family, which loosened his family ties. He worked as a 
day-labourer for a long time, then entered the cooperative and the MDP. His 
younger brother, István remained a self-employed farmer, working on 10 cad. 
acres.
János became the president of the council and his brother was elected vice- 
president in 1952. In the former's absence, István headed the council for a short 
time in the following year. His humane measures at times violating the directives 
soon earned him popularity. His activity did not remain unpunished: the district 
leadership stripped him of his post for a statement of his that was declared anti­
cooperative ("... the comrade party secretary failed to mention... when the maize 
was cut, though this piece of land was the heart of the village, incorporated in the 
cooperative,... that the army troops worked here a lot, so it was easy to make a gain 
by the work of others"). He was not even nominated into the second village council.
The Rottek family was then represented by a young car driver, Mihály Rottek 
(son of József III, in line 3 of Table III), who soon came into conflict with the local 
leaders: first he declined to agitate for the subscription to Peace Loan bonds, then 
he was the only member of the council to vote against the recall of two EC 
members.
Apart from the humane conduct and political competence of István Piroska and 
Mihály Rottek, their family relations, the former political dominance of their 
families must also have played a great part in their election on 27 October as 
president of the national council and, at 22, its secretary, respectively.
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In addition to them, another three national council members were provided by 
the close kinship of the Rottek family, as the family tree shows, while another five 
members are included in the sample. The weight of the Rottek family is also 
demonstrated by half of the 8-member revolutionary council being provided by 
them.
The group of the participants belonging to this kinsfolk is spectacularly enlarged 
when the family tree is continued after the fourth generation as well and the 
degrees of relationship are extended. By way of an example, let some descendants 
of Mihály Klucsik (line 2, Table II) be detailed here.
R o t te k  M á ria  18 7 3 :K lu c s ik  M ih á ly
M ih á ly  1 8 9 7  G y e n e s  E r z s é b e t  P á s z to r  Jó z se f: G a jd o s  A n n a
B 1 9 4 6 - 1 9 5 0 - J á n o s  1 9 0 7 :  K a re c z k i  M á r ia
- F e r e n c  19 3 6 : ----------s p o u s e s - ---------- -  Má r i a
- I s tv á n  1 9 3 2 -  R o z á lia : B e r ty á k  Ján o s
- M i h á l y  1 9 2 3 - ( B a j n a i)  F e re n c
1 932
The intention to recreate a public function once held but often lost as a result of the 
political changes is a major drive of the individuals, too. A public post is itself an 
index of certain political affinities and aptitude. That is why the participants' past 
was examined from this angle.
Twenty-seven persons in the sample could be demonstrated to have had some 
public function up to 1956. (The circle could be considerably expanded here too if 
the immediate kin were also taken into account.) This is a high rate: one-third. The 
sample includes:
- three of the thirteen aldermen between 1940 and 1945 (juror János Klucsik, 
judge Márton Molnár and treasurer Sándor Pólyák), as well as a former clerk of the 
district notary's office who returned to his former post after his dismissal from the
council;
- another three local representatives elected in 1945 (thus altogether seven 
persons were involved directly in the work of the pre-war local authority);
- in another composition, a further four people from the local authority of the 
coalition times: two from the communist and two from the peasant party (a former 
Small-holders' Party member and a peasant party member in the national 
committee can be added to these);
- 10 out of the 42 ordinary and 20 substitute members of the first post-war 
council, and 7 (with some overlappings) of the 38 members of the second council 
(four of them were also elected to the national committee: István Piroska, József 
Czerman, Márton Molnár, Mihály Rottek);
- apart from the organs of the local authority, several of them were leaders or 
board members of various social or professional organisations and societies (e.g. 
Mihály Rottek was for a short time a board member of the district Federation of 
Working Youth, national guard József Szakállas was a leader of its local branch 
and of the sports club).
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Finally, this section can be concluded with an example that will illumine most 
sharply the motivating force of family tradition. In the two Lutheran office terms of 
three years each the judge was József Molnár (the uncle of Márton Molnár already 
mentioned), a farmer holding 40 cad. acres of land. The term ended in 1950 with a
Catholic judge.
On 26 October 1956, the eve of the demonstration, a nephew of József Molnár 
asked the village swineherd to declare him to be judge during the demonstration, in 
return for half a litre of wine paid. The herdsman complied, without success.14
Although it is impossible to reconstruct the event perfectly, the assumption may 
be permitted that it was an attempt to restore the interrupted historical continuity. 
The revolutionary situation encouraged the members of the once well-to-do and 
prestigious Molnár family to restore their former roles, a set of positions felt to be 
justly theirs, similarly to the Rotteks. It was possibly owing to the differences in the 
size and popularity of the two families, the divergences rooted in the past and in the 
personality of their outstanding scions that only a son-in-law of the Molnárs (and 
the Lutherans) - János Králik jr. - was elected a national council member, and it 
was only through subsequent coopting that others followed him.
Conflicts
Besides clashes caused by the disruption or distortion of the communally adopted 
structure of positions, a series of far more immediate grievances also burdened the 
society of the village in the fifties.
'Crimes' against the plan, economic offences of various type and motive, 
accidental or deliberate political confrontations entailed the growing awareness of 
opposing the situation or regime, while the antagonisms derived from personal 
grievances fed the emotive motivation.
The most serious grievances were undoubtedly suffered by the nine persons and 
families who were denounced as kulaks. Seven of them were not rehabilitated 
before September 1956. None took part personally in the revolutionary events, but 
the sample includes several representatives of various branches of the Lutheran 
Molnárs, the relatives of judge Mihály Klucsik, the younger brother of Vince 
Pásztor, János, and the son of József Dobos, János, who became a member of the 
nominations committee.
In Nógrád, the spectacular violation of the principles of traditional morals, 
property rights, and social organisation caused the strengthening of communal 
solidarity. Signs of this were the blocking of the organisation of the cooperative by 
the rigid resistance of the community of farmers and the complete withdrawal from 
public functions. "In the council election, the capable refuse to take on any 
function," the village party secretary complained in 1954. Only two of the second 
set of council representatives made it into the sample of the examination, which 
also indicates the narrowing of the recruitment base of the local authority and its 
'decline in quality'.
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Another three elements fed the sense of solidarity.
- The broad, numerous community of farmers with a strong adherence to 
property had a decisive influence on public opinion.
- There was an insignificant number of large peasant land holdings later 
declared to be kulak holdings. (The justification for entering those nine persons on 
the kulak list did not include the size of their land holdings but 'kulak sentiments 
and mentality'!) As a result, the tribulations that befell this group - shattering their 
families and crippling them emotionally - did not also mean the total annihilation 
of the former actors, spokesmen and organisers of local public life, thus the 
representatives of the prevailing power could choose a 'more peaceful' turnover 
showing some signs of continuity but painfully wary of the proportions. This, in 
turn, meant that the possibility of personally reviving these roles and of more 
openly shaping public opinion was preserved.
- The high birth rate allowed ample room for organising kinship relations. The 
farming families were thus not forced into exogamous marriage strategies but could 
rely on the solidarity of a downward broadening base of intricate relations.
Access to the documents of the district attorney's office in Rétság for the period 
between 1953 and 1956 was available for this study. During these four years, in a 
total of 84 cases legal procedures were inititated - mostly for criminal offences - 
against inhabitants of Nógrád. Fifteen of the accused are included in the sample, 
amounting to one-fifth of the participants.15
The venues of the clashes of a political character were various forums of public 
life. One of the most interesting instances - the observations of János Pásztor made 
at a council meeting in 1954 - can be cited: "Agriculture developed well parallel 
with industry in the years 1946-48. Now, however, it isn't industrial production that 
is tripled, but the prices are many times higher... compulsory delivery of produce 
was immense, those who could not deliver were interned, cows were imposed a 
quota of milk even if they gave none... Earlier, there were more pigs in a single 
street of Nógrád than in the whole village today. That's because all the fodder is 
taken away from the people. Those high up don't know what's going on down in the 
village... the people can't stand it much longer. I, too, have attended courses and I 
learnt that the peasants would be squeezed until they joined the cooperative... There 
is no relaxation whatsoever in the new delivery regulation, so tell us your opinion 
and don't hesitate to speak against the government, either."16 But conflicts arose in 
nearly all areas of life and were avenged in a variety of ways. For example, János 
Králik jr. was given a prison sentence of several months for a remark made in the 
field to another cooperative member but meant simply as a joke: "You won't pillage 
our lands much longer, the communists will be hanged in October.'"7
The above ideas and statements about the motivational net seem to point to two 
things. First, that the local protagonists and actors of October 1956 did not come 
from nowhere but the potentiality of participation was inherent in their fate, 
situation, past and personality.
The records of both council bodies prove that the 1953 change of direction and 
the ensuing political changes had repercussions locally. The participants in the 
debates used the changeable national declarations and currently valid directives as 
arguments and counterarguments. This came to a head in mid-1956, in the
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rekindled debate over the organisation of the cooperative. The vocabulary of the 
local leaders began to abound again in the rhetoric phrases used three or four years 
earlier ('The enemy must be exposed', 'Class struggle must be launched in the
village!', etc.).
The final break was marked by Rajk's funeral, which all of a sudden made 
everyone aware of the possibility and need of change: "We are not only burying our 
martyrs but also an age," Vince Klucsik, the president of the council, said in the 
last meeting of the body in mid-October.18
Secondly, the above cautions us that the essential motive forces of the events 
cannot be known unless certain collective dynamical factors are exposed. What has 
to be emphasised in the revolutionary events is not the eruption of emotions but 
first of all the problem-solving decisions determined by the elements of motivation.
The emotional identification of the community
The central feature of the local events is a majority (mental) consensus of local 
public opinion rather than a drive to form a coalition on the basis of property or 
political affiliation. This consensus, however, has its roots in the category of 
collective approval rather than injustice.
Individual social groups certainly saw different power organisations and 
distribution of authority as just. However, the differing opinions also had broad 
surfaces of overlapping, or became synthesised in a process of reconciliation 
(invitation from house to house, nominations committee, village assembly, election, 
coopting).
The elections on 27 October probably had losers apart from the representatives 
of the old regime, but the overwhelming majority of the population could identify 
with the social contract established.
From a distance of 35 years, it is most difficult of all to determine the mental, 
emotive affinities and commitments, as well as the degree of awareness of the 
participants. If an attempt is made nevertheless, it is no more than the drawing of 
the rough outlines.
The slogans of the demonstration on 26 October survive in testimonies and 
reports. They reached the people in the centres of the uprising and from broadcasts 
by Radio Free Europe. 'Russians go home', 'All Hungarians are with us', 'The 
Kossuth arms, the Hungarian nation, all Russians go home', 'Down with the old 
leaders' indicate that the villagers surprisingly quickly and precisely aligned 
themselves with the goals and emotions of the rebels in Budapest.
The slogans mentioned all centre around the freedom and independence of the 
nation and the replacement of the leaders. No claims for rehabilitation appeared; no 
intention to avenge old grievances can be detected. The events of the demonstration 
included aspects that can be subsumed rather into the emotive-political sphere 
(demolition of symbols, burning of party documents and books, forcing 
representatives of the old regime to join the march, etc.). In this phase of the events 
the emotional factors predominated, but, as has been seen, certain dynamic 
elements were already activated that came to a head in the election phase.
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The demonstration must be assigned a symbolic content: it was the symbolic act 
of terminating the old regime.
The first transport of aid from the village set off to the Károlyi Hospital in 
Budapest on 27 October, followed by other contingents until 12 November. The 
number of contributors and magnitude of donations are a moving indication of the 
solidarity shown by the population of Nógrád with the cause of the revolution.19
The legitimacy of the local leaders of the revolution is best exemplified by the 
fate of the national council after 4 November. The self-governing organ of the 
revolution sat until the end of December. "They were elected by the people, so they 
alone can be the leaders", the former council leaders reporting for work after 10 
November were turned down with these words.20 Adapting to the situation, during 
the dual reign István Piroska was elected EC chairman, and Mihály Rottek 
secretary, but the only role the members of the old executive committee were 
ascribed was to sign the notices of dismissal (mainly their own).
"We accept and approve of the proposition submitted by the provisional 
National Council elected by the workers of the village. Acknowledging that the 
officials of the council committed certain abuses of their authority, the population 
demanded that they be removed. Since the EC was elected by the villagers, the EC 
must represent the causes and will of the village, so at their demand, the officials of 
the former Council are recalled as of 27 October and we acknowledge the exclusive 
operation of the provisional National Council elected by the workers of the village," 
stated the valuable and informative justification summarising the direction, goal 
and nature of the events.21
The 'will of the people' is a phrase often cited by those explaining or evaluating 
their deeds:
"He resigned at the first assembly as he saw the people did not wish them to rule 
any longer, and he still sticks to this decision."
"The vice-chairman of the EC acknowledges the recall of the chairman and the 
secretary as it happened at the demand of the village, and he still acknowledges it," 
the former council president and his deputy declared to the district delegate as late 
as 28 December.22
The implementation of the people's will gave the revolutionary leaders of Nógrád 
self-assurance, while the supportive public climate provided the moral background. 
This duality enabled the president and the secretary of the National Council to 
remain in office - despite enormous pressure - until mid-January when both of them 
were interned.
Intentions and wills
An examination of the steps taken by the national council can only shed light on a 
fragment of the intentions and wills that are inherent in the decisions. Our sources 
are particularly defective in this regard, and surprisingly enough, the recollections 
also turned out to be unreliable.
One characteristic feature of the operative phase is that the circle of persons in 
the centre of events narrowed down; only the top leaders of the national council had
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information on most of the decisions and measures. Although the national council 
sat parallel with the restored executive committee until the latter half of December, 
only a few persons took part in all the meetings.
The series of food deliveries meant for Nógrád as well a continuous source of 
information in the capital, although there is no indication that they had direct 
contact with the ministerial organs.
By contrast, connections were rapidly established between the village council 
and the district centres of authority after 28 October. The need for information gave 
rise to peculiar solutions, which, however, indicate that the spontaneously emerged 
organs of the revolution immediately began to seek contact with each other. The 
different hierarchical levels and centres were organised into a system within days. 
In the district of Rétság very rapid consolidation took place, re-elections or minor 
atrocities taking place after 29 October in only a few villages after 29 October.
Some of the measures taken by the national council were aimed at 
implementing the directives of the district. They applied to law and order, and 
supplies. They included the establishment of the initially 16-strong national guard, 
reduced later, upon higher order, to four. Securing order and preventing atrocities 
were frequent topics discussed at council meetings, too. To this end, hunting 
weapons had to be handed in as well.
Another part of decisions tried to solve the conflicts accumulated locally. The 
distribution of collected maize followed the abolition of forced produce delivery, 
and the sharing of the brandy distilled on a half-and-half basis aimed at the 
restoration of a time-tested rule. (Earlier, the village distillery made brandy for a 
fixed - and importantly, low - price, raised to half of the distilled spirits in the 
fifties. The efforts to restore the custom are indicated by the old lists recovered, 
similarly to many other villages, showing the distribution of the brandy and the 
payment of the traditional fees.)
An answer to economic grievances was the restoration of the common land 
ownership of the old owners and the new land-holders. In the meetings organised 
by the national council the old leaders were re-elected and the restoration of the 
commonly owned forests was decided unanimously. This move was important as it 
went beyond the national and regional declarations and indicated the assertion of 
the village's own interests.
An attempt of similar importance was made in late November to restore the 
lands incorporated in the cooperative. However, with the changed situation it was 
not possible to realise this demand.
Few examples of measures implying political messages were found. One was the 
transfer of the party building - a farmer's property nationalised in the fifties - into 
public ownership and the dismissal of the entire council staff. (It is a peculiar and 
highly informative fact that these decisions were made in the second half of
November and early December.)
It is also to be noted that the extant documents of the revolution, the subsequent 
reports and recollections exclusively concern the remedying of grievances affecting 
almost the entire community.
The assertion of these traditional legal principles, the restoration of the accepted 
values and the will to finalise the power position can be seen as the most
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characteristic tendencies of the operative phase. Besides the ideological aspect of 
the restoration of the old position structure, this materiality is the other main local 
feature of the village's revolution. This, besides the idea of freedom that was 
embraced throughout the country, induced the citizens of Nógrád to answer the 
challenge of history in a rural space trying to find its equilibrium.
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continuously from 1955. (NML XXHI.783.d. 19).
8 NML V. 323.21. The budget of the village of Nógrád for 1950.
9 NML V.323.224. List of fanners 1949/1950; NML XXIH.783.d. 12. List of income taxes of 
the agrarian population 1957.
10 NML V. 323.255. Registration of public food supplies 1943 I-П. (data on religious 
affiliations).
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11 NML V.322.7.52-8-123/1949.
12 NML ХХШ.783.С.3.208/1957.
13 NML ХХХШ. 1. State registers. Registration district of Nógrád.
14 NML XXV.4 B.il/1958. Law-suit of Ferenc Bajnai and his collaborators charged them 
with conspiracy against the people's democratic political order.
15 NML XXV.24.Documents of the District Attorney's Office of Rétság. Registers 1953- 
1956.
16NML ХХШ.783.а.4. 9 January 1954.
17 NML XXV.4.B.4/1956. Trial of János Kárlik jr. for subversion against the people's 
democratic order.
18 NML ХХШ.783.а.7. 13 October 1956.
19 NML ХХШ.783.С.11. Confidential documents 1956, documents of the National Council of 
Nógrád 13. One of the shipments was also reported about by the press under the title 
"Nameless patriots of the village of Nógrád" (Egyetemi Ifjúság, 31 October 1956).
20 NML ХХШ.783.c.3.208/1956. On the activity of the national council, ibid.; NML 
ХХШ.783 . С . 1 1. Confidential documents 1956, documents of the National Council of Nógrád 
2-18; NML MSZMP NMB Archives fond 33, fond group 1, 1956. 9.".e. Nógrád; the trial of 
Ferenc Bajnai and his comrades mentioned in note 13.
21 NML ХХП.783.С. 11. Confidential documents 1956, documents of the National Council of 
Nógrád 10.
22 NML ХХШ.783.а.7. 28 December 1956.
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